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ELMORE COUNTY A POLmCAL 
SUBDMSION OF nm STATB OF 
mAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
Plaintiff's Reply Brief 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURESACf HAS NO APPUCATION TO 
THIS CASE 
Elmore County asserts the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act {APA) 
requirement of a 28-day notice of review ts mandated, citing I.C. 31-1506. That 
section addresses payment of claims presented to the county cc,mmisstouera u 
per a "list of all bills and accounts•; the county treasurer ts to only issue 
warrants for bills so listed. This bill-paying statute does not circumscribe the 
law of wrongful discharge. 
'Ihe Elmore County Board of Cf\mmisstoners is not an agency, which for all 
purposes, has its decisions controlled by Chapter 52, Title 67 of the Idaho 
Code. (APA). Jones v. Home Federal Bank, WL 996476 (Not reported in 
F'.su:pp.2d D.Idaho 2010.) See, Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 
Plaintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 1 
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938 P.2d 124 (1997); Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 993 P.2d 
617; 
"A count;y board of commissioners does not fall within the definition of an 
'agency' for purposes of applying the AP A in its totality." 
It gm act u an agency when rnandatm. to do so by a statutory scheme, such 
u Hospitals for Indigent Sick, Title 31,Chapter 35 Idaho Code. Intermmm.tain 
. . 
Health Can, Inc. V. Board of County O>mmi.ssio1Ul1" of Blaine County, 10'7 
Idaho 248, 688 P .2d 26o (1984). The Administrative Procedures Act (APA ) 
require.I rules by agencies such u the public utUStiea commission. The 
legislatlve reason for adopting the APA wu •to require administrative agencies 
to make available information coneeraiug their intm&al jimc:tfonin.g's. 
WUifam.s u. Stoa, 95 Idaho s. sos P.ad aoa (1912). There iii no reported case 
m Idaho holding that wrongful termination cases are subject to Idaho 
Adm1n1strative Procedures Act requirements in any manner regardless of dicta 
quoted by Elmore County. Even if APA affords an altemative remedy, the 
constltuttonal right to a jury trial cannot be impaired. .As stated In Jones, 
supra: 
• Defendant's contend, without supporting case Jaw or clear 
statutoty language, that a jmy trial is not available for claims 
under the Idaho Whistleblower Act. ... To the contrary, the 
Idaho Supreme Court as noted that issues of fad: in ac:tions 
under the Idaho Whistleblower Aet are to be reso~ by a 
jury. See Van, 147 Idaho 561 citing Sm:l.th.140 Idaho 900; See 
also Curlee v. Kootenai Count;y Pins and Rescue, 224 P .ad 
458, 2008 WL 459 5239 (Idaho October.16, 2008.)" 
Curlee is now reported at 148 Idaho 39lt 224 P-3d 458 • 
AS stated. in Lubdat v. Boise City /Ada County Housing .Authority, 124 Idaho 
450, 86o P .2d 653 (1993): · 
"In cases souruting in law, the parties have the right to have the facts 
determined by a jury. • 
Plaintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 2 
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Idabo Qmst. art. 1. § z; David St,e,l andAssocs. v. Young. us Id@hg 
M'L 2,.1,0, 166 P,2d 717, 22A l1088} .• 
Once the Court defines public policy, the question of whether it bu bun 
violated is one for a jw.y. Smith u. Mitton. L40 Idaho 893, 104 P .sd 367 
(2004). 
Wrongful termination is a violation of public policy protecting a valuable 
property right. Van v. Portneuf Medical Omtsr, 147 Idaho 552 , 212 P .sd 982 
(2009). 
l,C. 67::5277 states• Judicial review shall be conducted without a jury.• A 
statute cannot abollah a Constitutional right nor should the Court be asked to 
so Interpret the Administrative Procedures Act aa doing exactly that. 
Elmore County does n~ provide in its ordinances and rules including the 
Couni;y Personnel Policy that judicial review must be requested as per APA; in. 
the absence of such guidelines, even in administering statutory programs sach 
as the Medical Indigency Act there are no specl.flc deadlines for requesting a 
hearing. Uniuenity of Utah Hospital v. Minidoka County, 120 Idaho 91, 813 
P.2d902. 
'The cue is cxmtroiling for another obvious reason; Nb: states in her complaint 
( agreed upon by Elmore County) that she was denied any hearing; she was 
denied the ·Pre-Deprivation" hearing : 
.. The persoDDel policy of mmore County establishes the 
right for full-time regular and part-time employees to a 
hearing prior to any final declsion on discharge, 
demotion with attendant change in pay, or suspension 
without pay". 
Employee Manual, Page 20. 
The Board of Commissioners refused to grant her a hearing: 
Plaintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 3 
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• The Elmore County Board of Commissioners will not 
engage in an evidentiary hearing on June 12, 2012. • 
ProMtcuting Attorne, letter to attom,y Grant Burgoyn,2 lqbibit H to Nix 
Affidavit. 
• Ms. Nix shall not be entitled to a hearing to consider the mertta of 
her termination aa she was a probatiomuy employee and u 
such. she ts not entitled to a bearing upon termination". 
Elmor-1 County Commissioners D«:lslon Junt118, aou, Exhfbtt I to Nh 
Affidavit. 
Where there bu bee a denial of a request for a hearing by a eoumy, APA is 
not applieable; there waa no hearing and no •contested cue". 
" A careful reading of the provisions of LC, § 6'7::saL5 clearly leads to the 
conclusion that the statute co:;templates and requires a •fm.aJ. decision• in a 
•contested cae" prior to implementation of the thir~·day time requirement 
for seeldngjudfclal review. Further, the board of commissioners' Febrwoy 27, 
1989 order y,as .sim.Pla a denial qf the hogital'• rcmcet ,for a 
heari:n.g, Although an application for medical lndlgency aasiat.ance was filed 
putSUaDt to I.C, § 31-M04, there had never been a •contested case" or a "fiDal 
decision" as contempm:ted by I.C, § tz-5215. We are aware of the unusual and 
protracted pioceediDgs which followed the initial filing of an application by the 
hospital, however, a careful study of the records of all of the appeals and 
proceedmp iD these cases reveal that then ha.a never been a determination 
by the board of mrm.ty commissioners thm constitutu a "final diJJclsion" tn a 
•contested c?a.N• whsretn the merits of the appllcations .for payment of 
medical seruica have been directly addressed and resolved. Inasmuch as ~ 
§ 31-35.25 does not provide any time limitation or deadUne upon an applicant's 
request for a hearing after denial of its applir.ation, and considering that I&:..! 
A7:5115(bl exptealy provides that there be a "ftnal dedalon" in a •contested 
case• before the thirty-day time requirement within which to seek judicial 
review is imposed, we hold that the hospital is entitled to a bearing on its 
applications as teqUested on December 28, 1984. • (empbasfa added). 
Plaintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 4 
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Elmore County appended to ifs brief a decfsion of Hon. Patrick. H. Owen 
dated September 13, 2011. Judge Owen in citing Gibson v. Ada County. 142 
Idaho 746, 133 P -3d 1211 (2006) roled: 
• 11:ae Supreme Court in Gib.sonII stated that Idaho Code 
Sec.31-1506 did not apply because the statute expresaly 
applies to board •action• not inaction•. 
The rcasoDing fs not complicmed; refusing to bold a hearing produces nothing 
for the district court to review; there is no record on appeal : 
• In the absence of a hearing before the Board of County Commissioners, 
no record could be made, no findings of fact could be entered and no 
record could be made upon which a dlatrlc:t court could conduct ita review 
under the statute.• 
Univmit&t qFUtah Hqmttal v, Mfmdoka Counu,. 115 Idaho 409, 767 P.2d 249 
(1987). 
ASSERTIONS OF AT-WTLL STATIIS ARB JBRBI,EVANT. 
Elmore County repeatedly stresses that Nix as an at-'Will employee bad no right 
to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing. This assertion is contrary to the plain language 
of the Personnel Polley: 
• The personnel policy of Elmore County eatablishes the 
right for full-thne regular ,m.d part-time employees to a 
hu.ring prior to am flnaJ decfsfon on cllgbam, • 
In the same section, entitled • Appeal Hearing (Pre--Deprivationt at page 20 of 
the manual' are stated the "elements of procedure"' for the bearing, which 
includes a notice of charges, a record to be maintained and the right to legal 
counsel: 
• The purpose of the hearh:lg shall be to pl'OVide the employee 
an opportanity to present evidence and to rebut the 
information upon which the proposed personnel action is 
based.. 
Plaintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 5 
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Nowhere In the Policy does it state d.isclpli:naey probation e.mnguishes the 
"established right"' to a hearing : 
" When. public employees have a protected property 
interest in their employment, the due process clause 
requbea that, prior to termination, the employees be 
given: a) oral or written notice of the reason(,) for the 
termination, b) an explanation of the employer's evidence, 
and c) an opportunity to present their side of the story. • 
Lu.bckll v. Boise City /Ada County Housf.n.g Authority, 1234 Idaho 450. Citing 
ClevelandBoani qfEdut:ation v. Loudvaif/J. 470 U.S. 532. 
Elmore County argues that the dlsciplinarg probation nottc. established that 
Nix was at-will as au. employee : 
• ... Plaintiff's attempt at distinguishing these two types of probation is 
irrelevant because PlaintifTs notlc, of,lun: onH«ot disciJ,ltnan, probation 
clearly states that part of the conditions of her probation were that Plaintiff 
was, and would remain, an at-will employee and could be immediately 
terminated at any time during the one-year probationary period" (emphasis 
added). 
Dqendants Memorandum, page 20. 
Nope; cann.ot be done. Even where there is a2 written agreement a upifonn 
reasonable notice of @!Dffl In employment agreements must be given by the 
Employer: 
"In the absence of a written agreement. this Court has held that an employer 
may unilaterally change the employment agreement by uniformly providing 
reasonable notice of the change to its affected employees; the employees 
accept by continuing to work following receipt of such notice. Watson v, Idaho 
lalls ConsoHdated Homftqll, Inc,, 111 Wab2 44, 48. 720 P.2d 632, 636 
(108A); Parks,: v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit Umon. 129 Idaho 248. 254, 923 P.2d 
499, 490 Cet;Am,,19961. • 
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural E'b6ctric, Co-op., Inc. 152 Idaho 632, 272 P3d 
1263-
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It is axiomatic the notice authored by supervisor Vence Parsom cannot 
change the status of Nix to deprive her of an agreed-upon covenant, the right 
to a heariq; only tbe county commfssf'>Del'I have that authority; Elmore 
County ii the employ81'.11te ~otice of Last Chance• attempt to~ Nix of 
\ 
her bearing fa prohibited by the expreu 1,mguage of the Persomiel Policy: 
• OvlY the J1mort Cqpp\y Board of CoJnrn1"1orun bee authority to establish 
general policy for Elmore CouD.1Y Employ-.. 77u, tl1"ms and c:onditiom set 
farth tn th.16 polley, and tn the raolutfons and policy statBm87ltB which 
support it, cannot he ~d bu. o.nJI. otlur o/ftl:lal'a commitment, without 
ths e,q;,raa written Q(pW1Jl8nt of tlui Board of CommissioMr.t. T1Jat is 
parti-..,lar)y true for terma and conditlom that would establish a financial 
oblfgatlcm for Elmore County now or in the future. It ii important that all 
employees understand the relatiOJlSbip between policy adopted by the Board 
of Commission.era and department policy implemented by other elected 
offlctala.• (emphaaia added). 
Persomuu.Pollcy, Pager, exhibit A to Affidavit of Barbara Steele. 
Enough said. Ad:m.ittingly belaboring the point: a full-time employee on 
disciplinary probation is vested with the agreed-upcm rigla to a hearing prior 
to discharge. 
Aa stated in Wesco Auto Body Supply, Inc. v. Ernd, 149 Idaho 881, 243 Pad 
1069; 
·Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an 
implied covenant of good &.ith and fair dealing. Such a 
covenant is found in all employment agreements, btcluding 
employment at-will relationships.• Cantwell v. CitJJ Qf 
Bo.la, 146 Idaht) 121, 1.1-i;, 191 P.3d 205, 213 Caooa} (internal 
citation omitted). The determination of whether the covenant 
has been breached is an objective determination of whether 
the part:ie& have acted iD good faith in terms of enforcing the 
contractual provision& Jtmldns,-w Idaho at M-1, 108 P.sd at 
~·AD action by one party that violates, qualines or 
Plaintiff Nb Reply Brief Supporting Motion fot Partial Summary 7 
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significantly impairs an11 beneftt or rl,ght of the other po:rl:JI 
under an amployment contract whdutr exprea or implied, 
violates the COVffllJJ'lt. • **1.o8o *8911 Cantwell, u6 Idaho at 
is.i;-36, 191 P.3d at 213-14, However, the •covenant only 
arises ID con.nection with the terms agreed to by the parties, 
and does not create new duties that are not inherent ID the 
employment agreement.• Van v, Pcrrtneyf Med. Ctr •• 14% 
Idaho 5-,;a, 563, 111 P,sd 982. 991 (googl.'' 
Elmore County C01lfuw two judicial concepts; au agreement between the 
employee and flmployer that in law and fact over--rides at-will status of 
employment, and the due precess right to a pre-termination hearing not only 
afforded, but mandated by the County. The later ia not dependent upon 
employee status to be enforcecl: 
• Idaho law recognizes a cause of action for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. which is 
found in o« cmPloument gqrumenfL iu.clwfinrl At will 
,mJJloyment relq.tiomhi.p,. Jenkins v. Boi.se Ca.scads 
Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242-43, 108 P.3d 380, 389-90 
(2005). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing fs a 
ju.did.ally created exception to ths employment at-wiU· 
doctrine based on a contractual duty of good faith. • 
Crea v. FMC Com,, 1.1-,; Idaho 115, 179. 16 P.3d 212, 216 C2000). 
(emphashl added) 
Any action that violates, nullifies, or significantly impairs any benefit 
or right that either party has in the employment contract, whether 
express or implied, is a violation of the covenant. Mett;glf_ U, 
Int,nnountain Gas Co .. 116 Idabo 622, 627, :n8 P.ad 144, 749 '19891. 
However, • the covenant 'does not create a duty for the employer to 
terminate the at-will employee oJJ1:y for good cause.' The covenant 
simply requires that the parties permrm in good faith the obligations 
Plaintiff Ni.,: Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 8 
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imposed by their agreement. J,nkfnt,141 Idaho at 243. 108 P.,sd at 
392 (cltation omitted) (quotingMetcczlt 116 Idaho at 627, ml P.ad at 
7!l:!ll (citing Domam v, ctn, qf Idabo Fofk, ;ia6 Ideb2 587, 593, 887 
P.2d 1094, 1100 CCt-Am>-199&D- • (emphasis added,). 
Prado v. Potlatch Corp. ( Dldaho 2006) WL 2597870, 
The Personnel PoHcy fa unequivocal; full-tfma employees have the right to a 
Pre-Deprivation bearing • The written declslon of the commissioners denying 
Nix a hearing wu a violation of their own policy. 
Metca/fu, Intmnmmtmn; Ga.s Co., 116 Idaho 622. 627, 228 P,ad 744, 
749 Cl!ll9). Mitdulll, us Idaho at 712. 874 P .2d at 523; 
Maw v, Qm-ColaNorthwestBottllng Co,, 129 Idaho 708, 931 P.3d 
1227 (1997). 
Elmore's argument here ts identical to that made in Sommer v. Elmore County, 
F. Supp.2d-2012 WL 4523449. Hou. Ronald E. Bush United States Magfst:rate 
for the District of Idaho surgically d!ssected Elmore County's arguments, 
quoting statements made in their brief: 
• Defendants' counsel argued at the hearing that, regardless of 
wh.tltlun- Sommer is ctm6idsred a "regul.ar• full.-tinu, employee, 
as an at-will emplo,ee she has no property right in continued 
employ17Umt and, thus, no bau /or a due prceea challmge. 
Defendants' brlflmg. and tbs recont gfSommv's enmlOJlment, 
SJ.Cg,gssts othffl,IJise, Defendants repeatedly refer to the hearing 
provided to regular employees and even refer to it as a "rlahr 
O[ "guarantee" for thoa ~ (• Sommer WU a 
probationary at-will employee at the tbne of her termination, 
and the County's PersonnelPolky only atent1s thJl oppommity 
for a pre-dq,rlvation appeal to ftdl.-tlma and part-time ragu}a.r 
smployea . •) (internal citations omitted.; emphasis added); 
(8In the ... Polley, the only limitation on the at-will 
Plnintiff Nix Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 9 
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employment relationtihip is that full-t:imtl nrgular and part .. 
time regg1ar employees mag request a pre-deprivation appeal 
I 
hearing before temunatlon. Thfa hearing fa available to regular 
employees «prior to any final decision on discharge, demotion 
with attendant change in pay, or smpension without 
pay.• 1 ("Sommers termmatiou was proper because she was a 
probationary employee, and was not a Pull-Tim• Regular 
empl.oyM , othen.ui.N provided a pre-tmn:ination hearing.•) 
(emphasis added); Defs.' Reply, p. 2 ("In Elmore County, full-
time regg1ar employees through the Personnel Polley are 
aft'orded a pre-deprivation hearing upon notice of termination 
(if the employee requestl it). Sommer, while a full-time 
employee, wu a probationary, and not a 'regu]at employee and 
had DO such hearing right. 1 (internal citation.a omitted); Id., p. 
5 (the Policy •only guarantees hearing to fall time regular 
employees 1. Thus, Defendants' briefing indicates that there 
may be agm.c limnatio» on the a,t-wjll enmlo.maent relattonshlu, 
at 1m,t with res_pec;t to •regnlat" gplovw, who have right tq 
me:-tmmip,tiou 11,:peal hearing. See Reply, pp. 4-5 (Dkt. 21); 
Def&' Memo., p. 4 (Dkt. 19-1) ('1n the ... Policy, the only 
limitation on the at-wm empJgyment n;Iatioumm is that full-
time regular and paitMtime tegU]ar employees may request a 
pre-deprivation appeal hearing be!ore termination. This 
hearing is available to regular employees • 1, 
(some internal cites to Elmore's brief omitted for ease of 
reference.) 
Sommer v. Elmore County, supra. Attached to Plaintiffs first Brief 
herein. (emphasis added). 
Playfair v. South Lemhi. School District 292 Board of Trustees ( Not Reported 
in F.Supp.2d 2010 WL 1138958 ( D.Idaho) presented a similar situation; a 
schoolteacher wu denied a pre-termination hearing. Hon. B. Lynn Winmi1l. 
Chief Judge ruled that constitated a constitutional injury requiting a remedy: 
Plaintiff Nix Reply BrlefSupporting Motion for Partial Summary 10 
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• ... the Court faced the difficult decision of how to fashion an equitable remedy 
«to ensure Playfair is aBorded due process and the publtds interest ia not 
harmed.' The court conclucled that the most equitable remedy was : 
•Allow the Board to render a decision after providing Playfair a full and fatr 
~to be heard.· 
The parties then presumably settled the case reserving the right to petition the 
Court for attomey fees and com. The Court undertook an exhaustive analyail 
of case law and concluded that Playfair wu entitled to ·her attorneys fees in the 
sum .of $14, 676-45 since she prevailed. to the extent that the Board was 
required to hold : 
• ... ~ hearlng at which Playfalr would have the opport:unit;y to 
be hmu:d. ... Playfair was not required to achiew the exact relief 
she sought In order to be eligible for attorney fees under Sec. 
1988 .... Defendanta now argue that P1ayfair received the requisite 
pre-termination notice and hearing after remand by the Court.• 
The Court concluded that ; 
"Playfair obtained a judicial determination that Defendants 
likely violated her due process rights, and a judicial order 
requhing Defendants to hold a fair and unbiased hearing and 
P1ayfair would be given an· opportunity to be heard. Twenty-
two • later, Plaintiff received the fair hearing that she 
sought. Accordingly, Playfair's legal success was not merely 
'technical· •• 
( A copy of Play/air v. South Lemhi School Di.strict :292 Board 
o/Trusteu is appended to this brief. ) 
CONCLUSION 
Elmore County agrees that paragraph 13 of Plaintlfts Statement of Undisputed 
Facts is undisputed. '11:i.at paragraph states: 
Plaintiff Ni,: Reply Brief Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 11 
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•mmore County Commiaaicnera held a meeting OD June U, 2012 
and issued a written decision on June 18, 2012 ccrr.8rming 
P'Jatntlff'a termination. She wu Dtmn' given auy pre-deprivation 
pJ:OCedure. or a list of the cbargea. Plaintiff wu denied any hearing 
at to the reuona for her termination or au opportunity to respond 
to any charges agamst her: 
As a matter of law Plaintiff Cherri Ntz ta entitled to an Order of Partial 
Summary Judgment that her termination wu a wrongful discbuge. She bl 
entitled to recover her back salary aucl benefits without delay. Upon 
application with supporting affidavit the Court caD detarmiDe attorneys fees 
and coata to be awarded ; Idaho statutoiy law is not more restrictive than 
Sec.1983; 1988. The prevailing party in an act:lon brought for breach of an 
employment contract ta entitled to an award of fees m:uiar § 12-120(3), on the 
.basis that an employmeut contract constitlltes a contract for the purchase or 
sale of service. Clark u. State, Dqt. of Health and Weff'". 134 Id@b'l 527, 5 
P.ad osa {aooo}: Atwood v. wesmrn Const. Inc., m lda!l2 ™ aa1.e saa 
P.2d 479. 48a {Ct,App.10B} ; Jlllilcim v. Boiss Cascade Corp. 141 Idaho 23& 
108 P .3d 380 (2005). 
Lee Scblender,Att.omeyfor PlamtiifNix 
CERmICATB OF SER.VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon t11e/f_ day ottl~ . 2013, the 
undersigned attorney, sent/delivered a true and correct copy of the f'oregoing 
document, to wit PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMAR.Y JUDGMENT 
to the Attorneys for BJmore County: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor ct Hala, P.C. . °"\ 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 } 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
BY THB FOLLOWINO METHOD: ct~~~~---- ._ 
FAX: 383-9516 
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· vVestlaw. 
Not leponed in P.Supp.2d. 2010 WL 11389'8 (D.Idabo) 
(Cite u: 2010 WL 11389!8 (l).Jdaho)) 
H 
Only tbe Weatlaw citation is cun-eotly available. 
United States District Court, 
D. ldlbo, 
June L. PLA YPAJR. Plaintfff. 
v. 
SOUTH LEMHI SCHOOL DISTRJCT 292 BOARD 
OF TR.USTBBS; Von Bean. a board member; Jamct 
Whittaker, a board member: Carl Lufldn, a board 
member; .Roa Ciocldard, 1 board m•mbet; and Deb 
Fo.ter. a 'board member. Defendan11. 
No. CV09-37,-BLW. 
March 20. 2010. 
Bron M, Rammsl~ Dial May & Rammelt. Pocatello. 
m. tor PlalntJfr. 
8rian K, Julian. Anderson Julian & Hull, Boise, m. 
for Defbndants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
'8, LYNN WlNMJLL. Chief Judge. 
*1 Before the Court ii Plaintiff lune Ptayfalr's 
Petftfoa tor Award of Attorney's Pees Pursuant to il 
u.s.c. § t 911. F,R..C,P. '4{dl and Loeal Rule 54.2 
(Docket No. 22). For tho f'oUowmg reasons, the Co\lrt 
snaa the Petttfon. 
BACKGROVN.D 
Playfait commenced thft action, alleslnl vlola-
tlons of sme statutes and of her todcral and state pro-
cedural due process rlghll and seekin1 to enjoin a 
scheduled hearins repdinS the non-renewal of her 
contract wf1h South Lemhi School District No. 292, 
Yuifl1d Complaint for JnjuncdWI Rellef {Ooc:ket No. 
l-2). Specltlc:al.ly, Playfalr alleged that the defendant 
School Board members ("Defendan11") could nor 
fiurty preside over her non·renewal hearina, orl&fnal-
ly scbedulod for Ausust 4, 2009. becaue Defendants 
previously decided to terminate bet employment at a 
board meedna oa May 11. 2009. Id. Playtair sought 
relief' In tho form of "'a temporuy restnlnfn& order, 
as well as preHmfnuy and permanent Injunctive relief 
pnMllllin9 the School Board and its individual Board 
mcmbon mm sitting and partlc:fpatin1 u decision 
;2085870992 # 14/ 19 
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makers in the noruenewal proceedings noticed 
againR P1alntltf, Playfalr.,. Id. at p. 4. 
Playfait tiled this action tor injunctive relief in 
state coun. Id., and Defendacl removed die cue to 
federal court. Notto. of b1110WII (])oc:ket No. 1). 
Ptayfait thea a filed Motion rot Tem,oraty Kaatram-
lng Onlef and/or Preliminary Injunction. Plalntlfl', 
Motlonp TelllptJIWI Ru/raining Order and/or Pre-
llmiltt;try ln}tmadon (Docket No. 2). On Auaun 4. 
200,. the Court srantec1 Playf,I,', Motfon tor Tempo-
,_, R.Ollrafnfq Order. 0,.,. (Doctet No. 5), "nle 
Court heJd an evtdentiary hearing on PJayfaln Mo-
tion for Preliminary !Jtjuncdon on August 10, 2009. 
and panted that modon on Aupst 12, 2009. M1mo,,. 
l'flflfhtm 0/lfJ 01*r RI: Motion far he/1111/na,y ln-
j'llnCtlon ("hi/Im/nary lnj,lnctlon Ordtr") (Docket 
No. 16). 
In tho decision granting Playf"ait's Motion for 
Preliminary Iojum.don, tho Court found '"that the 
Board voted to totmnWo -· [Ptay&ir's] position on 
May 11, 2009, and [Playfalr] Is thus likely to succeed 
on bet duo ptOCGSS claimt." Id. at p. 11. Consequect-
ly, the Court ordeRd Defendants to sec aside the non-
renewal of Playfair's contract. Id. at p. 19. 
After rmdins that Playfidr sufrenid IL "constitu-
tional Injury,,. tho Courc faced tbe dltllcult decltlon 
ot how to fashion an equitable remedy "to en.ure 
[Playfalr] ls affbrdcd due process and tho public's 
fnterest ts not harmed." Id. at p. 13. Oetermlnin1 the 
appropriate remedy was especially cballenafna elven 
that Leadore. tho town fn ~fch Playfalr taupt, Is • 
small fanning communky with less than ISO citizens. 
Id. at 3, 16. Ultimately, tbe COUil decided tbat lbe 
most equitable remedy wu to "allow[ J the Boanl to 
render a decision aftor providing [Play&ir] a tun and 
fair opportunity to be heard ... Jd. at p. 15. The Coun 
cautioned Defendants that it would be "Incumbent oa 
each ot (them) to assea their own state of mfnd and 
~ tbemulvct that they can be open.minded and 
fair," and that '"[l]f any of them havo any doubt that . 
they can do that ... it would be their duty to nsc:use 
themseJva &om participation in the due process 
hearing. .. Jd. at p. 17. PurslJant to this reanecly. th• 
Coun ordered that Defendants be "enjoined fi'om 
enforcm1 the Superlntendem's recommendations of 
C 20 I 3 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to OS Gov. Works. 
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non-renewal of [Playflllr's] contra«- until Detendanu 
could hold a "t\lr hearln1 at whleh [P!aytafr would 
have) the opporturuty to be heard and the Board or 
Trustees [could] reach a fair and reasancd decision 
baaed OD aJJ of 1be evidence." Id. • p. 19. 
•2 On October 21, 2009, the pania filed a 
Stipulatlon for DlsmfasaJ, (J)ockec No. 19), and the 
Court enbnd III Otder to, Dfsndsaal that nm, day, 
(Docket No. 20). Becauso tho parties each contead 
that they n the prevaJ1ln1 party, Stlpulodon for 
Dllml.180/, p. 2 (Docbt No. 19). th41y teHrvtSd the 
rfsbi to pedtion Wt Court for attorney fees and COIII, 
Onil, fa, Dll•iJaol (Docket No. 20). 
ANIU.m8 
.Blob pany contadl that it ii tho "J)revailmg par-
V In thft aedon. Brief In Support of Plolntl/fl RI-
pa for AIIOl'lltl1'a F111111 .1'unuanl to 4J u.s.c J 
1988. f.& C,P, J.ltdJ and Loool Rule $,1.2 ("Ploln-
t/11 Pedtl01t" ). PP• 3-9 (Docket No. 22-1); ~ 
:rponn to Plalnt/18 Prtfllon for Altornq F,u Prr-
ruant to ,12 use I LS fRCP 54/dJ and lMal bl• 
34.l ( .. Dv,ndtmt6' Ruponn" ). p. 4 (Docket No. 
23). Playfalr contends that she la entitled attorney 
feet and COl1I totalln1 S14,676.45. Rlp/y Brlrf 111 
Support of Plalntt6'8 Raf{lldlt for Atl°"""Y':r F11u 
Puriua111 to 42 U.S,C. £ 1988. F.& C.P. SHdJ and 
local Ru/, S4.J ( .. Plolnl/Jfa RaJJI," ), p. 2 (Docket 
No. 24). Defendams contend that they are th• pnmll-
ina pan. but if the Court finds that Ptayfair ii the pre-
vail.ins party, har attorney fees are unreuonable and 
should bo niduced. D1/ffldanl3' Rapo,ud, pp. 8-13 
(Docket No. 23). 
A. Prevaillq Party 
Pursuant to 42 u,s,c. I t988<b>, a court may 
award reasonable attorney fees and costs to "the pre-
vailing P'IV" In a acdon to enfon:e a provision of 
43 u,s,c. , 1113,~ 42 u,s.c, , t ?SS<b). P1a)'f4in 
claim seeking to protect her federal due process 
riahts throu;b injunctive relief was appropriately 
raised under um. S•• Mmndq 11, City & County 
qf, !Jonqlu(u. 512 P.3d 1148._llSd (2,th Cit.2008) 
("'(TJbe Due .Process Clause may give rise to a claim 
under ll213.."). 
"The touchstone ot the pnvatJina P"IV· inquiry 
[is] the material alteration of the legal relationlbip of 
the parties In a manner which Consrea sought to 
promote in" I 1231,. ra. sw,, Tc«b«a 4M'n v. 
;2086870992 # 15/ 19 
Page2 
Qq,:lqntflndg Sch. Pfll., 489 u,s, 782, 222-23, IQ? 
S&J. 14&§. 103 LEd,2d 8§6 CJ989\. "Jtthe plaintiff 
ha succ:eedtd on •any significac is&l1e ia litigation 
which achfovo [d] some of the benefit the pard• 
soupt In brlnafn1 sufr,' the plalntltfhll croued the 
thrabold to I j\11 l1'll'd of lOme ldncL" Id. at 791::92 
(chadoa omktad) (altemadon In orlplll). A pat.)' Is 
not requlrecl to "suc:ceed 011 the 'central s.u.· in the 
litigldoa [110t) acbiffe .. 'primaly relief soupt to 
be eUphle for • award of momey'1 feel under I 
.12U." Id, pt 714; ,_ al• Id, at 720 ("[T]he 'central 
-~ ttlt ... is dittcdy CCDUm)' to the rhrust of O'UI' 
decision In H,.,,,_,. ); Id, pt 791 ("ln sum. the 
._,. t. tti.. 1centnl· m 'tlllgeatiar ialNI ia ti. 
lawsuit. or for tho "primary.' a opposed to the •sec-
ondary.' relief IJOUlht. rnuch Hice th search tar, tbe 
goldM f1eecct. dllfraCII the dlsuicc coun: ftom the 
prflllm, purposes behind f J 911 and ft OINlltwly 
unhelpfbl In dotlnfna the term 'pmailln1 part)'.' "). 
However, "[w)bete tilt pbuntifh legal S11CCGS1 OA a 
lepl ctalrn can bo o.hanoterlud u purolJ teehnlc:al 
or • mbt,,,. a c:Uatric:t eourt would be justified m 
concludlna that' the standard tor achltvin1 '"prevail-
ing party" status ha not been met, /d\ at ffla 
*3 Guided by thi9 ha.work., tM Court finds 
that Playf'air Is the prevallln1 pany In this action. 
Playfidr, throush her 1Jm acdon aaainst Deftlnd-
ams, matedalJy altered the lepl relatlonshlp between 
herself. and .Defendants. IUec:eeded on a sianificat 
issue in litiption. and achieved some of the benefl& 
she soupt when brmalnl suit. The legal relation.dlip 
betwtell Playfait and Dof'ocdats WU materially al,.-
tered when tho Court set aside Defendantl' non-
1'1newal of Playt\ifs contrMt and ordered Dcf'endlllCI 
to hold • "fair barlna • which (Playfm would 
have) the oppcirtumty to bo lleard." JWlbtlilltll'Y Jn-
j1ln«loll Ortllr. ~ 19 (Doctet No. 16). The Courts 
order c:auaed Defendants to alt.et their process for 
malchlg.1lOIM'elleWl1 decisions and. with regards to 
Ptayfa)r. to start the process anew withoui violatln1 
her ripe. to due procen. 
P!ayf.afr also succccdecl on a slpiflcanc flllle In 
lftlpdoo-whetber Defendants terminated her posi-
tion at 1be May 11. 2009 boant meeting. Pray,,ir al-
teaect that ~ accepted tM Superintendents 
recommendatiCla l'lOI to ntnOW her COAlnlCt • the May 
2009 board mccdna, Vll'fll,d Complolllt for lnftmc-
tlw b/J.f, 16 (Docket No. 1-2), whereas Defmdaml 
contended mac they only "'Voted to accept the Sup«-
C 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Wo."i'.s. 
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lntendents recommmdadon to hold a llarln& .. Af/1-
dav'- of Lil/km, 1Yhtnoar. Goddn • von Bllt111, , 
7 (Docbr Nol. 25-2. 25-4, 25-5. and 2'--6, respec-
tively) (emphasis added). AatNln1 with P1ayfalr, 1ho 
Court tbuncl ~ the Board votacl to blmlmate ... 
[Playfain] poisitlon on May l I, 2009.• J'Nlimlno,y 
h,J,mctlon Ordt,, p. l 1 (Docket No. 16). 
Pmtlly, Ptay1Wr aehhMNI some of 1he benolk 
she souaht when brfnams thit action. PJl)'talr aoupe 
'4an 1dmlnlltradw hlll'lna where the decision makets 
haw nat JW.iudsed or pmnmuroly declded any Issues 
that wlU be prlHDteCl ac the baring.,, Y,rVl,tl Com-
pla/Jlt P lnj1llltZIIN /Wfttt 1 l6 (.Docket No. 1-2). 
Duo to Playfifn perception that Def'eddantl bad al-
ready rnadt up thetr mfndl NfPll'Cllnl 1he non--renewal 
of her contract, she apeoUlcally requeat.ecl 16fnjuncdve 
relief' r,tevendq. I.J)ofend11111J. ftont sll'dna and par-
dclpmlna u deoistoa muon" It the hearing n,prd-
ins the non-rmewaJ of h• comraoc. The Courc grant-
ed Playtalr's request fbt a non-blued admfnlltradve 
heering by ordtrin1 Defendanll to hold .._ talr bear-
1na-and -reacb a 1Ml' and l'WMOMd decflion baaed on 
all the evidence." P,../lmlna,y lllftlnt:t/on Ol'du, p. 
19 (Docket No. 16). Defendants do not ttgue that 
they acted as bmsecl decflfon makers at 1he subse-
quent non-renewal bearlna. Dtfentlantr bqonn 
(DadcetNo. 23). In fict, 'Defendantl rely on tanauaae 
In the Cown preliminary injunction order finding 
that non, of thern "questioned (Playfair's} teach.Ina 
abilities, bad un&.vorablo impressions ofber. or har-
bored a personal bin apfnst her." Id. at 4 (quoting 
Pr,llminary Jnj1U11:tlan OrtJ:r, p. 16 (Docket No. 
16)). 
Thu,. 11 a result of her 1J.Ul action against 0.-
f'eadants. Playftdr was awarded a flair and unbiased 
admfnJstradve hearing.just u she requesttd. TIie fllet 
that Defendants sat u tbo decision makers at that 
bearm& con1rary, to PJayfaln requesc for relle( does 
not nepte the fact that Playfair achl.wed somo. if not 
most, of the benefiu she sought ita bringmg suit. 
Playfair wu not required to achieve the exact relief 
she souabt In order to be eligible tor attorney rea 
under § 1988fb). 
•4 Defendants' mpment that Pfayfidt Is not enti-
tled to attome, tees under § J 28800 because she 
suff'ored no constitutional violation and "only pre-
vaDed on a stale statutol'y basis" ii without merit. ,-
Dgf,""'1no' Ruponse, pp. ~ (Docket No. 23). be-
;2085870992 # 16/ 19 
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C1U11 the Court found that Playftdr suft"ered a "con-
stitutional mjury." Pr,/lmlttary lnj,mcllon Ordv, p. 
13 (DocketNo. 16).Dil Because Ptayfair pnwailod on 
her .Ll.213. claim, not on a state scatutory basis, ab• Is 
entitled to seek attorney fees plUIUlllt to f l 988M. 
nil,. Aldloup there wu never a f'lnaJ Judl-
ctal determination on 1ho merks that Do-
folldallts violabld Playfain due pn,cesa 
rlalUI because tbis action never proceeded 
put tho pnlimhmy tqjunctlon stap, tho 
Court's order WU blNd Oil the likelihood 
that PJ.,_ would succeed on her consdtu-
tioaal claim. l'r,//ml_,.,, Jnjllnotlon Ortlu, 
p. 11 (Docbt No. 16) ("[Phl>'falr] ls thus 
UkcJy to succeod on hot due proca1 
claims."). The Court did not base hi deci-
sion Oil staU; statutory ~ s.. Id. 
Moreover, the Court lmpUckly f'ound that 
Detendants violated Pfayf',fn rights to due 
procoss when it Kt aside Oefendan111 deci-
sion regarding the non-renewal of Playfah'1 
contract. Su id. at p. 19. · 
Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants are 
estopped &om arguing that P1ay&Jr "received 1111 the 
process she WU due" at the May 11, 2009, board 
meeting. S- Dtl,f,ndatta' Rupa111e, p. 6 (Docket No. 
23); •• al.to Hamilton y. Slqlf Form fir, 4 Cq.,. 
Co.. 270 F,3d 778. 782 '9th Clr,2001) (explainfns 
that Judicial estoppel '"precludes a party from gainin1 
8Jl advaJitago by asserting one position. and thea later 
seokfna an advantap by taklna a clearly fncoaslstenc 
pc,sidon"). In ~OUt afttdavits. Dtftmdantl stated 
thac at tbe May It. 2009, board meetlq. tbcy voced 
only to ac:cept the Superinteodeats recommendacfon 
to bold a hearing regarding the llOn-renewal of Ptay. 
fain contract. Aj/ldtt'llt4 of Ltqkln, Whlttoklr. God-
dard, 4' Yon &'111. 17 (Docket Nos. 2'-2. 2S-4, 2.S-
5, and 15-6, respootivoly); silll auo P,e/iminary In-
junction OrtJ.r, p. 11 n.1 (Docket No. 16) (""Because 
[D]eflndants contend thaC [Playta(rs] position wu 
not terminated at the May 11. 2009 beard meeting, 
they do not quo that tho brief May 1 l, 2009 execu-
tive session • which [Playftdr) wu given approxi• 
mar.ely five to teat minutet nodee that the could speak 
on her behalf served • a p,...termbaadoa hearl•I 
·-"). In contrast, In response to Playfain petition for 
attorney fees. Defendants now arpo tJm Playfalr 
rec:erved the requisite pn-termlnadoa notice and 
hearln1 at tht May l l, 2009, board meedna- De-
C 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to US Oov. Worb. 
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ftndrmu' Ruponn, p. 6 (Docket No. 23). These posi-
tions ue inconsistent and. thus, the Court wiU not 
entemln Def'ondan1I' arsuntent that Playfalr "re-
ceived all the process she wu duo" at the May 11, 
2009, board meedq. 
Defendana also argue that Playf'air's succea in 
obtafnlna a pnlfmlnary lnjunc:don wu a "technJc:al 
victcry" that "doe. not constitute prm1Hln1 part)' 
status" because P!ayf'alr'a aucceu "merely paatpOllfld 
the non-renewal hemin1 until 22 days after orfclnalJy 
scheduled." ~ au,,o,,,-, p. S (Ooeklt No. 
23). In suppott oftbls araumenr. Defenclama cite "2fl 
\I• lt),w. 55J U.S, 7:9, 12? S.ct. 2181. 167 bEd,2d 
1069 Q007l, D,t,ndantl' Rupons._ pp. 7-8 (Docka 
No. 23). Ia So/11, the plaintiff" pfned a preJfmfnary 
Injunction after ID abbreviated hearfnl, but WU de-
nied a ~ fnjunetlon aft9,, a dfss,ostdve adju-
dication on the merits. Sg/f. 551 U.S. II 77--80. 1bo 
Supteme Court held that "a final decision on the mer-
Its denylna permanent injuncdvo relief ordiftarily 
determines who pnrvalll In the ac:tfon for purposes of 
§ 198800," and .. II, at tho end of the litiptior,. (the 
plaintiff's] fnttlal suc:cea la undone and [the plaintiff] 
leaves the courthouse emptyhandecl," th.en the plafn-
tift canot l'8COWl' attomey tee. plll'SUIJlt to .iJ..211.. 
14 at 78. 
*5 Here, unUko tho plaintiff in Sol•. Playf'air wu 
never denied a permanent Jnjunc:tion after a dlsposJ-
tive adjudication 011 the merits. Moreover. Playfain 
succe• in obtaining the preliminary Injunction wu 
never "undone, .. and sbo did not ·~leaw the cowt-
houN emptyhanded." . Instead, Play&lr obtained a 
judicial determination that Defendants likely violated 
her due proceu ripes, and a judlclal order requlrfna 
D.tendants to holcf a &fr 111d unbfued bearla1 at 
which Playf'afr would be given aa opportudity to bo 
heard. 'J\vent)'-two days later, Plaintiff' received the 
fllir beat1n1 • she sought. Aec:ordfngJy. P)ayfafr's 
lepl success was not mc:rely "technical ... 
B. Amount of Award 
Playfair petitions the Caurt for an award of at-
tomcy fees and costs totaling $14,676.45.m Ploin-
ttfft Reply, p. 2 (Docket No. 24). .Defendtn1I arauc 
that the Memorandum Decision and Orde,-Pap 11 
amount awarded should be reduced because: (J) 
Playf'air prevailed onJy on state statutor,y claims. not 
on her .Ll.213, acdon, /)eflndanu' Raponi,, p. 10 
(Docket No. 23); (2) Playmir obtained only lfmm:d 
;2086870992 # 17/ 19 
suceeu, which did not confer any public benefit, Id. 
at p. l 1. 12; and (3) PJayfalr did not ob1Din acollent 
mu1t1. Id. at p, 12. Deftmdantl do not contend that 
the hourly fee rate ot Ptayfait'a attorney Is unreason-
able, or thac Playf'alr's anorney oxpendecl ID unrea-
sonable amount of time working oa tbll ~DI For 
the following reasons. lhe Coun awards Play&lr 
Sl4.'39.9$ In attorney fees and costs. purnant to 1 
1911(b). 
fH2,. Playfafr orlafnally requested ID award 
of SU,J44.4$. Aftdtnll of Bro,, Rtatntlll la 
Suppo,t of Plolntlf/1 P1tltlon for AWl'fl o/ 
Atton,q', F-. hnutznt to J2 U.£C, f 
JB.I, t& C,f, Udl """ L«:al Alli• J4.2 
("RalnnM-ll~"~1S(Dock•No.22-
2). After realizina tlW ah• lnadvcnently in. 
eluded $468 of non-compenable fM. Play-
flair rodllad hot request ro $14,676.M. 
Plaintiff, Rqly, p. 2 (Docket No, 24). 
Howeww. in makina the orismal calculadon, 
Playfalr miscalculated tbe attomey tee,. Sn 
Ram11111/I Aj/1davlt, 1 s (miscalcuwlaa Sits 
per hour multlplfed by 71.9 hours. naehlq 
a total of Sl~l.57.O0. Instead of 
$14,020.50), 
.Eli3... Defendants did point out that Playfalr's 
attomey ineluded $461 of costs and fees th.at 
should noi be compensable. D.jindontr R.., 
SJIOII#, pp. 9-10 (Docket No. 23), M tx• 
plained In the precedfn1 footnote. Playfair 
aclmowledsed th.la mistalc• and acoordlnaly 
reduced the amount for which she petfflons 
the Court. s.yond th.is mistake. Def'adants 
do not comoad thac the amount of houn 
Playtaln attomey spent on this cue i, un-
reasonable, S- Id. 
'"The most useftll startfns point tor det«mining 
tho amount of' a reasonable feo is tho number of hours 
reasonably expended on the Utlptlon multiplied by a 
reasonable hourly rate." H,mlq y. Ecgrhe,t, 461 
U.S. 424. 433. t 03 S.Ct. t 933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 {1983). 
Tho resulting number is ftequemly called the "'lode-
stai' amount. c1cv of Brnnfd« r, a,,,,,. 427 u.s, 
S6J. 568- 106 S.Ct. 2686, 21 L,Ed.2d 46§ 0916). In 
decermlnina a reasonable hourly rate, the Court con-
siders the "experience. skill and reputation of the 
attomey requesdna recs. .. 22.'afBA 1, Gara. 22 F,34 
911. 924 (9th Ctr,19%). as well as "tho pn:vaiJlna 
0 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Oria- US Gov. 
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Not Raported ira P.Supp.U. 2010 WL 1138958 (D.Idaho) 
(Cite u: 2010 WL UJS,51 (D,ldabo)) . 
market ~ ht tho relevant community," Blum J', 
$lewor,. 4§5 y,s. Bl§. &95. 104 S.ct. 1$41, 79 
L,Bd,2d 821 0284). 
One. the 1odeltar IIIIO\IDt Is determined. the 
Courc '"tben u....,. wbedw it la l18Cellll'Y to adJ111t 
the presumpdVlly reasonable lodestar figure oa the 
basis of the x.,.,. ftleton dud are noc ~ sub-
sumed In the lnltlll lodest8t calculation."• Monrlu 
v, Cf& 9/ San Ba& H f,3d 351, l§Hf C2da 
Qit,122§) (toouiot. omitted). "Tbn II a stn>n, pre-
sumption 1hac the lodatlr figurw ~ti awn-
abhJ toe. Ont, In nn lnlllllOtl should the 1adestar 
fl,IUre I» adjustecl oa the buia of other COdlicfn. 
tions." Id. at 363 n. a (Internal quoumon marks and 
cftadon omlued). 
W,. The X,rr ftleton are: 
(1) the time and labor required, (2) the 
novehy and difflcuJcy ot the quesdaatt h1-
volved. (3) the skill requisite to perform 
tho lepl servieo properly, (4) the pt1elu-
sion ot other employment by the auomey 
duo to acccprance of the case. ($) the CUl-
toinmy fee, (6) whodl• the fee Is fixed or 
condn;ent. (7) time lfmiradona imposod 
by the client or tho circumstances, (8) the 
amount Involved and the results obtahled. 
(!>) the ~ tep\ltatfon, and ability 
of the attorneys, (10) the "undasirabitity" 
ot the cue, (11) the nmure and lenpb of 
the profeubw relatiombip with tile clf-
ent. and (12) awards In similar cues. 
Mora/11, 9§ P,3d a1 363 n. I (~odna 
Kur y. Sc,.,,, Qrlld Esra,, /no,, 521 
F,24 62, 70 <9th Cit, 1975)). 
Here. Playf.dr's attomey submitted affidavits and 
supponf n1 evidence explaining that his hourly rate is 
$19S per hour; .,acb hourly na ls reasonable and 
consistent with similarly qualffled attorneys In the 
area; ho has been in pracdco t'or over fifteen yeri he 
expended 69..S hours working on this case; hie J*a-
lepl'I hourly rate Is 175 per hour; hit paralopl .., 
pended 0.2 hours worldn1 on this case; and the costs 
of the ~ tolllecJ Sffl.45. Rlllmnd .4/ftdtnlt, ff 2-
3, Ex.b. A (Docket 22-2); Suppl••trtol A/fldavll of 
Bron RantnNJII. 1 tS (Docket No. 24-1) (incorporatln1 
"'the filcaw swemafll in- P1aidtifh Rep~ Brief ...,. 
C 2013 Thomson Reuten. No 
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pnling iudwrttntJy mcludina attorney's r... which 
should noc be and were no1 Intended to be claimed In 
thil cue"). Makfna the appropriate caJculatlom, the 
Comt concludes that tht lodeltu' amount in thl1 cue 
Is su.539_g5. l1lo CGUtt ftu1her caaoludes that the 
present cuo II not a "raw' cue requJrlna the lodllllr 
amOUlll to be adjusted uaifta the /Corr ractan. 
•, Detendams' arpmem dlai the morney fee 
award should I» reduced becauM PJa,t'dr pn,yailecl 
only on srate stamtory claims, not on her l.l2J1 ao-
tlon, lacks merit. Sec ~,,._, bspo,,111. p. 10 
(Doc1cet No. 23). Al aplained abofl. PJaytair pre-
vailed Olr her um claim and, thu. Is entftted to 
seek aaorney '* punuam to§ l988(b). 
Defendard arpmont that the attome)' fee award 
should be reduced because Play&lr obtained only 
limited S\1CCell and the reault of thil cue did not con-
fer an.y public bonofit Is also without merit. SM a 11 
p. 11, 12. Id suppott ot this argument_ Defendants 
cite MoCown y, Cta 9/fotaa,. 5§5 P,3d 1027 (2th 
Cit.2009). which held that ~ feel awarded 
und• 42 u,s.e. § 1988 must be adjusted downward 
whete the plaintiff' baa obtained limited IUcceu on 
bis pleaded ofalms. and the result does not confer a 
meaninaftal publfc benefft." Id. at 1103, 
McCowr, ft tnapposite to the present ease. Here, 
Playt'lair obullner substanrJal success because she · 
succeeded on her .L!2Jl claim. 11 evidenced by the 
Courts order requiring Defendants to sor asido thoit 
decision reprdfna the non-reMWal of Playflaln con-
uacc and to hold a &it hetl'ml at which Playtait 
would have the opportunity to be beard. Tho faac that 
Playtiait did not receive the .act relief' she requ..-. 
does not neptt the fact tbac she prevailed overall oa 
her um claim. 
Additionally, tho resull .Playfalr received does 
confer meaninaf\11 pubJfc benefits. First, as a result of 
the Col.ltt'a otdar, Dflf'e1rtdants became awan, of' the 
proper process for deciding noc to renew an •ploy-
cc'1 contract. In order to avoid future lawsuiu, De-
Ctndalm will likely aute that they give other em-
plOJNI proper pn-tennfuden notieo and b•l'lq 
before makin& such declslons. Thia will, in tum. ben-
efft those employea beeau11 their due procea rlptl 
wiU not be vioJatect, and it will not be necessay for 
them to brin1 costlJ J.Jm claims apinst Defend-
lJdS. ill ordet to protllict their r1p-. Funhermore. 
to Ori~ US Gov. Worb. 
•. Q3-10-13;03:23PM; 
Not Reported in P.Supp.2d. 2010 WL l 1389'8 (DJdlho) 
(Cite tu1: 2010 WL U3U!I (D.Jdabo)) 
other school diJtricts in Idaho are llkel)' to learn 
about Playfah'1 case against Deftnduta and be de,, 
terred from termlnatm1 omploy1t1 whhou1 sivin& 
them proper pre-tennlnatlon notice and bearin1-
Thus. • a resull of this lllCtion. tho pollcf• of Idaho 
sdlool dlstric:11 will Hkely be aff'ocled. Md the due 
procou rlpfl of school dbtrict enaployea will Ilk• 
ly be protected. 
Finally. Defendants' arpment th8I the anorney 
fee award should be reduced because PJayftdr did not 
obtain excellent results also lacks merit. S.. Dtl/dnd-
antr Rapo,,:,,,, p, 12 (Oodcet No. 23), In support of 
their arpment, Defendams cJte HIM/q, In wbfcb the 
Supreme Coun stated: "wi.. a plamtlff' hu ob-
tained excellent results, his auomey should rocovtt a 
fuJly eotn\*ISll,01)' tee. ... [l]n some cua of excep-
tional IUCCIII 111 enbanc:ed award may be justified. ,,, 
I( on the other haad. a plafntlff' hu adlleved only 
partial or Um.hod succeu, tho [ladostlt amount] may 
be an ._..., amount." 4§1 U.S. at 43}-36. Thus, 
under Hfmhly, obratn.ma axcelleitt results can be 
used by the court as a jmdflcation for •nhandng an 
attorney fee award. However, H•rulq doa not stand 
for the proposition that it a plaindff' fail• to achieve 
.. excellent" results. but Instead only achieves average 
results. tbe at.tome)' tee award should be r,duc,d. 
"'7 A• discussed above, Playfair achieved more 
than .. pardal ot limited succeu.,. Thu-. the Court 
finds that, in this case, the lodestar amount represents 
a reasonable fee. · 
ORDER 
NOW TIIER.U'ORE IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED that Pllfofflf Playfafr'a Peddon for Award of 
Attorney's Fcos P1b'IUlllt to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
P.R.C.P, $4Cd) and Local Rule 54.2 (Docket No. 22) 
shall be, and the same iJ hereby. GRANTED. Play• 
fair Is awarded attomey fees in the amount of 
$14.53!1.95, 
DJdaho.201 O. 
Playfillr v. South Lemhi School Dist. 292 Bd. or 
Trustees 
Noc Repotted in F.Supp.2d. 2010 WL 1138958 
(DJdaho) 
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County of Elmore ) 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINA 
SCHINDELE IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S FACTUAL 
SUPPLEMENT IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, KRISTINA SCHINDELE, having been duly sworn do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am the elected Prosecuting Attorney for Elmore County, and I have personal 
knowledge as to the organization of the supervision of employees in Elmore County. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KRISTINA SCHINDELE - 1. 
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2. In the Elmore County Personnel Policy, in discussing the pre-deprivation 
appeal hearing, indicates that any such hearing is to be held before the Supervising Elected Official. 
(See Affidavit of Barbara Steele in Support of Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Ex. A, p. 33). 
3. At the time of her termination on April 30, 2012, Cherri Nix was a custodial 
and maintenance employee with Elmore County. 
4. Had Ms. Nix had a pre-deprivation appeal hearing prior to her termination, 
this hearing would have been heard by the entire Board of Elmore County Commissioners, as her 
supervising elected official. 
Dated this 19th day of March, 2013. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 19th day of March, 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at '2..\~t)fi (ol)~ 
Commission Expires: 1 · :J] · JO lS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERV1CE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of March, 2013, I caused to be served, by 
the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
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Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474) 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
• 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S FACTUAL 
SUPPLEMENT IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, 
P.C., hereby submit this factual supplement in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
In oral argument of March 18, 2013, before the Honorable Lynn G. Norton, the Court 
raised the question as to who would have been Plaintiff's Supervising Elected Official during her 
employment at Elmore County. In response to this question, the Elected Prosecuting Attorney for 




Elmore County, Kristina Schindele, has firsthand knowledge establishing that the entire Board of 
Elmore County Commissioners would have been the Plaintiffs Supervising Elected Official in the 
event of any pre-deprivation hearing. The affidavit of Ms. Schindele indicating said knowledge is 
filed concurrently. 
DA TED this 19th day of March, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of March, 2013, I caused to be serve~ by 
the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 




..JC. Email leeschlender@amail.com 
~; ~7l!::::==IIPlflflk'ie-~ 
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ELMORE COUNTY, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant. 
APPEARANCES: 
E. Lee Schlender for the Plainti1f 
Castleton for the Defendant 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING PlAlNTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on March 18, 2013, regarding 
----~- -------~--~-- -- ------- --~-- ·- ·-- --- ---- ----·- - --- - -----
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL fflSTORY 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix began employment with Defendant Elmore County on June 1, 2007.1 
On February l, 2012, Plaintiff's supervisor, Vence Parsons, gave Plaintiff a "Notice of 
Disciplinary Action - Notice of Last Chance. "2 The Notice of Disciplinary action was given 
1 Affidavit of Steele, Ex. B. p. 5. 
2 Id at p. 1. 
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because of numerous alleged instances poor performance.3 On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff was 
terminated from her employment with Defendant by her Supervisor Vence Parsons.4 
After the termination, Plaintiff and Defendant had numerous communications. Then, the 
Elmore County Board of Commissioners had a hearing where the board determined no hearing 
was required and issued a "Decision following Hearing June 11, 2012.'" Plaintiff then filed this 
action on December 11, 2012 requesting damages. The Complaint alleges wrongful discharge 
violating the Elmore County Personnel Policy and the Idaho Protection of Public Employees 
Act.6 The Plaintiff only moved for partial summary judgment on Count One alleging she was 
not afforded a pre-deprivation hearing required by the Elmore County Personnel Policy. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on January 23, 2013. Defendant 
filed an opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on March 4, 2013. 
Plaintiff replied on March 11, 2013. The Court has considered Ms. Nix' s supporting brief and 
affidavit, Defendant's memorandum, the affidavit of Barbara Steele, and the Plaintiff's reply 
memorandum. The affidavit of Kristina Schindele was not filed until after the hearing by the 
Defendant. I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that if the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits 
the party must do so at least fourteen days prior to the date of the hearing. Therefore, this 
affidavit was not considered by the court because it was untimely. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Summary judgment is an appropriate remedy if the nonmoving party's "pleadings, 
affidavits, and discovery documents ... , read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
·------- ---~ ~----
-~ matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P .3d 488, 491 (2002) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). The court must construe the evidence liberally and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84-85, 73 P.3d 94, 97-
98 (2003). If the facts, with inferences favorable to the nonmoving party, are such that 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary judgment is not available. 
Haywardv. Jack's Pharmacy Inc., 141 Idaho 622,625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005). 
3 Id. at pp. 2-S. 
4 Affidavit of Nix, Ex. D. 
s Id. at Ex. I. 
6 Id. at Ex. E-1; Complaint filed December 11, 2012. 
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The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. When the nonmoving party bears the 
burden of proving an element at trial, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of 
material fact by establishing the lack of evidence supporting the element. See Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (1994) (concluding moving party's 
burden "may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving 
party will be required to prove at trial"). "Such an absence of evidence may be established either 
by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the 
nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking." Id. at 
fu. 2. The nonmoving party "is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her 
case at that time, but rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element 
or elements challenged by the moving party's motion." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 
Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
"may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's 
response ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 
56( e ). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or depositions, but "the Court will consider only 
that material ... which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at 
trial." Harris v. State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156, 1158-
59 (1992). ~ the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law 
remains on which the court may then enter summary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. 
Farmers Ins. Co.pfldaho, 138 Idaho 443,A45,_ 65 P,3_d 184,_186 (2003)._ _________________ _ 
Regarding contract disputes at summary judgment, "[w]hen the existence of a contract is 
in issue, and the evidence is conflicting Oi admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to 
decide whether a contract in fact exists." Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 679 
P.2d 640, 645 (1984). "Interpretation of unambiguous language in a contract is a question of law. 
Interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact. Whether a contract is ambiguous is 
a question of law." Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 731, 170 P.3d 393,396 (2007). The Idaho 
Supreme Court has defined contractual ambiguity as "reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation." Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 
(2003). 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PIAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
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ANALYSIS 
"It is settled law in Idaho that, unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract which 
specifies the duration of the employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be 
discharged, the employment is at the will of either party." Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 
712,874 P.2d 520,523 (1994). An at-will employee can be terminated for any reason or no 
reason at all. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172,179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 
(2003), citing, Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 61 P.3d 557 (2002); 
Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330,563 P.2d 54 (1977). In fact, "[e]ither party 
may terminate the [employment] relationship at any time for any reason without incurring 
liability." Id. "This rule reflects the judiciary's reluctance to bind employers and employees to an 
unsatisfactory and potentially costly situation, although we recognize that either party is likely to 
be damaged by an unforewarned termination of the employment relationship." Id. 
Plaintiff states in her affidavit that she was an employee of Elmore County for 
approximately five years 7 and that she ''was not and is not, an at will employee" and that "she 
was a contract employee (full time) of Elmore County."8 
While "[i]t is well settled in Idaho law that terms of an employee handbook or personnel 
manual can constitute an element of the employment contract" and Idaho case law clearly 
implies that employee handbook provisions can create enforceable contract rights in Idaho, the 
Plaintiff has not presented any admissible evidence at summary judgment to show there was a 
contract. Ferguson v. City of Orofino, 131 Idaho 190,193,953 P.2d 630,633 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(citing Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 353,356, 715 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1986); Johnson v. 
" -- ------- -----~-- ---------~---------------------- - -----------------·------- -- - -- - - -- ---
Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,679 P.2d 640 (1984)). 
The assertions the Plaintiff has offered do not show she had a contract to be employed for 
a specified time or which limits the reason(s) she may be terminated. While the Plaintiff 
attached portions of the Elmore County Personnel Policy (ECPP) to her affidavit (with the full 
policy attached to Ms. Steele's affidavit), the manual states in all capital letters at the top: 
THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A CONTRACT. NO CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT WITH ELMORE COUNTY WILL BEV ALID UNLESS IT IS 
SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPER PROCEDURES BY A 
7 Affidavit of Nix, t 2. 
8 Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial, t 10. 
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SPECIFICALLY AUTIIORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF nm GOVERNING 
BOARD AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED BY AND CONTAINS THE NAME OF 
THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOUI.D BE BENEFll"l'EO BY THE CONTRACT.9 
At summary judgment, the burden is on the Plaintiff to show a material issue of fact 
exists of whether there was a contract. The Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the 
ECPP was signed by an authorized representative of the Elmore County Board of County 
Commissioners or signed by Ms. Nix. Elmore County argues that even by its own terms, the 
policy is not intended to be an enforceable contract, only guidelines and expectations. It is the 
court's obligation to discern the parties' intent by viewing the entire agreement as a whole. 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638,640,227 P.3d 568,570 (2010); 
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 309, 160 P.3d 743, 748 (2007). The 
Court has reviewed the ECCP, not just the disclaimer on the front, and finds the Agreement as a 
whole was not intended to create enforceable contract rights. 
Regarding contract disputes at summary judgment,, "[w]hen the existence of a contract is 
in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the jury to 
decide whether a contract in fact exists." Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363,679 
P.2d 640, 645 (1984). However, in this case, the Plaintiff has not presented conflicting evidence 
that the personnel policy was not a contract. There is no admissible evidence-only the 
Plaintiff's assertions--that a contract exists. Therefore, the evidence permits only one 
inference-there is no material issue of fact that the personnel policy constituted a contract 
between Elmore County and Ms. Nix. Absent a contract to the contrary, an employee is an at-
will employee. 
-··--··· 'I'he-existenaror-a grievance procedure in an employee policy manual rs·msiifffcieiifto·-······ .-. 
overcome the presumption of employment at-will and create an issue of fact for trial. Jenkins v. 
Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242, 108 P.3d 380, 389 (2005). The Plaintiff has not met 
her burden at summary judgment by evidence sufficient to show that she was a contract 
employee as she alleges. 
Since there was no contract, Plaintiff was an at-will employee and the Defendant had the 
ability to end the employment relationship at any time without incurring liability.10 
9 Affidavit of Nix, Ex. C, p. 2; Affidavit of Steele, Ex. A. p. 7. 
10 Id. 
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The implied-at-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment-at-will 
relationships covers "[a]ny action by either party which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs 
any benefit of the employment contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant." Metcalf v. 
/ntermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622,627, 778 P.2d 744, 749 (1989). The covenant applies to 
both employment contracts and employment agreements that are not contractual. Bollinger v. 
Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 640, 272 P.3d 1263, 1271 (2012). Even when 
there is no express employment contract and only an employment agreement, "the covenant is an 
objective determination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in terms of enforcing the 
contractual provisions." Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233,243, 108 P.3d 380,390 
(2005). So, although this court has found the personnel policy did not constitute an employment 
contract, the court must further consider whether Elmore County acted in good faith in following 
its employment policies as stated in the personnel policy. 
"The covenant only requires that both the employer and employee perform the 
obligations they agree to in good faith." Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 
266,288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991). "A violation occurs when either party violates, qualifies, or 
significantly impairs any benefit or right of the other party under the agreement." Bollinger, 152 
Idaho at 640, See also Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552, 562, 212 P.3d 982, 992 (2009). 
The covenant "does not create a duty for the employer to terminate the at-will employee only for 
good cause." Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587, 593, 887 P.2d 1094, 1100 (Ct. 
App. 1994), See also, Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 288, 869 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1994), 
Olson v. Idaho State University, 125 Idaho 177, 868 P .2d 505 (Ct. App. 1994). A breach of the 
_ C(tY«mantiS-llQtatort,_ butinstead a contractual breachwith-anypotential-recovery being£Ontraet-~ -
damages. Metcalf, 116 Idaho at 626. 
Plaintiff argues that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached because she 
was entitled to and denied due process when she was terminated from Elmore County .11 
Plaintiff's assertion that she was a contract employee is addressed above. Plaintiff also asserts 
that she was a "regular, full time permanent employee" at the time of termination and, therefore, 
entitled to the disciplinary procedures and pre-deprivation rights as a regular full-time 
employee. 12 The admissible evidence before this court for purposes of summary judgment is that 
11 Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial, 1 16. 
12 Affidavit of Nix, 1 4. 
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the Plaintiff was informed of her at-will status on February 1, 2012 in the document entitled 
"Notice of Disciplinary Action-Notice of Last Chance" when her supervisor, Vence Parsons, 
stated "You are, and remain, an at-will employee."13 If there was an issue of Ms. Nix's 
classification before this letter, this letter clarified she was an at-will employee with a 
probationary status beginning February 1, 2012.14 She was then terminated from her employment 
on April 30, 2012 while on probation.15 
"Full-time regular" and "part-time regular" are defined on page 14 of Exhibit A. Under 
"Significance of Employee Classification," the handbook states "The procedures for hiring, 
promotion, and transfer of full-time employees shall be subject to the provisions of this policy. 
Personnel actions concerning part-time or casual employees are not subject to guidelines set 
forth herein unless the handbook provisions expressly provide therefore." There is no employee 
classification for probationary employees. Probation is only mentioned under "Probationary 
period" as 
The probationary period shall be regarded as an integral part of the selection 
process and shall be utilized for closely observing the employee's work, for 
securing the most effective adjustment of a new employee to his or her position 
and for rejecting an introductory employee whose performance is not satisfactory. 
The probationary period will typically be a standard 90 to 180 days.16 
That last sentence was later amended to say, "The initial probationary period will be 1 year."17 
The term "regular" is never defined nor distinguished from "probationary" in the handbook. 
Also, the policy stated other changes in assignments and terms were not subject to appeal 
hearings and Elmore County retained "full authority, without prior notice, to modify the general 
terms and conditions of employment."18 
Section 3 on page 20 of the disciplinary policy stated a supervisor could take "probation" 
as a disciplinary step for policy violations and in this case. Idaho law allows an employer to 
"unilaterally change the employment agreement by uniformly providing reasonable notice of the 
change to its affected employees; the employees accept by continuing to work following receipt 
of such notice." Bollinger, 152 Idaho at 638, See Watson v. Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, 
13 Affidavit of Nix, Ex. C, p. 6. 
14 Id. at Ex. D, p. 1; See also Affidavit of Steele, Ex. B, p. 5, 6. 
IS Id. 
16 Affidavit of Steele, Ex. A. p. 14. 
17 Id. at Ex. A. p.22. 
18 Id. at Ex. A. p. 34. 
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Inc., 111 Idaho 44, 48, 720 P.2d 632,636 (1986); Parker v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit Union, 129 
Idaho 248,254,923 P.2d 493,499 (Ct. App. 1996). The Plaintiff was notified by Defendant on 
February 1, 2012 that her employment agreement was being changed. The letter stated, 
(Y]ou are hereby notified that. .. it is my intention to impose the following 
discipline: 
2. You are placed on Probationary Status for a period of one (1) year. Your 
probation will run until February 1, 2013. You are, and remain, an at-will 
employee. 
5. A failure to meet the goals set forth herein will subject you to termination at 
the conclusion of your year-long probationary period. A review of progress will 
be made with you throughout this year-long period. If progress is not evident, 
you may be subject to immediate termination at any time during the probationary 
period. 
Aff. of Steele, Ex. B, p. 6 (Emphasis in original). Therefore, even if probation or probationary 
status had not been previously defined in the employee policy, any previous ambiguity in the 
policy of the meaning of"regular'' was then overcome by this amendment to Ms. Nix where her 
status was defined unambiguously by her supervisor as on probationary status, as at-will 
employee, and subject to immediate termination at any time before February 1, 2013. In the 
court's review of the admissible evidence offered at this hearing, the supervisor, Vence Parsons, 
followed the policy requiring notice prior to discipline which could, and did, include placing her 
on probationary status as set out on page 33 of Exhibit A to the Steele Affidavit. 19 Therefore, 
Plaintiff was a probationary employee subject to immediate termination when she was 
terminated on April 30, 2012. At the time of her termination, the Plaintiff was not a "full-time 
regular" or "part-time employee" under the provisions of the employment policy so the Elmore 
County Board of County Commissioners was then not required to provide an appeal hearing 
prior to any final decision on discharge to comply with its policy on page 33 of Exhibit A to the 
Steele Affidavit. 
The Plaintiff has not shown a material issue of fact exists that the Defendant breached the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
19 Affidavit of Nix, Ex. C, p. 6. 
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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on Count One, 
Defendant's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, is DENIED. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~y of April, 2013. 
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E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar 11171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STA TE OF 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant 
Case No. _2012-1213 
MOTION FOR RULE 54 (b) 
CERTIFICATION 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix by and through her undersigned attorney hereby 
moves this honorable court for certification as final, the court's Order Denying Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 2013. 
This Motion is based upon the finality of the Order on the following issues 
and there is no just reason for delay in that this cause and case law is by the Order 
established with respect to controlling issues : 
1. That ambiguity if any of the employment status of Cherri Nix was 
cured and removed by a letter of her supervisor dated February 1, 2012. 
2. The probationary status of Cherri Nix established she was not a 
"regular" or "full-time" employee. 
3. Plaintiff was an employee-at-will not entitled to a pre-deprivation 
hearing. 
4. Plaintiff was subject to immediate tennination without a hearing . 
Nix Rule 54 Motion for Certification 
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5. Plaintiff was not a regular or full-time employee. 
PLAINTIFF CERTIFIES THAT THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF FACT TO BE 
RAISED OR BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO THESE 
ISSUE AND FINDINGS UPON FURTHER HEARING OR TRIAL. 
Oral argument is re uested upon this Motion. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon~ day ofJ-11~'°""'~--' 2013, the 
undersigned attorney, sent/delivered a true and corr the foregoing 
Document, to wit: 
Motion for rule 54 (b) Certification 
To the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor& Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
E ender 
i,omey for Plaintiff Nix 
Yes. --
Yes r:? . 383-9516 
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E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar #1171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant 
Case No. _2012-1213 
MOTION FOR RULE 12 (B) 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Plaintiff Cherri Nix by and through her undersigned attorney hereby 
moves this honorable court for permission to appeal the Order Denying Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 2013. 
This Motion is based upon criteria stated in I.A.R. 12 (a) in that; 
there is a substantial difference of opinion on a controlling question of law and an 
immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation. 
The Order of April 16, 2013 states therein on page eight (8) that the 
employment agreement of the plaintiff was changed by her supervisor's letter dated 
February 1,2012. The amendment is held by the court's Order to: (1) change her 
employment status; (2) remove any ambiguity as to the meaning of "regular" employee 
and (3) define or clarify the tenns "probation'' and "probationary status" as they are 
stated in the employee policy and their application to Nix. 
There exists a controversy as to the law with respect to the following: 
1.Can an employee of Elmore County, herein the supervisor, change the 
employment status of Cherri Nix by his letter and action? 
Rule 12 (b) Motion for Permission to Appeal 1 
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2. Is there as a matter of law an ambiguity in the personnel policy as to 
how disciplinary probationary status defines Cherri Nix as not being a "regular" or 
"full-time" employee and if so, was that cured by the supervisor's letter to plaintiff? 
3. Does the status of Cherri Nix as found by this court to be an 
employee-at-will control her right to a pre-deprivation hearing by reason of 
the court's finding her to be neither a full-time or regular employee as per the personnel 
manual? 
4. Was the plaintiff subject.to immediate termination without a hearing 
as a matter of law? 
5. As a matter of law, was the plaintiff not a regular or full-time 
employee by reason of her probationary status? 
Oral argument is requested upon this Motion. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon th~y of_.,.~~~,--_;, 2013, the 
undersigned attorney, sent/delivered a true and corr e foregoing 
document, to wit: 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales., P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
yes. __ 
yes ~ .383-9516 
( 




Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. {208) 383-9S 11 
Facsimile No. {208) 383-9516 
Email: kirt@naylorhales.com: bic@naylorhales.com: iak.e@na.vlorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTIONS FOR I.A.R. RULE 12 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL AND I.R.C.P. 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, 
P.C., hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12 and Motion for I.R.C.P. Rule S4{b) Certification. For the 
reasons set forth below these motions must be denied. 





On April 16, 2013, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment In this Decision the Court found that there was 
no contract of employment between Plaintiff Nix and Defendant Elmore County, and thus Nix was 
an at-will employee. The Court further found that because the Plaintiff was notified on February 1, 
2012, that her employment status was being changed to probationary, she was not entitled to an 
appeal hearing. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8. Thus, the Court denied the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which Nix had sought the Court's ruling that she was 
entitled to the appeal hearing. 
Plaintiff thereafter filed two motions with the Court. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 
l 2(b) Permission to Appeal, and Plaintiff also filed her Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification. In these 
motions Nix is asking this Court to allow an immediate appeal of the Court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order before any other issues in this case proceed. Nix has specified several questions related 
to the Memorandum Decision she seeks to appeal. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Rule 54(b) Certification is Improper 
In moving for a Rule 54(b) certificate, Nix must ordinarily demonstrate hardship, 
injustice, or some other compelling reason why the claims disposed of by the Court should now be 
allowed to be appealed short of the entire case being resolved at the district court level. Milbank 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carrier Corp., 112 Idaho 27, 29 (1986); Kolin v. Saint Luke's Regional Med Ctr., 
130 Idaho 323,328 (1997). The Idaho Supreme Court has directed that a Rule 54(b) certificate 
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be routinely, or as a matter of course; it should be reserved only for 'the 
infrequent harsh case."' Kolin, 130 Idaho at 328. When there is an absence of any evidence in the 
record indicating any hardship, injustice, or compelling reason why a partial summary judgment 
granted to one party should be final before other claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has found an 
abuse of discretion in granting the 54(b) certificate. Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505-506 
(2005); see also Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho at 29 ( 1986) (holding a grant of 54(b) certificate 
in absence of showing of hardship or injustice constitutes abuse of discretion). The delay of waiting 
for an appeal is not a hardship, where "the delay itself cannot constitute hardship for purposes of 
Rule 54(b ), since the rule contemplates such delay absent a showing of 'no just reason for delay' in 
order to fairly adjudicate liability and avoid piecemeal appeals." Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 
at 29; see also Kolin, 130 Idaho at 328. 
However, the analysis above is wholly premature in the present case, as there has been 
no grant of summary judgment as to any claim. Rather, the Court's Memorandum Decision was a 
denial of partial summary judgment as to Nix. The County has not yet filed any affirmative motion 
for summary judgment as to the issues ruled upon by the Court, and accordingly Nix's claims with 
respect to her employment appeal (First and Second Causes of Action) are still technically pending 
and thus ineligible for Rule 54(b) certification even if the Court were to find all other factors in Nix' s 
favor in the Rule 54(b) analysis. 
Having stated that, those other factors are not established in Nix's favor. In her 
Motion Nix makes no argument and cites to no evidence showing any hardship, injustice, or some 
other compelling reason to appeal these issues. Instead, Nix merely asserts that ''there is no just 
reason for delay .... " Motion, p. 1. The County denies this, and asserts that aside from the procedural 
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ineligibility above, is no reason why these claims should be appealed now as opposed to 
waiting until final resolution of the case as a whole for appeal. Nix has not cited any basis for doing 
so, and accordingly the Motion must be denied. 
B. I.A.R, Rule 12 Permissive Appeal ts Imprqper 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12 sets forth that permission may be granted by the district court 
and then by the Idaho Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal from an order of the district court 
"which is not otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate 
appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." The 
seminal Idaho case governing Rule 12 permissive appeals is Budde// v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2 (1983). 
Buddel/ sets forth several factors the Court should consider in determining whether to grant a 
permissive appeal here. These factors, when viewed in their totality against the backdrop of this 
case, fall squarely against Nix's motion for permissive appeal here. 
The Buddel/ case set forth that "[i]t was the intent of I.AR. Rule 12 to provide an 
immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal issues of great public interest or 
legal questions of first impression are involved." 105 Idaho at 4. Other factors for the Court to 
consider are: ( 1) the impact of an immediate appeal upon the parties; (2) the effect of delay of the 
proceedings in the district court pending the appeal; (3) the likelihood or possibility of a second 
appeal after judgment is finally entered by the district court; and (4) the case workload of the 
appellate courts. The Budde/I court then explained that "[n]o single factor is controlling in the 
Court's decision of acceptance or rejection of an appeal by certification, but the Court intends by 




Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule to broaden the 
appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under I.A.R. 11." Id 
With the present motion, Ms. Nix has not set forth in her Motion any basis upon 
which this Court could engage in an analysis under Budde/I. Rather, her sole supporting basis is her 
conclusory statement quoting the language of Rule 12 that "there is a substantial difference of 
opinion on a controlling question oflaw and an immediate appeal will materially advance the orderly 
resolution of this litigation." Motion, p. 1. But such is not the case here. To the contrary, the issues 
in the Court's decision sought to be appealed by Nix are based on a very straightforward and well-
established series ofldaho Supreme Court cases involving at-will employment. This is hardly a case 
where there is an absence of guidance on the legal matters involved. The rules and principles relied 
upon by the Court are found in uniform and consecutive cases that are in harmony with each other. 
Thus, it cannot be said that there is a substantial difference of opinion on the controlling question 
oflaw in this case. Plaintiffs disagreement with the Court's decision does not create a substantial 
difference of opinion. 
A permissive appeal now would not affect the orderly resolution of the remaining 
claims in this case. Because the claims raised in the Third Cause of Action are legally distinct from 
those raised in the First and Second, and where the Court's review of the claims in the Third Cause 
of Action is not contingent or dependent upon its ruling on the First and Second, a permissive appeal 
is not beneficial. 
More so, to address the Budde// factors, this case does not involve issues of great 
public interest nor, as just stated, do the questions of law addressed by the Court's Memorandum 
Decision constitute issues of first impression. More so, the impact of a permissive appeal on the 
MEMORANDUM - 5. 
?. 4 2 
•· 
parties and the effect of delay would be negative and detrimental, particularly where there is only one 
remaining claim where legal issues have not been resolved. The County would be forced to wait for 
18 months or more for the appeal to progress through the system and be decided. Additionally, it 
is likely the party losing on Plaintiff's third claim would seek appeal at the conclusion of the case, 
resulting in a second appeal given that the legal issues in that claim are significantly different that 
the issues addressed in the Court's decision. 
In sum, this is not an exceptional case meriting a permissive appeal as required by 
Budde/I. Plaintiff Nix has not set forth any reason in her Motion why the circumstances in this case 
are exceptional and require an appeal now. As such, the Motion should be denied. 
m. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification and 
Motion for I.A.R. Rule 12 Permissive Appeal must be denied. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2013. 
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ce J. Castleton, Of the Firm 
A omeys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of May, 2013, I caused to be served, 
by the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
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Plaintiff's Attorney 
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V- Email leeschlender@amail.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI~~~rtHli~) 
OEPUT ~ 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF E~MORE 
CHERRI LYNN NIX, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELMORE COUNTY, a Political Subdivision 
of the State, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
I. Motion for Rule S4(b) Certification 
The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of this Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 
2013. This Court denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count One, the 
Defendant's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Defendant filed 
hearing on May 20, 2013. 
A. Legal Standard 
In moving for a certificate of final judgment where only partial claims are resolved under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the moving party must demonstrate hardship, injustice, or 
some other compelling reason why the claims disposed ofby the Court should now be allowed to 
be appealed short of the entire case being resolved at the district court level. Milbank Mut. Ins. 
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v. Carrier Corp., 112 Idaho 27, 29 ( 1986); Kolin v. Luke's Reg. lvled 130 Idaho 323, 
3 28 ( 1997). A Rule 54(b) certificate "should not be granted routinely, or as a matter of course; it 
should be reserved only for 'the infrequent harsh case."' Kolin, 130 Idaho at 328. 
B. Analysis on Motion for Rule S4(b) Certification 
Since the court denied the Plaintiff's motion, this matter is set for trial. Therefore, this 
matter is not final. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b )( 1 ), the denial of a motion for 
partial summary judgment would only be final if this court directed the entry of a final judgment 
by reaching an express determination that there is no just reason for delay in entry of a final 
judgment. The Defendant is correct that the Plaintiff's request for certification as a final 
judgment is ''wholly premature" since there has been no grant of summary judgment as to any 
claim. Since the motion for partial summary judgment was denied, all claims remain for trial, 
and since there are other claims that continue to be litigated, entry of a final judgment on Count 
One is premature. The Plaintiff has not demonstrated hardship, injustice, or some other 
compelling reason to grant the motion. The Court DENIES the Motion for a Rule 54(b) 
certificate on this claim. 
II. Motion for Rule 12(B) Permission to Appeal 
A· Motio~ for- Rule- l 2(B) Permission-to Appeal was- filed by PlaintiffTcounset on-A:prit 
26, 2013 moving this court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule l 2(b) for an order approving an 
interlocutory appeal from this court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 2013. The Defendant filed an objection 
to the Plaintiff's motion on May 13, 2013. This matter came before the court for hearing on May 
20, 2013. 
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A. Legal Standard 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12(a) provides: 
Permission to appeal may be granted by the Supreme Court to appeal from an 
interlocutory order ... of a district court in a ••. civil action, ..• which is not 
otherwise appealable under these rules, but which involves a controlling question 
of law as to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in 
which an immediate appeal from the order or decree may materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation. 
The motion for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order is to be filed with the 
district court within fourteen days of the entry of the order, and noticed for hearing in the same 
manner as any other motion, although expedited. The court shall enter an order setting forth its 
reasoning for approving or disapproving the motion within fourteen days of the hearing. I.A.R. 
12(b). 
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 12, the court intended this rule to allow appeal in the 
exceptional case to resolve substantial legal issues of great public interest or legal questions of 
first impression with the court also considering the factors as the impact of an immediate appeal 
upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district court pending the 
appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after judgment is finally entered, and the 
case workload of the appellate courts. Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,665 P.2d 701 (1983); 
----------·--- -------------
Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785,215 P.3d 505 (2009). 
B. Analysis of Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
The Plaintiff moves for an interlocutory appeal of this Court's ruling denying a motion 
for partial summary judgment claiming there is a "controversy as to the law" with respect to 
issues addressed in the court's decision. The Plaintiff does not address what she contends is the 
controversy in the law. Additionally, the Plaintiff does not address how any of these issues are a 
controlling question of law. The Plaintiff cited a variety of decisions in her briefing on the 
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motion. Many are federal decisions or unpublished Idaho decisions which do not have 
precendential value controlling this court's decisions. The Court's decision cited well-settled 
and controlling Idaho Supreme Court opinions and there are not differences among these 
opinions on the law of at-will employment in Idaho. These are not issues that involve great 
public interest or issues of first impression. The Plaintiff has not established the denial of the 
motion for partial summary judgment involves a controlling question of law as to which there is 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion. Additionally, an interlocutory appeal would 
promote the orderly resolution of the claims with the motion for summary judgment or the 
remaining claims. Rather, an interlocutory appeal upon a denial of a motion for summary 
judgment where the court did not grant the summary judgment would substantially impede the 
orderly resolution of claims and interject the appellate courts unnecessarily into the trial process 
at this stage of litigation. This Court DENIES the Plaintiff's request for an order approving an 
interlocutory appeal from this court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 2013. 
III. Conclusion on All Motions 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby DENIES the Plaintiff's request certifications 
· as-final judgment an&also DENIES-th~ Plaintitr s. request-fot an order approving an.. -
interlocutory appeal from this court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 16, 2013. 
Dated this ~y of May, 2013. 
L~ 
District Judge 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL- 4 -
~48 
& 
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Dated this 21st day of May, 2013. 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submits its Memorandum in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 
Rule 56. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion must be granted and the Plaintiff's claims 
dismissed with prejudice. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1. 
, 
6/2 2:09 PM FROM: Fax TOI 5872134 PAGE: 007 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Court is already well versed in the factual background of this case, having already issued 
its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
April 16 of this year. Thus, the Defendant will forego another recitation of the facts of this case. 
Instead, Defendant Elmore County hereby refers to and incorporates herein the record on summary 
judgment already before the Court through Plaintiff's prior Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
However, it is important to note that following this Court's Memorandum. Decision the 
Plaintiff flied two motion.5-a Motion for I.A.R. Rule l2{b) Permissive Appeal and a Motion for 
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) Certification-asking this Court to allow an appeal of the Memorandum Decision. 
At oral argument on these motions counsel for the Plaintiff stated multiple times that the facts upon 
which this Court relied in its Memorandum Decision are the facts of this case, and that there are no 
more facts for this Court to consider in addressing the issues of this case. Thus, Ms. Nix is bound 
by the statements of counsel regarding the state of the facts of this case. See Vreeken v. Lockwood 
Engineering, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 109 (2009) (holding "it is generally accepted that the relationship 
between an attorney and client is one of agency in which the client is the principal and the attorney 
is the agent" and the client "is bound by counsel's actions"); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 73 I, 736-737 
(2010) (holding "(g]enerally, parties are bound by the actions (and failures to act) of their 
attomeysj. 
II. DEFENDANT ELMORE COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
As this Court held in its Memorandum Decisio~ Ms. Nix was an at-will employee ofElmore 
County subject to immediate termination and not entitled to a pre-termination hearing. This Court 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2. 
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expreuly found that the Plaintiff had failed to set forth any genuine issue of material fact as to the 
status of her employment and her claims of wrongful termination and breach of the cov~ of good 
faith and fair dealing. Thus, Elmore Colmty is entided to a grant of summary judgment as to these 
claims (First and Second Causes of Action in Plaintiff's Complaint). 
More so, Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action must likewise be dismissed on summary 
judgment This Cause of Action, which asserts a claim under the Idaho Protection of Public 
Employees Act ("Whistleblower Statute'j, must fail where Plaintiff failed to assert this claim within 
the express statute of limitations set forth in that Act. Idaho Code §6-2105(2) states that a civil cause 
of action under the Protection of Public Employees Act must be brought within one hundred eighty 
(180) days "after the occurrence of the alleged violation of this chapter." Plaintiff Nix was 
terminated on April 30, 2012. Affidavit of Cherri Nix Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Exh. D. Her deadline to file a whlstleblower action based on her termination was 
October 29, 2012. Nix did not file her Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial until December 11, 
2012, well past the 180-day time period for filing. Thus, herwhlstleblower claim must be dismissed 
for failure to timely file her complaint within the applicable statute of limitations. 
To the extent paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Complaint sets forth any other cause of action 
regarding the County's alleged failure to give Nix a pre-termination hearing, Defendant Owyhee 
County seeks summary judgment on that claim as well based on the Court's earlier Memorandum 
Decision finding Nix to be an at-will employee. Owyhee County likewise moves for summary 
judgment as to the Third Cause of Action where the Plaintiff has failed to establish any recognized 
public policy that was violated by Owyhee County so as to exempt Nix' s termination from the at-will 
laws of the State of Idaho. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .mDGMENT - 3. 
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m. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Owyhee County is entitled to summary judgment 
on the Plaintiffs claims and the Court must dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
DATED this 25th day of June, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of June, 2013, 1 caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
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K.irtlan 0. Naylor [ISB No. 3569) 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915) 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attomeys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise. m 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9S 11 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
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BARBARA STEELE 
CLERK OF TH~URT 
DEPUT :_J'-
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby files its Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to I.RC.P. Rule 56. For the reasom set 
forth in the accompanying Memorandum in Support, the motion must be granted and the Plaintiff's 
claims dismissed with prejudice. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1. 
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DA TED this 25th day of June, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C. 
CERTIFICATE Qli' SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 25th day of June, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
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E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 





CLERX OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY r 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
Defendant 
Case No. _2012-1213 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT RE: 
MOTION FOR STAY: 
RULE 56 F MOTION 
Cherri Nix, Plaintiff herein, being duly sworn on oath, does state: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and have personal knowledge of the 
facts set for herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are Plaintiffs First Interrogatories , Request for 
Production of Documents and First Request for Admissions. 
3. Exhibit A was served on the Attorneys for Elmore County on June 17, 2013. A true 
copy of the fax transmission confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. It is necessary for this case as per the rulings of this Honorable Court that I 
establish issues of fact to be determined by a jury. By my outstanding discovery 
requests and requests for admissions as well as perhaps depositions to be taken herein 
I can prove certain facts that will allow me to prevail in this litigation. These facts 
include the following: 
a. That Elmore County had in fact, a policy of not terminating or firing any 
employee for any reason, other than for cause. That the causes are set forth 
in the Personnel Manual of Elmore County. Further, that no employee had 
been terminated for any other reason than violation of the enumerated rules of 
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conduct therein, for a period of not less than ten years prior to date. 
b. That Elmore County as a matter of history and fact, hired, retained and 
provided retirement benefits for specific time periods for more than ten years 
prior to date; that unless an employee for terminated for cause, no employee 
was terminated nor released until their retirement and /or they left the 
employee of Elmore County voluntarily. 
c. That no reasons nor grounds for termination of Elmore County employees 
exists ; no policies for termination have been adopted nor published by Elmore 
County for a period of not less than ten years prior to date, except those 
expressly set forth in the Personnel Policy Manual as Rule of Conduct. Elmore 
County has in fact and practice , only used the Rules of Conduct as stated in 
the Manual as reasons for terminating any employee. The manual accordingly 
has by direct inference provided the sole and exclusive reasons by practice and 
custom, for terminating any employee of any reason, including cause. 
d. There is no language in the Personnel Policy Manual that either expressly or 
by implication, provides any limitation or period of employment for any 
Elmore County employee. 
e. There is no provision in fact or law in the practices of Elmore County for the 
past ten years prior to date, nor in the Personnel Policy Manual or any other 
law , statute or ordinance of the county, giving any supervisor or other 
employee of the county the power and authority to change modify, or interpret 
the Personnel Policy Manual , or resolve issues of ambiguity of that Manual in 
any respect whatsoever. That power and authority has been reserved to the 
Elmore County Commissioners. 
f. That Elmore County has never in at least ten years prior to date terminated 
nor fired a·n employee without cause, except perhaps for across the board, 
required reductions in staff. 
g. That there is no rule, guideline or authority in the Personnel Manual stating that 
another employee or supervisor of myself could change my status from that of 
a full time employee once I completed by initial probationary period 
Accordingly , my supervisor's stating that I was not a full time or regular 
employee was a void act. 
h. That Elmore County has not stated nor adopting any rule or regulation which 
states that I or any other employee of the county was or is, expressly an at-will 
employee, but conversely followed custom and action negating any such policy 
or rule , either of fact or law. 
i. That at the time of my termination I was not a probationary employee except for 
disciplinary reasons; that I could not be fired nor terminated without cause; 
that I was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing and not given one; that my 
supervisor had no authority to change my employment status so as to deprive 
me of such a hearing. 
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j. That the Elmore County Personnel Policy limits the reasons an employee may 
be discharged or terminated for cause. 
k. That Elmore County has stated to the United States District Court for Idaho 
in Sommer v. Elmore County that: "The only limitation on the at-will 
employment relationship is that full-time and regular employees may request 
a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This hearing is available 
to regular employees.,. Accordingly, as a full time and regular employee, I was 
entitled to that hearing and was not given one. 
Dated this 3 day of July, 2013. 
~6 
Ch ·. N'J>0 'ffh . em 1x , amti erem 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) sa. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Cherri Nix , being first duly sworn, deposes and states that she is the 
plaintiff named in the above-entitled action; that she has read the foregoing 
Affidavit and believes the facts therein stated to be true to the best of her 
knowledge. 
Cherri Nix 
re me this~ day of July 2013. 
Notary Public for Idaho, 




E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






Case No. _CV-2012-1213 
Plaintiff's First Interrogatories, 
Request for Production of Document and 
First Request for Admissions 
WILL YOU PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff herein requests Defendant above named to 
answer the following Interrogatories within thirty days from the date of service herein in 
conformance with all provisions of Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In answering these Interrogatories, furnish all information available to you including 
information in the possession of you and your attorneys, investigators, experts, etc., retained by 
you and your attorneys (not merely Information known of 
First Discovery NIX V. ELMORE COUNTY JUNE 18, 2013 1 
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your own personal knowledge) accountants, advisors or other persons directly or Indirectly 
employed by or connected with you or your attorneys and anyone else otherwise subject to your 
control. 
In answering these Interrogatories, you must make a dlllgent search of your records and 
of other papers and materials In your possession or available to you or your representatives. If 
an Interrogatory has subparts, answer each part separately and In full, and do not limit your 
answer to the Interrogatory as a whole. If these Interrogatories cannot be answered In full, 
answer to the extent possible, specify the reason for your Inability to answer the remainder, and 
state whatever Information and knowledge you have regarding the unanswered portion. With 
respect to each Interrogatory, In addition to supplying the Information asked for and Identifying 
the specific documents referred to, Identify and describe all documents to which you refer In 
preparing your answers. 
These Interrogatories are deemed continuing and your answers thereto must be 
supplemented, to the maximum extent authorized by law and the applicable rules, as additional 
Information and knowledge becomes available or known to you. 
DEFINITIONS 
Unless otherwise Indicated, the following definitions will be applicable to these 
- Interrogatories: 
A. "Person" means any natural person, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, 
association, governmental entity, agency, group, organization, or group of persons. 
B. The word "Document" means every writing or record of every type and 
description that Is or has been in your possession, custody, or control or of which you have 
knowledge, Including but not limited to emails, correspondence, memoranda, tapes, 
stenographic or handwritten notes, studies, publications, books, pamphleUly pictures, drawings 
and photographs, films, microfilms, voice recordings, maps, reports, surveys, minutes or 
statistical compilations, or any other reported or graphic material In whatever form, including 
First Discovery NIX V. ELMORE COUNTY JUNE 18, 2013 
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copies, drafts, and reproductions. "Document" also refers to any other data compilations from 
which information can be obtained, and translated, if necessary, by you through computers or 
detection devices into reasonably usable form. 
C. To "Identify" a "document" means to provide the following information Irrespective 
of whether the document Is deemed privileged or subject to any claim of privilege: 
1. The title or other means of Identification of each such document; 
2. The type of document (e.g., letter, memorandum, record); 
3. The date of each such document; 
4. The author of each such document; 
5. The recipient or recipients of each such document, Including but not llmlted to, 
Defendants or anyone who purports to represent the Defendant; 
6. The present location of any and all copies of each such document In the care, 
custody, or control of Defendant; 
7. The names and current addresses of any and all persons who have custody or 
control of each such document or copies thereof; and 
8. If all copies of the document have been destroyed, the names and current addresses 
of the person or persons authorizing the destruction of the document and the date the document 
was destroyed. 
In Heu of "Identifying" any document, It shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with 
these Interrogatories to attach a copy of each such document to the answers hereto and 
reference said document to the particular interrogatory to which the document is responsive. 
D. To "Identify" a natural person means to state that person's full name, title, or 
afflllatlon, and last-known address and telephone number. To "Identify" a person that Is a 
business, organization. or group of persons means to state the full name of such business, 
organizatlOn, or group of persons, the form of the business, organization, or group of persons 




(e.g., government agency, corporation, partnership, joint venture, etc.), and to "identify" the 
natural person who would have knowledge of the information sought by the Interrogatory. 
E. "Defendant," "you" or "your" refers to, without !Imitation Inc. Elmore County, its 
agents, employees and commissioners . 
F. Plaintiff refers to, without llmltatlon, the named Plaintiff Cherri Nix. 
G. Complaint" refers to the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff In this action. 
H. The Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A may be referenced herein as the ECPP or other term, such 
as Employment Policy or Polley. 
ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff herein, pursuant to Rule 34 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, requests the production of documents as hereinafter described, 
at the office of the undersigned, E. Lee Schlender, counsel for Plaintiffs, within thirty days of 
service hereof. Compliance with this request may be made by mailing copies of the requested 
documents to the offices of E. Lee Schlender, 2700 Holly Lynn Drive, Mountain Home, Idaho 
83647, within the requisite time period above described. 
This request Is intended to cover all documents in the possession of Defendant. or 
subject to Defendant's custody and control, whether located In Defendant's Dffices, or located In 
- some other place. 
IN THE EVENT ANY DOCUMENT OR WAITING IS NOT PRODUCED BY REASON OF A CLAIM OF 
PRIVILEGE OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, STATE THE EXACT BASIS OF THAT CLAIM. ALSO, 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES MAY BE REDACTED FOR PURPOSES OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AS LONG 
AS A DATE OR OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDES SUFFICIENT LANGUAGE TO DETERMINE THE 
NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, AS A TERMINATION, DISCHARGE, ETC. 
ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Requests Answers to the Request of 
Admissions contained herein, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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PLAINTIFFS FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
INTERROGATORY NO. I. 
State the name of any employee of Elmore County who within ten years from date 
of this Interrogatory, was dismissed and/or terminated from employment for conduct or 
violation of any rule , other than those stated under Rules of Employee Conduct of the 
Elmore County .. Personnel Polley, pages 9 through 13 thereof which Polley Is attached to 
the affidavit ol Barbara Steele dated March 4i 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2. 
For each person named In Interrogatory No. 1 , state the conduct, which resulted In that 
employee being terminated and/or dismissed. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 3, 
State which person or persons, if any as named In answer to Interrogatories 1 and 2 
a full-time employee of Elmore County at the time of the termination and/or dismissal. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO 1. 
Provld• a copy of. th& final Ordef and/or Decision terminating and/or dismissing any person 
named In answer to Interrogatories 1 and 3. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO, 2. 
Provide a copy of the final Order and/or decision terminating any employee of Elmore County for 
any reason whatsoever, for the last ten years. For purposes of privacy, unless the name is one 
provided In answer to Interrogatories 1 and 3, the name of the 
terminated lndMdual may be redacted from the document or documents of dismissal and/or 
termination. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 3. 
Provide a copy of every Rule of Conduct adopted and/or promulgated by Elmore County for its 
employees for the last ten years, other than those stated Rules of Employee Conduct of the 
Elmore County Personnel Polley, pages 9 through 13 thereof which Policy is attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
If none exists, please so state. 





State what Rule or Rules of Conduct where relied upon by Elmore County for the termination 
and/or dismissal of any employee for the past ten years, other than those Rules of Employee 
Conduct of the Elmore County Personnel Policy, pages 9 through 13 thereof, which Polley Is 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele, dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5. 
State the name of each full-time employee of Elmore County terminated and/or dismissed by the 
County In the past ten years who was not given an Appeal Hearing as provided by the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy, pages 9 through 13 thereof, which Policy Is attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele, dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. pages 33 and 34 thereof. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 4. 
Provide a copy of each Order and/or Decision terminating any employee In the manner as 
described In Interrogatory No. 6 ; any full-time employee not given an Appeal 
Hearing. ? If none exists, please so state. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6. 
State the !Imitation on time or length of employment if any of any full-time Elmore County 
employee, as the same Is stated In the Elmore County Personnel Polley 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 5. 
Provide a copy of every document stating any Policy adopted by Elmore County in the past ten 
years which states a date and/or time limitation on the employment of full-time 
employees of the County, other than what may be stated expressly or Implied, In 
the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A . If it does not exist, please so state. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7. 
State the title and office of each and every elected and/or non-elected person who for the past 
ten years has held the authority to terminate and/or dismiss any full-time employee of Elmore 
County. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8. 
State the title and office of each and every elected and/or non-elected person who for the past 
ten years has held the authority to terminate and/or dismiss any employee of Elmore County 
during the first year of their employment while they were on probationary status. 




INTERROGATORY NO. 9. 
State the names of those employees of Elmore County who while on first hire probationary 
status have been granted a pre-deprivation hearing prior to final dismissal as an employee, for 
the past ten years. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 1 o. 
State If the term "employee at will" or any similar phrase Is stated or used In any Personnel 
Polley of Elmore County, Including the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 6. 
Provide a copy of each and every writing or document described or named In answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1 o. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11. 
Identify any writing of any kind, which constitutes a decision, or policy of the Elmore County 
Commissioners in the past ten years, which states a date and/or time !Imitation on the 
employment of full-time employees of the County. ? If It does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7. 
Provide a copy of any document or writing identified In answer to Interrogatory No. 11. 
INTERROGATORY NO.12. 
State what document considered as a policy or practice applicable to Elmore County employees 
adopted by the Elmore County Commissioners by vote and/or signature In the past ten years 
which states that any employee may be terminated and/or dismissed without cause. In 
answering this Interrogatory, if reference Is made to a document believed to imply dismissal 
without cause, so identify the document and language therein. ? If it does not exist, please so 
state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8. 
Provide a copy of each document or writing identified or otherwise described in answer to 
Interrogatory No. 12. 




INTERROGATORY NO, 13. 
State the name of any elected or non-elected person or polltlcal entity and/or body that Elmore 
County allows dlrectly or Indirectly, to change any term or condition of the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 14. 
State If any non-elected official of any department of the Elmore County government or staff, 
may terminate any employee In a specific department. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15. 
Does there. exist any written policy, letter or document Issued and/or adopted by the Elmore 
County Commissioners In the past ten years that states any employee of Elmore County can be 
terminated and/or dismissed for any reason other than those set forth In the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A ? 
If It does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 9. 
Provide a copy of any document Identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 15. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16. 
Does there exist any written policy, letter or document Issued and/or adopted by the Elmore 
County Commissioners in the past ten years that states any employee of Elmore County can be 
terminated and/or dismissed without cause ? If it does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 o, 
Provide a copy of each Item Identified in answer to Interrogatory No. 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17. 
Did the supervisor of the Plaintiff have the authority as per any law or policy of Elmore County to 
change her status from any type of employment other than full-time ? 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11. 
Provide a copy of any document stating the authority of Plaintiff's supervisor to change her 
status from that of a full-time employee, if any exists. If it does not, please so state. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 18. 
State the section and paragraph of the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A , by which the Plaintiff was placed on 
probationary status by her supervisor. 
INTERROGATORY NO.19. 
State what document, writing or policy of Elmore County provided authority for the supervisor of 
Plaintiff to determine and/or establish, that her status after her lnltlaf first hire employment period 
expired, was that of an at-will employee. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.12. 
Provide a copy of any Item described or named In Interrogatory No. 19. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO., 13. 
Provide a copy of each and every document which sets forth the acts or actions of plaintiff other 
than as stated In the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, for which she could be dismissed and/or terminated. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. 
State what section and/or provision of the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, provides that probationary 
employees are "at-wilt employees." 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20. 
4t Was Plaintiff terminated and/or dismissed from employment by Elmore County without further 
pay? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21. 
Name the page, section and paragraph of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, which was relied upon by her 
supervisor as authority to change her status from other than that of a full-time employee prior to 
her termination. 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1 




Admit that Plaintiff did not sign any document approved and authorized by the Elmore County 
Commissioners, stating that she understood and/or agreed that the Elmore County Polley 
Manual was not a guarantee of any partlcular length or term of employment. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2. 
Admit that only an appointed , elected official of Elmore County or a politic body of such elected 
offlclals, has the authority to change or alter any provision of the Elmore County Personnel 
Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3. 
Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to provide an 
Interpretation of the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. In the event any provision thereof Is deemed to be 
ambiguous. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4. 
Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners did not by any specific ruling , decision or order 
state pnor to June 2012 that Plaintiff was at the time of her termination on probation In 
accordance with that section of the ECPP entitled "Employee Classification, compensation and 
Benefits", sub-section B. Probationary Period ; all as found on page 14 of the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOB ADMISSION NO. 5. 
Admit that Elmore County's Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A , can be changed only after notifying elected officials and at the 
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. 
I REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6. 
Admit that no neither Mr. Vence Parsons or any other supervisor of Plaintiff notified In writing, 
any elected official of Elmore County of any Elmore County personnel polley change regarding 
Plaintiff, prior to her termination of employment. If you deny this request, provide a copy of any 
such notification. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A places limitations on the reasons an employee may be discharged 
and terminated. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains all of the causes related to performance of job duties or 
other violations of the policy as grounds for termination , adopted or ordered by the Elmore 
County Commissioners prior to the Plaintiff's termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that it Is not part of any type of employment contract. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state In any provision thereof, that 
employees are at-will . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11. 
Admit that Plaintiff did not sign any agreement between her and the Elmore County 
Commissioners specifically stating that her employment could be terminated without cause at 
anytime. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12. 
Admit that no supervisor of Plaintiff had vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from 
that of a full-time employee. If denied, provide a copy of the decision, policy or order of the 
Elmore County Commissioners granting that authority to any supervisor. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A Is the only policy document of Elmore County 
stating the reasons for which Plaintiff could be terminated and/or discharged. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14. 
Admit that in no employee of Elmore County has in the past twenty years 
been terminated and/or discharged for any reason other than those stated in the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any provision thereof, that 
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employees may be terminated without cause. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that employees may be terminated at any time for 
reasons not stated In that document. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17. 
Admit that plaintiff had a property Interest In her employment regardless of any contractual right 
created by the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. 
Admit that it Is the contention of Elmore County In this case that unless Plaintiff was hired 
pursuant to a contract, her employment was at-will. 
REQUEST FOR ADMSSION NO. 19. 
Admit that prior to the month of June 2012, no elected official of Elmore County advised Plaintiff 
orally or In writing that she was an employee at-will. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20. 
Admit that plaintiff was a full time employee of Elmore County at the time of her termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21. 
- Admit that plaintiff's probationary period ordered by her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 
1, 2012 was for a disciplinary reason. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22. 
Admit that plaintiff successfully completed her first hire probationary period one year after the 
calendar year 2007 In which she was hired. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23. 
Admit that Vence Parsons was without authority to change, modify or establish any employment 
policy of Elmore County . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24. 




Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to change the terms and 
conditions of the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, which must be by an express writing. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25. 
Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to Interpret the Elmore 
County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as 
Exhibit A with respect to the reasons for employee termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26. 
Admit that Vence Parsons had no vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from a full 
time employee as defined In the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27. 
Admit that Vence Parsons at no time between 2010 and this date, was an elected offlclal of 
Elmore County. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28. 
Admit that Vence Parsons In 2012 was at all times relevant to this action, an employee of 
Elmore County and subject to the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains no statement other than In the paragraph discussing the 
Introductory period of employment, that employees can be discharged for any reason or at any 
time, without cause. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30 
Admit that no employee of Elmore County including supervisors, have the authority to 
resolve for any employment issue, any express or implied ambiguity in 
The Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 31. 
Admit that Plaintiff was not advised of her at will status as an employee, other than by those 
notifications authored by Vence Parsons, her supervisor. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32. 
Admit that Elmore County has represented to the United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho In Sommer v. Elmore County, et al Case 1 :11-cv-00291-REB that: 
" The only limitation on the at-will employment relatlonshlp Is that full-time regular and part-time 
regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This 
hearing Is available to regular employees.• 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33. 
Admit that after serving her Initial first-hire probationary period, Plalntiff was a full-time employee 
In accordance. with the employee classlflcatlon system provided by the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to. the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34. 
Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners did not by an offlclal act, change the employment 
status of Plalntlff from being a full-time employee, untll date of her termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35 
Admit that no act by an elected official of Elmore County changed the Elmore County Personnel 
Polley attached to the. affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. regarding 
the classification of employees as full-time or otherwise, between 
January 1, 2013 and the date of plaintiffs termination of employment. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36 
Admit that employees place on disciplinary probation as per the Elmore County Personnel 
Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A are not 
automatically re-ctasslfled as not being full-time employees. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37 
Admit that full-time employees placed on dlsclpllnary probationary status are not first-hire 
employees subject to the probationary period stated on Pages 14 and 15 of the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the 18 day of June, 2013, the undersigned attorney, 
sent/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document, to wit: 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
AND FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
4t First Class Mall addressed to: 
-
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Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 61 o 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
yes. __ 
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E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
-·l Et-~- I } 
I - • ,,, 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar #1171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
LOd JUL -3 PH l: 1+3 
BARBARA STEELE 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
leeschlender@gmail.com 0EPUTY(t!"'~.,._-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant 
Case No. _2012-1213 
MOTION FOR STAY : DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I.R.C.P. 56 (t). WITH SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHERRI NIX 
Comes now the Plaintiff Cherri Nix in the above entitled proceeding and requests 
of this Honorable Court that this Motion for Stay of Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed as per I.R.C. P. 56 (0, be in all respects granted for the 
reasons as set forth in the Affidavit of Cherri Nix filed herewith in support of this 
Motion. 
This Motion is not filed nor pursued to delay or hinder this litigation but to allow 
a reasonable time for discovery herein; Plaintiff has outstanding since June 17, 
2013 Requests for Production of Documents, Requests for Admissions and 
Interrogatories, the same being attached to the Affidavit of Nix as Exhibit A. 
Oral Argument is Requested. 




lender, Attorney for Plaintiff Cherri Nix 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon th~ day of 
attorney, sent/delivered a true and correct copy 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR STAY ; HE 
JUDMENT AND AFFIDAVIT OP CHERRI NIX 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County: 
Kirtian O. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
BY THE FOLLOWING METHOD 
FAX: 383-9516 
2013, the undersigned 
g ng nt, to wit: 
N MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
I.R.C.P. 56 (f) Motion to Stay Summary Judgment Hearing 
27~ 
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7/22 2:01 PM FROM: Fax TOI 5872134 PAGB1 007 
K.irtlan 0. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor . (ISB No. 8474) 
NAYLOR & HALES, P .C. 
Attorneys at Law 
9S0 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9S11 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
FILED 
2013 JUL 22 PH 2: 13 
BARBAR A ~ TEELE 
CLERK Of TH~RT 
DEPUT <c::)'~ 
Email: Jcjrt@pwtorhales,com; bjc@nulorhales.com; jake@na.ylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
26. 
Currently pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
June 25, 2013. This summary judgment motion notes simply that this Court has previously ruled 
that Plaintiff failed to set forth any genuine issue of material fact as to any contractual nature of her 
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employment, and denied her partial summary judgment motion regarding claims of wrongful 
termination and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law as Plaintiff 
was an at-will employee. (Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, April IS, 2013, pp. S, 8.) Therefore, Plaintiff's at-will employment status is a 
legal determination previously made bythis Court, and is controlling in Defendant's pending motion 
for summary judgment. Defendant bas alleged no additional facts in its summmy judgment motion 
beyond those established by Plaintiff in her initial partial summary judgment motion. Summary 
judgment is appropriate for Defendant because of Plaintiff's at-will employment status. Likewise, 
as to Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action alleging violation of the Protection of Public Employees Act 
(which was not addressed in Plaintiff's initial partial summary judgment motion), Defendant has 
asserted a simple statute of limitations defense which requires no further factual development. 
Good cause exists for staying discovery pending this Court's determination of Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. I.R.C.P. 26; Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 749 (1995). It is 
a matter of the court's discretion to suspend discovery pending a potentially dispositive summary 
judgment motion. Id Defendant's pending Motion for Summary Judgment is based on this Court's 
prior legal holdings regarding Plaintiff's at-will status, and to allow any discovery prior to the 
determination of that summary judgment motion would only impose unnecessary cost and effort to 
Defendant. Staying discovery at this point in the litigation would avoid this unnecessary cost and 
effort to Defendant while preserving judicial economy in resolving a potentially dispositive motion 
before the Court. 
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Additionally, Plaintiff has a currently pending a 56(t) motion to stay determination 
Defendant's pending summary judgment motion to allow Plaintiff to conduct discovery prior to 
determining the Defendant's summary judgment motion. This motion also supports Defendant's 
request for a protective order staying discovery. Plaintiff has asserted what facts she intends to 
establish through her discovery that would require a stay of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Should the Court deny Plaintift"s 56(t) motion, and thus deem that Plaintifr s discovery 
is immaterial to Defendant's dispositive summary judgment motion, the logical conclusion is that 
any discovery completed before the summary judgment determination would be unnecessary. 
Therefore, a protective order is currently appropriate, at least until the Court determines Plaintiff's 
56(t) motion to stay Defendant's summary judgment motion, to avoid the unnecessary expense of 
completing discovery that would later be held as immaterial to Defendant's dispositive summary 
judgment motion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Owyhee County requests a protective order staying 
all discovery until the determination of its pending Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 




.. . 7/22 2101 PM FROM1 Pax TOI 5872134 PAGEi 007 
CERTIFICAD OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July, 2013. I caused to be served. by the 
method(s) indicated. a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. Lynn 0. Norton 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mo1mtain Home, ID 83647 
Plalntljfa Attorney 
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Kirt1an 0. Naylor (ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Sticet, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
FILED 
2013 JUL 22 PH 2: 13 
BARBAAA~T '"ElE 
ClERK Of TH RT 
DEPU 
Email: kirt@oayJorhales.com; bjc@rulYlorhaies.com; iake@nAYJorhales,com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), hereby requests the Court issue a protective order 
staying all further discovery pending resolution of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. This 
motion is supported by the pleadings and documents on file and Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Protective Order, filed concurrently. 
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER- 1. 
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DA TED this 22nd day of July, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. Lynn G. Norton 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
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Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9S11. 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
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BARBARA ~.,TE LE 
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DEPUTY 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLmCAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSmON TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR STAY OF 
DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of recor~ Naylor & Hal~ P.C., 
hereby submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Defendant's 
Summary Judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 56(t). 
Cummtly pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
June 25, 2013. In response, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Stay on July 3, 2013, with her 
accompanying affidavit, alleging that outstanding discovery responses are necessary to "prove certain 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSmON 
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facts that will allow [her] to prevail in this litigation." (Plaintiff's Affidavit Re: Motion for Stay: 
Rule 56 F Motion. 14, hereinafter ''Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Aff.j However, the facts that she 
wishes to establish are immaterial to her defense of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
would not affect the Court's ability to determine summary judgment for Defendant, even if 
established. Accordingly, Defendant bas filed a Motion for Protective Order to stay responses to 
Plaintlir s discovery pending resolution of the summary judgment motion. 
Defendant's summary judgment motion argues simply that this Court has previously ruled 
that Plaintiff failed to set forth any genuine issue of material fact as to any contractual nature of her 
employment, and denied her partial summary judgment motion regarding claims of wrongful 
termination and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law as Plaintiff 
was an at-will employee. (Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
SummaryJudgment,April 15,2013,pp. 5, S;hereinafter"April 15,2013 Memorandum and Order.") 
Therefore, Plaintiff's at-will employment status is a legal determination previously made by this 
Court, and is controlling in Defendant's pending Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant has 
alleged no additional facts in its summary judgment motion beyond those established by Plaintiff in 
her initial partial summary judgment motion. Plaintiff, through her affidavit, seeks no further 
discovery regarding the contractual basis for her employment. 
"The decision to extend time to .supplement an affidavit is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,211 (1994). In order to meet her burden in a 
motion to stay summary judgment pending further discovery, plaintiff"has the burden of setting out 
'what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justify their opposition,' making clear 'what 
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information is sought and how it would preclude summary judgment.'" Jenkins v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 141 Idaho233,239(2005),quotingNicho/asv. Wal/enstein,266F.3d 1083, 1088-89(9thCir. 
2001). 
Primarily, and as argued in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is important to 
note that following this Court's Memorandum Decision the Plaintiff filed two motions-a Motion for 
I.A.R. Rule 12(b) Permissive Appeal and a Motion for I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) Certification-asking this 
Court to allow an appeal of the Memorandum Decision. At oral argument on these motions counsel 
for the Plaintiff stated multiple times that the facts upon which this Court relied in its Memorandum 
Decision are the facts of this case, and that there are no more facts for this Court to consider in 
addressing the issues of this case. Thus, Plaintiff is bound by the statements of counsel regarding 
the state of the facts of this case. See Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering. B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 109 
(2009) (holding "it is generally accepted that the relationship between an attorney and client is one 
of agency in which the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent" and the client "is bound 
by counsel's actions"); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 736-737 (2010) (holding "[g]enerally, parties 
are bound by the actions (and failures to act) of their attorneys"). Plaintiff should not now, when 
facing summary judgment, be able to assert the need for further factual discovery as Defendant has 
relied on the prior statements of her counsel that the facts were established. 
However, even addressing Plaintiff's currently pending motion to stay on its merits, while 
never clearly stated in briefing or in affidavit, the further discovery that Plaintiff seeks as "essential 
to justify her opposition" can be broken down into two general categories: ( 1) history and facts that 
would support the assertion Elmore County had an implied policy for only terminating employees 
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for cause (Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Aff., fl 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h), (i), (j) and (k)); and (2) facts 
and history to support the assertion that the Elmore County Personnel Policy cannot be changed. 
modified. or interpreted by anyone other than the Elmore County Commissioners. (Id at Tl 4(e), 
(g), and (i)). Plaintiff seems to oppose Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment through 
argument that she was not an at-will employee based solely on the history and previous practices of 
Defendant, which is legally unfounded by basic Idaho precedent She also seems to argue that the 
Personnel Policy was somehow improperly modified or interpreted, which is immaterial to her 
termination as an at-will employee as this Court has established that it is not a contractual basis for 
her employment. 
1. Any Prior Facts Sug:pordngllistorical Precedent Supportin1A1Jeced For Cause 
Ieanlnattons are Immaterial to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judpaent. 
First and foremost, the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that, "An employer's custom 
of only terminatin1 employee, for 100d cause Is likewise not sufficient to suiu)Ort a claim of 
an implied contract term eliminating the emplgyer's ri1htto terminate at will." JenkJnsv. Boise 
Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242, l 08 P .3d 380, 389 (200S) ( emphasis added). Thus, any further 
discovery that Plaintiff seeks to support her assertion that she was not an at-will employee based on 
any "history or fact0 regarding terminations of employees of Defendant in the past l O years is 
patently unsupported by Idaho law. Even were Plaintiff able to find evidence through discovery that 
would support her assertion. she would still be unable to withstand summary judgment as a matter 
of law pursuant to finnly established Idaho law. 
In Jenkins, supra, the plaintiff there attempted to argue exactly what Plaintiff is arguing here: 
that "salaried personnel in positions similar to [the Plaintiff] were not normally discharged without 
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cause," and thus he was a "for cause" employee. The court then, held that simply having a policy 
or procedure for terminating employees without cause "did not represent the idea that an employee 
could only be terminated for cause." Jenlcbu, 141 Idaho at 242. In fact, the Court cited to a specific 
policy basis for why such an interpretation of the Idaho at-will presumption of employment was 
essential. To find to the contrary would imply that an employer would be in a position where it 
would be in its self-interest to abandon its pro-employee policies, such as indiscriminately firing 
employees for no cause in order to maintain its employees, at-will status. This is why the Jenkins 
court made clear that "an employer may provide guidelines, which are necessary conditions for 
continued employment, and avoid having them read as a guarantee for a specifled term of 
employment or placing limits on the reasons/or discharge." Jenkins, 141 Idaho at 242 (emphasis 
added). As discussed previously before this Court, the Personnel Policy is simply a general policy 
statement favoring employees. 
As this Court has previously held, Plaintiff was an at-will employee of Defendant because 
she had not presented any admissible evidence to show "w had a contract to be employed for a 
specified time or which limits the reason(s) ahG may be terminated." (April 15, 2013 Memorandum 
and Order, p. 4) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's purported further discovery would not fix that prior 
deficiency. In Idaho, employment is at-will unless an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that 
specifies the duration of employment or limits the reasons for which an employee may be terminated. 
See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., l 08 P .3d 380, 387 (Idaho 2005). Plaintiff now, however, seeks 
to establish "for cause" status not from the existence of a contract, but rather from the lack of a 
statement or rule from Defendant explicitly stating that she was "at-will." (See Plaintiff's Motion 
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to Stay Aft, 14(h)). She intends to apparently show that she was an implied "for cause" employee 
simply by virtue of an alleged historical precedent for only terminating employees "for cause," which 
argument has actually been directly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Defendant's Personnel Policy sets forth pro-employee oonditiom of employment that 
generally encourage positive employee relations. The disclaimers and statements in the Personnel 
Policy indicate that it is intended to be a general statement of policy, not a contract. Idaho precedent, 
along with this Court's own prior holding, is clear: a policy must indicate an intent that it become 
part of the employment agreement. Where, as here, there is contract disclaimer language specifically 
negating such intent, the at-will presumption stands. In addition, part of Plaintiff's sought after 
discovery would be to establish that, "[t]here is no language in the Personnel Policy Manual that 
either expressly or by implication, provides any limitation or period of employment for any Elmore 
County employee." (Plaintifrs Motion to Stay Aft:, 1 4(d)). This would directly support 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in that Plaintiff would be considered an at-will 
employee because there is no limitation or period of employment for any Elmore County employee. 
2. Any AUead Chan1e or Intemretation of the Penonnel Polley Manual is 
Jmmaterfal to Defendant's Motion for Summan Judunent. 
Again, Plaintiff "has the burden of setting out 'what further discovery would reveal that is 
essential to justify their opposition,• making clear 'what information is sought and how it would 
preclude summary judgment. rn Jenldns, supra. As this Court has previously held as a matter oflaw, 
Defendant's Personnel Policy was not "intended to create enforceable contract rights," and "there 
is no material issue of fact that the personnel policy constituted a contract between Elmore County 
and Ms. Nix." (April 15, 2013 Memorandum and Order, p. 5) Again, there is no further discovery 
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that Plaintiff currently seeks that would fix that prior deficiency. Therefore, while Plaintiffhas stated 
that she seeks discovery to establish that supervisors and/or employees of Defendant have no 
authority to change, modify, and interpret the Personnel Policy, or that the Personnel Policy provided 
no authority to change her employment status, these are moot points because there is no preliminary 
contractual basis for the Personnel Policy to have such authority. It is also unclear from Plaintiffs 
filings how such evidence would materially oppose Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff also seeks discovery to establish that any power and authority to change the 
Personnel Policy has been reserved to the Board of County Commissioners, but this fact is clear from 
the plain language of the Personnel Policy itse~ and thus, further discovery is unnecessary. (See 
Affidavit of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 7.) Likewise, although Plaintiff seeks discovery to establish 
that her supervisor, Vance Parsons, could not place Plaintiff on probation past her initial 
probationary period, she has admitted that the Board of County Commissioners confirmed and 
approved of Mr. Parsons doing so through her prior affidavit as well. 
Regardless of what any further discovery may reveal, Plaintiff has already admitted by 
affidavit in her prior partial motion for summary judgment that the Elmore County Board of County 
Prosecutors ratified her placement on probationary status and maintaining her at-will employment 
status in February 2012 and subsequent termination through a written decision issued June 18, 2012. 
(Nix Affidavit Supporting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 1 11.) In the course of that 
confirmation, the County Commissioners specifically noted that Plainti:ffhad probationary employee 
status at the time of her termination. (See Nix Affidavit Supporting Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, Ex. I) They also specifically note, without qualification, that Mr. Parsons placed Plaintiff 
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on probation in February 2012 (Jd) As Plaintiff's own evidence already indicates that the Board 
of County Commissioners reviewed and confinned all actions leading up to Plaintiff's termination, 
including actions of her supervisor, Mr. Parsons, it is unclear how evidence that the Persotmel Policy 
prohibits a supervisor from placing an employee on probationary status and maintaining her at-will 
status would even exist, seeing as the Board of County Commissioners themselves confirmed the 
very act of placing Plaintiff on probationary status prior to her termination. 
Further, this Court has already held that Plaintiff's supervisor "followed the policy requiring 
notice prior to discipline which could, and did, include placing her on probationary status as set out 
on page 33 of Exhibit A to the Steele Affidavit." (April 15, 2013 Memorandum and Order, p. 8.) 
A plain reading of the Personnel Policy, which Plaintiff already has in her possession and has been 
previously argued, states clearly that a supervisor has specific authority to impose discipline upon 
employees, including both placing employees on probationary status or terminating their 
employment. (Affidavit of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, pp. 32-33.) Thus, this Court did not hold that Mr. 
Parsons changed or deviated from the Personnel Policy, but rather that he followed the policy as 
written which allowed both placing Plaintiff on probationary status and ultimately terminating her 
employment. These actions were subsequently confirmed by the Board of County Commissioners. 
Thus, any discovery that Plaintiff might obtain regarding the authority to change or interpret the 
Personnel Policy or to place her on probationary status, would be immaterial to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and would be inapplicable to stay summary judgment at this time. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Owyhee County requests this Court DENY 
Plaintiff's Motion for Stay re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and to have a hearing 
and determination regarding Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
By ~b. tJ4 • Uile.) 
Bruicastleton, Of the Firm 
Att eys for Defendant 
CERTIFICAD OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29th day of July, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy copy: 
Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
lnorton@adaweb.net 
181 Via email 
E. LEE SCHLENDmt 
Schlender Jaw offices 
-
2700 Holly Lyu Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar •1171/Wuhington ~33921 
208-587-1999 
leescblender@gmail.com 
IN mE DISl'RICT COURT OF mE FOUR.111 JUDICIAL DISl'RICT OF mE STATE OF IDAHO, 
IN AND FOR mE COUN1Y OF ELMORE 
CHERRI NIX, 
VB. 
ELMORE COUNIY APOLITICAL 
SUBDMSIONOFTIIESTATEOF 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL 
SE1TING AND RE-SET 
Comes now the Plaintiff Cherri Nix by her attorney E. Lee Schlender and moves the 
Court to vacate the trial now set for December 3, 2013. 
The basis of this motion is : Plaintiffs counsel has a trial set to commence in Salt Lake 
City that was a prior setting but not disclosed by Utah counsel until two weeks past, for 
December 5, 2013. 
Defense counsel for Elmore County have stated that they have no objection to this 
request. 
· n be heard on August 5, 2013. 
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Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar #1171/Washington Bar#33921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STA TE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
NOTICE OF HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR TO VACATE 
TRIAL SETTING 
TO THE UNDERSIGNED ATTORNEYS AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
Please take notice, that the Plaintiff above-named will call on for hearing before the 
Honorable Lynn G. Norton presiding District Judge, Plaintiff's Moton TO VACATE 
TRIAL SKITING , on the 5th day of August , 2013 at 2:00pm 
at the Elmore County Courthouse, Mountain Home Idaho 83647. 
Notice of Hearing Motion to Vacate Trial Setting; Nix v. Elmore County 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon !htiL day of~ 201)1 ti!!, 
undersigned attorney, sent/delivered a true and co fthe foregoing 
documents, to wit: 
MOTION TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Bruce Castleton <bjc@naylorhales.com> 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
yes.x.-. 
yes ___ .383-9516 
Notice of Hearing Motion to Vacate Trial Setting ; Nix v. Elmore County 2 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE ST ATE OF 
IDAHO 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
NIX BRIEF SUPPORTiNG MOTION FOR STAY 
OF DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SETIING OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Nix filed for summary judgment and this court on April 16, 2013 
issued a written Memorandum Decision denying the Motion. The court stated in part: 
" Regarding contract disputes at summary judgment, "[w) hen the existence of 
a contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one 
inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in fact exists." Johnson v. 
Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 679P.2d 640, 645 (1984). "Interpretation of 
unambiguous language in a contract is a question of law. Interpretation of an 
ambiguous contract is a question of fact. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a 
1 
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question of law." Cannon v. Perry, 144 Idaho 728, 73 J, 170 P.3d 393, 396 (2007). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined contractual ambiguity as "reasonably 
subject to conflicting interpretation." Elliott v. Darwin Ne i b au r Farms, I 3 8 
Idaho 774,779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003)." 
In summary the Court stated that: 
"Regarding contract disputes at summary judgment, '1w] hen the existence of a 
contract is in issue, and the evidence is conflicting or admits of more than one 
inference, it is for the jury to decide whether a contract in fact exists." Johnson v. 
Allied Stores Corp., 106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984). However, in this 
case, the Plaintiff has not presented conflicting evidence that the personnel policy 
was not a contract. There is no admissible evidence-only the Plaintiffs assertions-
that a contract exists." 
Plaintiff requested permission to appeal, which was denied. The Court was emphatic 
that it did not consider the case to be without issues of fact, either existing or to be 
explored upon further proceedings, stating that a re-consideration was one possibility, 
depending on development of the issues and facts. 
Defendant urges the Court to essentially grant summary judgment, not for plaintiff but 
upon the same pleading.,, affidavits and documents, for defendant. Simply stated, 
their argument is that Elmore County is entitled to a summary judgment since this 
court denied one to Nix. The motion is not supported by affidavits, only argument. 
Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P .2d 1229 (1995) holds that even 
in cases that appear to raise issues of law, facts are important in determining if legal 
principles are controlling; a Rule 56(f) motion should have been granted before 
hearing the summary judgment motion. 
Plaintiff served Interrogatories, Requests for Production of Documents and Requests 
for Admissions on defendant on June 8, 2013. To date no answers have been filed. 
Likely is that the defendant, realizing that facts would be established by responding 
favorable to Nix, simply filed instead a Motion for Summary Judgment thereby hoping 
to avoid having the court before it key facts as to the following: 
1. That Elmore County has never had a limitation on the length of time an employee 
may continue employment. 
2. That there is no policy or document providing that employees can be fired without 
cause. 
3. That the term "employee at will" does not appear in any Personnel Policy or related 
document of Elmore County. 
4. That neither her supervisor Mr. Parsons nor any other employee of the county has 
the power to terminate an employee. 
5. That no regular, full time employee has ever been denied an appeal hearing. 
That no employee has been terminated except for the causes stated in the Manual 
except for budgetary reasons. 
7. That no policy exists of the county stating that regular employees who have served 
their initial probationary period are at will employees. 
8. That no supervisor including that of Nix, Mr. Parsons had any authority to 
interpret or decide any ambiguity in the Policy Manual. 
9. No supervisor had the authority to change the status of Nix from full time, regular 
employee status to that of at will or other status allowing the county to deny her a 
pre--termination hearing. 
10. Prior to her discharge, Nix was never "on probation" as per any policy of the 
county which either made her an at will employee or deprived her of the right to a 
termination hearing. 
11. That the Personnel Policy does not state it is part of any employment contract. 
12. That Nix never signed an agreement that her employment could be terminated 
without cause, at any time. 
13. That the Polley Manual limits the reasons employees including Nix can be 
terminated. 
14. That county employees were not in fact, treated as at will employees except for 
purposes of terminating them. 
15. That Nix had a property interest in her continued employment with Elmore 
County. 
16. That Elmore County in United States District Court case Sommer v. Elmore 
County, Case 1:11-cv-00291 advised the court that: 
• TIie onty llmitatfon on the at-wta employment relatlonehlp II that tun-time regular and part-time 
regular amployffe may requeat a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before tennlnation. This 
heanng II available to regu1ar emp1oyeee. • 
17. That placing Nix on probation for a disciplinary reason did not re-classify her 
3 
as not being a full time employee; that she in fact and law bad the right to a hearing. 
Brown v. Valley County, 2013 WL 1453368 found such facts involving an identical 
disclaimer in their Policy Manual as persuasive that Brown was not an at will 
employee; that he did have a property interest in continued employment. A copy is 
attached; it is not available as reported in Federal Reporter. The Court reasoned that 
since Brown was expected to perform in accordance with the Manual, that after the 
initial probationary period he was not at will; he expressly was to abide by the policy 
in performing his employment~ The Court concluded that the Manual could not be 
mandatory for Brown but only advisory and discretionary for Valley County. 
Finally, the counties reliance on the disclaimer was not controlling. As stated 
therein: 
" But Valley County's argument suffers from a fatal flaw. In essence, 
Valley County argues Idaho law require a contractual right upon 
which the employee must rely to rebut the at-will 
presumption. Yet Bollinger and its predecessors recognized 
that, in the absence of an express contract, a limitation to the 
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at-will employment presumption will be implied where the 
circumstances surrounding the employment relationship could 
cause a reasonable person to conclude that the parties intended 
limitation on discharge." 
It is without argument that the "circumstances surrounding the employment 
relationship" are issues of fact. 
The outstanding discovery clearly will give to this court facts upon which to 
conclude that Nix was not in fact, at-will; that she had a property interest in her 
continued employment; that she was entitled to a pre-termination hearing; that 
she was not converted to less than full time status by the actions of her 
supervisor; that she was entitled to due process as per the Manual hearing and 
appeal provisions. Additionally, there is no language in the Manual stating Nix 
was an at will employee. 
Issues of fact are relevant to determining the exact nature of the employment 
relationship and whether employees were fired at any time for reasons other 
than as stated "for cause" in the Manual; that Nix could not be demoted to less 
than full time status by her supervisor; that she was entitled to a hearing prior 
to discharge. These are jury issues. 
It is respectfully requested that the Motion for Summary Judgment be stayed 
pending completion of discovery. 
Dated this ___ day of July 2013. 
E. Lee schlender law offices 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nix 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the_ day of _____ _, 2013, the undersigned 
attorney, sent/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, to wit: 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF SUPPORTING MOTION FOR STAY ; HEARING UPON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDMENT AND AFFIDAVIT OF CHERRI NIX 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
BY THE FOLLOWING METHOD: 
FAX: 383-9516 E. Lee Schlender 
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2013 WL 1453368 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
D. Idaho. 
INTRODUCTION 
Jayne BROWN, as Personal Representative 
of the Estate of Steven P. Brown, Plaintiff, 
v. 
VALLEY COUN1Y, a political subdivision of 
the State of Idaho; and Gordon Cruickshank, 
Jerry Winkle and Ray Moore, Valley County 
Commissioners, in their individual and official 
capacities, and John Does I-XX, Defendants. 
No. 1:12-cv-00057-CWO. April 9, 2013. 
Opinion 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
CANDY W. DALE, United States Magistrate Judge. 
•t Steven Brown 1 filed a complaint against Valley 
County and its three Commissioners on February 8, 2012. 
The complaint asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
for deprivation of due process arising out of Brown's 
constitutional property MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER-I interest in his employment Valley County. 
Brown's second cause of action arises under the Idaho State 
Constitution, also alleging a deprivation of his property 
interest in his employment, which he claims could not be 
terminated without due process. Brown further contends that 
Defendants are liable for spoliation of evidence, because they 
either negligently or intentionally failed to record or preserve 
the recording of a pre-termination hearing held on February 
2, 2011. 
Brown moves for partial summary judgment, seeking an 
order finding that he had a constitutionally protected property 
interest in his employment relationship with Defendant 
Valley County. If the Court finds for Brown, he may move 
forward with his claims. Opposing him, Defendants, who 
collectively will be referred to as Valley County, seek 
summary judgment on the grounds that Brown did not have 
a protected property interest in his continued employment 
because he was an "at-will" employee. If the Court finds for 
Valley County, Brown's complaint will be dismissed. 
The Court conducted a hearing on February 4, 2013, at which 
the parties appeared and presented oral argument. The day 
after the hearing, Defendants filed a Motion for Certification 
to the Idaho Supreme Court, contending that this case presents 
an issue appropriate for the Idaho Supreme Court to decide. 
That motion now has been fully briefed, and will be decided 
without a hearing. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7. l(d)(I )(A). 
After carefully considering the parties' briefs, the applicable 
case law, and the record, the Court enters the following order 
granting Brown's motion for partial summary judgment, and 
denying Valley County's motion for summary judgment and 
its motion for certification. 
FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following undisputed, material 
facts. Brown was a Valley County employee from 1998 until 
February 3, 2011. At the time of his separation, Brown was 
the Building Department Head for Valley County. During his 
employment, Valley County promulgated a Policy Manual, 
effective upon distribution for fiscal year 2004. (Policy 
Manual, Stipulation Ex. A,Dkt. 22.) Brown relies exclusively 
upon the Valley County Policy Manual as the basis for his 
property interest claim. Brown signed an "Acknowledgment 
of Receipt of New Valley County Personnel Policy Manual" 
on December 16, 2003. (Acknowledgment, Stipulation Ex. 
B, Dkt. 22.) This acknowledgment was of the 2004 Policy 
Manual, which is the only policy manual relevant in this case. 
On February 3, 2011, Plaintiffs employment was terminated, 
via a written termination letter. 
According to the parties, the following provisions of the 
Policy Manual are material. First, in bold print on the first 
page, the Policy Manual contains a disclaimer regarding the 
creation of a contract of employment: 
*2 THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A 
CONTRACT. NO CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
WITH VALLEY COUNTY WILL BE V AUD UNLESS 
IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROPER 
PROCEDURES BY A SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNING BOARD 
AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED BY AND CONTAINS 
THE NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOULD BE 
BENEFITED BY THE CONTRACT. 
WesttawNexf 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to ong1nal U.S Government Works. 
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CHANGES TO THE POLICIES AND BENEFIT 
OFFERINGS OUTI.JNED IN THIS HANDBOOK ARB 
SUBJECT TO CHANGE AT ANY TIME, wrmoUT 
NOTICE. CHANGES MAY BB MADB AT nm SOLE 
DISCRETION Of nm GOVERNING BOARD. 
New employees were subject to a ninety day introductory 
period, during which "either the employee or Valley County 
may end the employment relationship at-will, with or without 
cause or advance notice." Otherwise, the Policy Manual 
classified employees, and defined an employee's employment 
status as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, employees 
of Valley County will not be suspended without pay, 
demoted with an accompanying change in pay, or 
discharged from their positions except for cause related 
to performance of their job duties or other violations of 
this policy. Cause shall be determined by the employee's 
supervisor/elected official and shall be communicated in 
writing to the employee when employee status is changed. 
Only suspension without pay, demotion with change of 
pay, or discharge for cause shall be subject to the appeal 
procedure set forth in this personnel policy. The appeal 
procedure is to be construed in a directory [sic] manner. 
It is the duty of the appellant to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that the factual basis for the personnel 
action is incorrect or that the reasons for the personnel 
action are contrary to the public interest or violate 
existing law. Should the appellant establish such basis, the 
employee's back wages and benefits shall be restored as if 
the specified action had not been taken. 
The Policy Manual established "the right to a hearing in the 
event of a discharge, demotion with attendant change in pay, 
or suspension," and outlined those procedures in Section V. 
ANALYSIS 
1. Modon to Certify 
Idaho Appellate Rule 12.3 provides that a United States 
District Court may certify a question of law to the Idaho 
Supreme Court if two conditions are met: (1) the question 
certified is a controlling question of law in the pending 
action as to which there is no controlling precedent in the 
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, and (2) the immediate 
determination of the Idaho law with regard to the certified 
question would materially advance the orderly resolution 
of the litigation in the United States Court. Idaho App. R. 
12.3. As a general matter, the benefits of certification have 
been held to include: assuring that state law will be applied 
uniformly and in accordance with the interpretations given by 
each state's high court; state courts will have the benefit of 
having the final say on a matter of state law; and, the federal 
courts can avoid the difficult task of attempting to divine 
how a state court would rule on a matter of state law. See 
uhman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (noting 
that certification "does, of course, in the long run save time, 
energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative juridical 
federalism"). 
*3 Defendants seek certification of one question: "whether a 
public employee can have a property interest in employment 
where a policy manual contains both contract disclaimer 
language and language to the effect that an employee cannot 
be discharged except for cause." Defendants claim this is an 
issue of first impression, and a contro11ing issue in the case. 
Defendants are correct that the issue is central to this case. But 
Defendants are mistaken that it is a "question of law" rising 
to a level requiring the Idaho Supreme Court to decide it. 
This Court is asked to decide whether Brown held a property 
interest in bis continued employment based upon the language 
in the Valley County Policy Manual. The Court looks to state 
law to detennine the extent of his property interest. There 
is no dearth of Idaho case law on this issue. The Court is 
left, then, to apply established Idaho law to the facts of this 
case. It is not deciding a matter of public policy important to 
the state, or a controlling question of law that is unresolved 
in Idaho. See, e.g., Miller v. Four Winds Intern. Corp., 827 
f.Supp.2d 1175 (DJdaho 2011). To the contrary-the Court 
is interpreting existing Idaho case law on the matter and 
applying it to the facts, a task the Court does routinely. The 
Court will deny the motion to certify. 
2. Summary Judgment Standards 
A principal purpose of summary judgment is to "isolate 
and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... " Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). lt is "not a 
disfavored procedural shortcut,'' but is instead the "principal 
tool[ ] by which factually insufficient claims or defenses 
[can] be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the 
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 
resources." Id. at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 
WesttawNexr@ 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to orioinal U.S. Government Works. 2 
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otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; 
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 
fact." Anderson v. liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 
(1986). 
The moving party bean the initial burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux 
v. Abbey, 263 F.Jd 1070, 1076 (9th Cir2001). To carry this 
burden, the moving party need not introduce any affirmative 
evidence (such as affidavits or deposition excerpts) but 
may simply point out the absence of evidence to support 
the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman Cato 
Johnson. 212 F.3d 528,532 (9th Cir.2000). 
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce 
evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in its favor. 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. The non-moving party must 
go beyond the pleadings and show "by [its] affidavits, or by 
the depositions. answers to interrogatories, or admissions on 
file" that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex, 477 
U.S.at324. 
The party bearing the burden of proof at trial "must establish 
beyond controversy every essential element of its ... claim." 
S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 889 
(9th Cir.2003) (adopting decision of district court "as our 
own"). A party w ho does not have the burden "may rely on 
a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot 
produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to the fact." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(l)(B) (advisory committee's note.) 
*4 As a general rule, the "party opposing summary judgment 
must direct [the Court's] attention to specific triable facts." 
S. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 889. An exception to this rule 
exists when cross-motions for summary judgment are filed. 
In that case, the Court must independently review the record 
for issues of fact. Fair Housing Council of Riverside Co., 
Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.Jd 1132, 1136 (9th Cir2001). 
Cross-motions for summary judgment-where both parties 
essentially assert that there are no issues of material fact-
does not vitiate the court's responsibility to determine whether 
disputed issues of material fact are present. Id. 
In this case, the parties argue vigorously as to their 
understanding of the Policy Manual. These disagreements are 
matters of argument and not contested issues of material fact. 
The parties have stipulated to the material facts, and have 
included the Policy Manual in their filings. 
3. Due Process Claim 2 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects individuals from the deprivation of liberty or 
property by the government without due process. A Section 
1983 claim based upon procedural due process contains three 
elements: ( 1) a liberty or property interest protected by the 
United States Constitution; (2) a deprivation of that interest 
by the government; and (3) a denial of adequate procedural 
protections.Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995 F2d 898, 
904 (9th Cir.l 993). To state a claim under the Due Process 
Clause, Brown must first establi$h he possessed a property 
interest deserving of constitutional protection. Brewster v. 
Bd. of Educ. of the Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.Jd 
971,982 (9thCir.1998); see also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 
924, 928-29 (1997). If a property interest exists, the essential 
requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity 
to respond. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill et al., 
470 U.S. 532,546 (1985). The Due Process Clause does not 
create substantive property rights; property rights are defined 
instead by reference to state law. Portman, 995 F2d at 904. 
To determine whether Brown's due process rights were 
violated, the Court first must determine whether Brown 
possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in 
continued employment. Dyaclc v. Commonwealth of N. 
Mariana Islands, 317 F .Jd 1030, 
1033 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538). To 
have a property interest, a person must have "a legitimate 
claim of entitlement to it," and such claim may be based 
upon a rule or policy that secures an interest in continued 
employment or that creates a legitimate claim to it. See Bd. 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577,578 (1972). 3 See also 
Sonoda v. Cabrera, 255 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir2001) ("An 
individual 'has a constitutiona11y protected property interest 
in continued employment ... ifhe has a reasonable expectation 
or a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to it, rather than a mere 
'unilateral expectation.' ") (citation omitted). 
*S Valley County argues that the disclaimer in the Policy 
Manual preserved Brown's at-will status under Idaho law, 
leaving Brown without a constitutionally protected property 
interest in continued employment. Valley County begins 
with the premise that the employment relationship itself is a 
contractual relationship. Because the bold faced disclaimer 
on the first page of the Policy Manual negates an intent that 
it become an employment contract, Valley County argues 
Brown's at-will status was preserved. According to Valley 
Wi;a,r;tt:w.,Nelcf ,c) 2013 Thomi:;on Re11!Ars No c:k1im to oriamal U S. Government Works. 3 
102 
Brown v. Valley County, Not Re 
County, the policies set forth in the Policy Manual were 
simply pro-employee guidelines that were not mandatory, 
did not limit the reasons for discharge, and simply created a 
framework for the employment relationship. 
Brown concedes he does not have a contractual right to 
continued employment, and his complaint does not assert a 
breach of contract claim. But Brown argues that, despite the 
Jack of a contractual right to continued employment, he held 
a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment 
based upon the Policy Manual provisions taken as a whole. 
He points to Section IV(A)(l) of the Policy Manual, which 
limits discharge .. except for cause related to performance of 
[your J job duties or other violations of this policy." According 
to Brown, the Policy Manual's provisions, considered as a 
whole, rebut the presumption that his employment status was 
"at-will," and gave him a legitimate claim of entitlement to 
continued employment. 
Valley County contends the facts of this case and applicable 
Jaw are most similar to those in Lawson v. Umatilla County, 
J 39 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.l 998). Oregon state law codifies the at-
will status of all county employees, stating such employees 
"hold office during lhe pleasure of the appointing officer." 
139 F.3d at 692. Valley County asserts that Oregon's state 
statute is analogous to Idaho's legal presumption endorsed 
in Idaho case law that employment is at-will "unless the 
employee is hired pursuant to a contract that states a fixed 
temt or limits the reasons for discharge." Bollinger v. Fall 
River Rural Electric Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1267 (Idaho 
2012). And in Lawson, the county's employment manual 
contained a disclaimer similar to the disclaimer in this case, 
which stated: "under no circumstances shall these policies be 
construed to act as any type of employment contract with any 
employee" of the county. 
Lawson asserted a Section 1983 due process claim, while 
Umatilla County relied upon the disclaimer and contended 
Lawson was an at-will employee with no protected property 
right. The court held that the disclaimer was an "unambiguous 
statement that the general at-will status of county employees 
established by [statute] shall not be altered by the provisions" 
of the policy manual. Id. at 693. 4 The court found that the 
handbook provision stating "(n]o pemtanent employee shall 
be disciplined except for violation of established rules and 
regulations," taken together with the disclaimer and Oregon 
state law, did not give the employee a property interest in 
continued employment. In so holding, the court noted that a 
handbook disclaimer can retain the employee's at-will status 
even when employment policies provide specific reasons for 
termination and for an appeal process. Id. 
*6 Recently, this Court had an opportunity to apply Lawson 
to claims brought by a Power County Sheriffs deputy 
upon his termination from employment. Power County's 
policy manual is strikingly similar to Valley County's Policy 
Manual. See Harms v. Power County, Case No. 4:11-cv-
5 00111-EJL...CWD, Mem. Order (Mar. 4, 2013) (Dkt.35). 
In fact, the contract disclaimer language in Power County's 
manual is similar to the disclaimer in Valley County's 
Policy Manual. Harms, Mem. Order at 13. Power County 
moved for summary judgment on Harms's constitutional 
claims brought under Section 1983, 6 arguing the language 
in its policy manual preserved Hanns's at-wiU status and 
he had no constitutionally protected property interest in 
continued employment, despite a provision requiring cause 
for termination of employment. 
The Court in Harms discussed the manual's provisions 
regarding workplace conduct as well as its disciplinary 
penalties, finding that the provisions were not all-inclusive 
and subject to change at any time. Because of the unlimited 
discretion retained by Power County, the Court found that 
the manual could not be read to create a protected property 
interest. Harms, Mem. Order at 24. Second, the Court 
held that, under Lawson, the manual's provisions regarding 
dismissal except for cause failed to create a property interest 
when construed in conjunction with the disclaimer. Hanns, 
Mem. Order at 24-26. But, importantly, Harms signed an 
acknowledgment form that stated he "understood and agreed" 
that the handbook was not an employment contract or a 
guarantee of any particular length or temt of employment, 
that he was an "employee at-will," and that the list of 
rules contained in the handbook were "illustrative and not 
all inclusive." As a result, the Court held that it was not 
just the contractual disclaimer, but also the discretionary 
language of the manual, and the receipt and acknowledgment 
fomt "under which Plaintiff unequivocally renounced a right 
to anything other than at-will employment," that together 
precluded Harms from claiming a property interest in 
continued employment. Harms, Mem. Order at 26 and n. 9 
(Dkt.35.) 7 
The Court concludes that the facts in Lawson and Harms are 
distinguishable from the facts before the Court in this matter, 
and that the Policy Manual disclaimer did not preserve the at-
will status of Brown's employment as a matter of law. Here, 
the Policy Manual mentions an employee is at-will during 
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the introductory period. After the 90 day introductory period, 
there is no mention of an employee retaining the at-will 
moniker. Instead, employees are told that Valley County's 
policy requires "cause related to performance of their job 
duties or other violations of this policy" before an adverse 
employment action may be taken against an employee. The 
paragraph requiring cause begins with the phrase: "Except 
as otherwise provided in this paragraph." The paragraph 
does not say "except as otherwise provided in this Policy 
Manual," but rather is confined to that paragraph. Thus, 
the "for cause" paragraph stands alone, without reference 
to any other portion of the Policy Manual, and therefore 
excludes any cross-reference to the disclaimer language or 
any other provision of the Policy Manual. The reference to 
the employee's duty to prove that the factual basis for the 
personnel action is incorrect does not change the requirement 
that adverse employment actions require cause related to job 
performance or violation of policy. 
*7 Another important difference between this case and 
both Lawson and Harms is the lack of an emphatic 
at-will acknowledgement. Although Brown signed an 
acknowledgement and receipt form, it simply reiterated that 
the Policy Manual was "not a contract and cannot create 
a contract," and that Brown was obligated to perform his 
job duties in conformance with the provisions of the Policy 
Manual. There was no acknowledgment like the one Harms 
signed. which unequivocally stated Harms was employed 
"at-will." Nowhere in the Policy Manual, other than in the 
paragraph discussing the introductory period, does it say 
employees could be discharged for any reason or at any time, 
without cause. And while Oregon codifies the at-will status of 
its county employees in a state statute, Idaho does not. Rather, 
Idaho case law has developed to hold that an employee is 
presumed to be at-will, but that presumption may be rebutted 
by express or implied contract. Bollinger, 212 P 3d at 1269. 
Lastly, although the Valley County Policy Manual includes 
expectations of performance and rules regarding workplace 
conduct that are not all inclusive and that may be changed 
at any time, such facts, together with the disclaimer, 
were not the only deciding factors in Harms for finding 
Harms's employment was at-will. Rather, the Court was clear 
that it was the three-part combination of the discretionary 
disciplinary policies, the contract disclaimer, and the at-will 
acknowledgment which precluded a finding that Hanns had 
a protected property interest in continued employment with 
Power County, despite the one clause stating Harms could 
be discharged only for cause. Here, the stool is missing a 
leg. Other than during the ninety day introductory period, the 
Policy Manual did not unequivocally state that Brown was an 
at-will employee. 
Although Valley County's policies are subject to change 
at any time and Valley County has discretion to change 
them, Brown could only be discharged for "violation of this 
policy," meaning the policies expressed in the Policy Manual. 
Further, Brown was expected to perform his job duties "in 
conformance with the provisions" of the Policy Manual. This 
leads to the reasonable inference, as Brown argued, that 
after the. ninety day introductory period employment was no 
longer "at-will" given the mandatory nature of the "for cause" 
paragraph excluding reference to any other part of the Policy 
Manual. Further, there was an express requirement that. at 
least for Brown, adherence to the policies expressed in the 
Policy Manual was mandatory. The policies cannot, on the 
one hand, be advisory and discretionary for Valley County, 
but on the other hand mandatory for Brown. 
Valley County next argues that the line of private employer 
cases cited in and relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P .3d 1263, 
1269 (Idaho 2012) support its argument that Brown retained 
his at-will status. The long-standing rule is that employment 
in Idaho is presumed to be at-will unless the employee is hired 
pursuant to a contract that states a fixed term or limits the 
reasons for discharge. Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1269. 8 Valley 
County argues its disclaimer, which disavowed the creation of 
a contract of employment, results in Brown's inability to rely 
upon the Policy Manual to create a contractual right rebutting 
the at-will presumption. Put another way, without a contract, 
or a contractual right that rebuts the at-will presumption, 
Valley County argues the Policy Manual is simply general 
policy that neither binds Valley County nor constitutes part 
of the employment agreement. 
*8 But Valley County's argument suffers from a fatal 
flaw. In essence, Valley County argues Idaho law requires 
a contractual right upon which the employee must rely 
to rebut the at-will presumption. Yet Bollinger and its 
predecessors recognized that, in the absence of an express 
contract, a limitation to the at-will employment presumption 
may be implied where the circumstances surrounding the 
employment relationship could cause a reasonable person to 
conclude that the parties intended a limitation on discharge. 
Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1269. Statements made and policies 
promulgated by the employer, whether in an employment 
manual or otherwise, may give rise to such an implied-in-fact 
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agreement Id. In other words, an express contract or contract 
right does not preclude a finding that the at-will presumption 
has been overcome. See, e.g., Ray v. Nampa School District, 
814 P .2d 17, 20 (Idaho 1991 ) (finding verbal statements 
together with an employee handbook created a factual issue 
of whether an implied employment contract existed); Parker 
v. Boise Te/co Federal Credit Union, 923 P.2d 493, 496-
97 (Idaho Ct.App.I 996) (finding that the lack of a written 
agreement did not mean there was no contract of employment; 
an employment contract exists by virtue of the employment 
relationship itself, of which the manual may be a part). 
The absence of a contract, although relevant, is not 
dispositive of Brown's procedural due process claim. Perry 
v. Sindennann, 408 U.S. 593,599 (1972); see also Hanns, 
Mem. Order at 17 (stating that the absence of a contractual 
right to continued employment does not necessarily lead to 
a finding that the employee lacked a property interest in 
continued employment). The United States Supreme Court 
in Perry explained that the concept of" 'property' denotes a 
broad range of interests that are secured by existing rules or 
understandings. A person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' 
interest for due process purposes if there are such rules 
or mutually explicit understandings that support h is claim 
of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a 
hearing." Perry, 408 U.S. at 601 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 
577). 
Stated another way. the lack of an express contract, which 
Brown concedes is disclaimed by the Policy Manual, does 
not determine the outcome of Brown's due process claim; 
but the Policy Manual is relevant for determining whether 
Brown may claim a property right in continued employment. 
See Sommer v. Elmore County, No. 1:1 l-<:v--00291-REB, 
2012 WL 4523449 (Dldaho Sept. 30, 2012) 9 (expressly 
recognizing that Elmore County's policy manual was not a 
contract, but relying upon its language to detennine whether 
the plaintiffs due process claim was subject to dismissal); 
Cameron v .. Owyhee County, No. CV09--423--REB, 2011 
WL 2945820 (D.ldaho July 20, 2011) (finding that the 
express at-will provision stated clearly in the personnel 
handbook, not the lack of a contract, was determinative of the 
due process claim); Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 887 P2d 
1094 (Idaho CtApp.1994) (relying upon the language of the 
policy manual, not whether a contract existed, to determine 
the plaintiffs property interest claim). 
*9 Valley County's argument that its disclaimer disposes of 
Brown's due process claim also distorts the rule applicable 
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under Bollinger and its predecessors. See Metcalf. 778 P.2d 
at 746. Valley County's argument, by logical extension, 
would result in the following application of Idaho's at-will 
employment rule: "unless an employee is hired pursuant to a 
contract, then employment is at-will." But the rule requires 
reference to the employee handbook or other policy manual to 
ascertain if it either states employment is for a specified term, 
or contains limitations on an employer's ability to discharge 
an employee. 
The Court finds that, when viewed as a whole, the Valley 
County Policy Manual places limitations on the reasons 
for discharge sufficient to create a property interest in 
continued employment. Neither the contract disclaimer nor 
the discretionary nature of the Policy Manual's disciplinary 
rules are sufficient to negate the effect of the stand-alone 
provision requiring cause related to performance of job 
duties or other violations of the policy for termination. See 
Harkness, 715 P2d at 1287 (citing Maloney v .. Sheehan, 
453 F.Supp. 1131, 1141 (D.Conn.1978) ("A law establishes 
a property interest in employment if it restricts the grounds 
on which an employee may be discharged. For example, if 
discharge can only be for 'just cause,' an employee has a right 
to continued employment until there is just cause to dismiss 
him."). IO 
Valley County's contention that its disclaimer is sufficient to 
preserve the at-will employment relationship is unavailing. 
In the employment manual cases where the Idaho appellate 
courts found the at-will employment relationship preserved, 
the manuals did not just disclaim the existence of a 
contract; they also stated clearly either in the disclaimer or 
somewhere else, such as in the text of the manual or in the 
acknowledgment, that employment was at-will. Bollinger, 
272 P.3d at 1267 (manual in effect at time of discharge 
contained a provision stating that in the absence of a separate 
written contract fixing a term of employment, employees are 
at-will and may be terminated by the company at any time); 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380, 387-88 (Idaho 
2005) (manual stated that an employee could be discharged 
with or without cause and that the handbook was not part 
of the employment contract); Jones v. Micron Technology, 
Inc., 923 P.2d 486 (Idaho 1996) (employee signed a written 
agreement acknowledging his employment was not for any 
definite period and that his employment could be terminated 
without cause at any time, thereby negating anything in 
the employment manual to the contrary); Mitchell v. Zilog, 
Inc., 874 P.2d 520, 524 (Idaho 1994) (manual stated that it 
was not to be construed as a contract, and elsewhere that 
Brown v. Valley County, Not Re 
employment was at-will); Sorensen v. Comm Tel<., Inc., 799 
P.2d 70, 73-74 (Idaho 1990) (manual had both a disclaimer 
that indicated employment was at-will, and elsewhere that the 
policies did not confer any right or privilege to remain an 
employee). Here, in contrast, the lack of any express "at-will" 
language, together with the stand-alone paragraph requiring 
cause related to job performance or other violation of policy, 
rebuts the at-wiJl presumption as a matter of law. 11 
CONCLUSION 
•to For the above reasons, the Court finds as a matter 
of law that the ValJey County Policy Manual, viewed as 
a whole, is not susceptible to two otherwise reasonable 
interpretations. While the Policy Manual does state it is · 
not a contract, elsewhere in the Policy Manual, and in a 
self-contained paragraph, it states that employees past their 
introductory period could be discharged only for cause related 
to performance of job duties or other violations of the 
policies set forth in the Policy Manual. Although Valley 
County retained discretion to change the policies, Brown 
was expressly required to follow the policies stated in the 
Policy Manual. And Brown did not sign an acknowledgment 
stating he understood his employment was "at-will," nor did 
Footnotes 
the Policy Manual contain any other provision explaining 
Brown could be terminated from employment for any reason, 
or for no reason, or at any time or manner. Because the 
Policy Manual limited the reasons for which Brown could be 
discharged, Brown was not an at-will employee and had a 
protected property interest in his continued employment. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
I) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Dlct.20) 
is GRANTED. 
2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dlct.21) is 
DENIED. 
3) Defendants' Motion for Certification (Dlct.39) is DENIED. 
4) The Court will conduct a telephonic scheduling conference 
with the parties to establish new case management deadlines 
in light of the Court's Order. A separate Notice of Hearing 
will be forthcoming. 
I Steven Brown passed away on August 15, 2012, and his wife, Jayne Brown, was appointed personal representative of his estate. 
(Dkt27.) Jayne Brown was substituted as Plaintiff by the panics' stipulation. (Dkt.31.) 
2 The panics did not separately brief the due process claim asserted under the Idaho Constitution. It appears the panies agree that the 
at-will status of Brown's employment is determinative of both constitutional claims at this juncture. 
3 In Roth, the Supreme Court recognized that a public employee who may be discharged only for cause has a constitutionally protected 
property interest in his tenure and cannot be deprived of his employment without due process. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578; see also Gilbert 
v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). However, the Supreme Court held in Roth that the university professor did not have a 
property interest in re-employment for the next year, in pan because "no state statute or University nile or policy" secured his interest 
in re-employment. 408 U.S. at 578. Therefore, it stands to reason that the converse is true-a policy may establish an interest in 
re-employment or continued employment, as the case may be. 
4 Brown cites to Judge Pregerson's dissent in Lawson, wherein he disagreed with the majority and would have found that Lawson 
could only be fired for cause based upon the language of the policy manual. Judge Pregerson viewed the disclaimer as precluding 
only breach of contract claims, not due process claims. Id. at 695. The Court finds it unnecessary to resolve which side-the majority 
or the dissent-had the better reasoned view in Lawson, because it finds the facts in Lawson distinguishable, as discussed later in 
this opinion. 
5 Harms was decided after the Court conducted oral argument in this matter, but the facts and law discussed are directly applicable to 
this case, and the Court would be remiss if discussion of the decision was not included. 
6 Unlike Brown, Hanns brought additional claims against Power County for breach of employment contract, and violation of Idaho 
state law, specifically the Idaho Personnel Act. 
7 The plaintiff tiled a notice of appeal in Harms on April I, 2013. 
8 The following cases set forth the same general principle: Jenkins v. Boise Cascatk Corp .. 108 P.3d 380, 387-88 (Idaho 2005); 
Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 874 P.2d 520, 524--25 (Idaho 1994); Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 73-74 (Idaho 1990); Metcalf 
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v. fotenno1mtai11 Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 747 (Idaho 1989); Watson v. Idaho Falls Co11sol. Hosp., Im: .• 720 P.2<l 632, 635-36 {Idaho 
1986); Jones v. Micro11 Tech., Ille., 923 P.2d 486, 489-90 (Idaho Ct.App.1996). 
9 The Court decided the defendants' motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment, in the opinion c it ied herein. A motion 
for summary judgment is now pending, but has not been decided. The Court does not intend for any part of this opinion to comment 
on the facts before the Court on the motion for summary judgment in the Sommer matter. 
l O Valley County relies upon Zilog for its claim that, if the Court finds the disclaimer insufficient to negate the for-cause language, both 
motions should be denied because there is a question of fact for the jury to decide. However, the court in Zilog decided a breach of 
contract claim. In so doing, the court noted that, if an employee handbook negated an intent to create a contract, a court may conclude 
from a review of the handbook that whether the bandboolt was intended by the parties to impliedly express a term of the employment 
agreement is a question of fact. Zilog, 874 P.2d at 524. By deciding that the disclaimer negated an intent to form an employment 
contract, there was no factual issue. Id. At 525. Here, in contrast, the Court is not deciding whether there was or was not a contract, 
because this case does not involve a breach of contract claim. The Court has previously explained that the existence of a contract, 
whlle it may be relevant, is not solely determinative of a due process claim asserting a property interest in continued employment. 
11 It would have been a simple task to revise the manual and include language notifying employees they could be discharged for any 
reason, that their employment was "at-will," or that they could be discharged without cause_or any other similar language used 
by the employers in the cases cited above. See e.g., Parker, 923 P.2d at 495, 496-97(court examined revised policy manual, and 
concluded the second manual, which stated "all employment was at-will," preserved the employer's right to terminate Parker at-will). 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF 
Defendant. 
Case No. _2012-1213 
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT RE: 
Opposing Motion for Summary 
Judgment ; Admitted Requests 
For Admissions 
Cherri Nix, Plaintiff herein, being duly sworn on oath, does state: 
l. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and have personal knowledge of the facts set 
for herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are Plaintiff's First Interrogatories, Request for Production of 
Documents and First Request for Admissions. 
3. Exhibit A was served on the Attorneys for Elmore County on June 17, 2013. A true 
copy of the fax transmission confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. That Defendant did not file a response, answer or objection to the Requests for Admissions 
as contained in Exhibit A, within 30 days after service of the Request for Admissions; that as 
of this date, no such response, objection or answer has been filed. 
5. That as per I.R.C.P. 36 (a), all the Requests for Admissions are ADMITTED for all 
purposes in this cause and action. 
6 . That the Admitted Requests for Admissions established law and facts 





sufficient to deny the Motion for Summary Judgment filed herein and enter 
judgment for me on all issues of liability. 
7. Admissions are the following: 
ADMISSIONS TO BE READ TO THE JURY 
1. Plaintiff did not sign any document approved and authorized by the Elmore County 
Commissioners, stating that she understood and/or agreed that the Elmore County Policy 
Manual was not a guarantee of any particular length or term of employment. 
2. Only an appointed, elected official of Elmore County or a politic body of such elected 
officials, has the authority to change or alter any provision of the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy. 
3. Only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to provide an interpretation of 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy in the event any provision thereof is deemed to be 
ambiguous. 
4. The Elmore County Commissioners did not by any specific ruling, decision or order state 
prior to June 2012 that Plaintiff was at the time of her termination on probation in accordance 
with that section of the ECPP entitled "Employee Classification, compensation and Benefits", 
sub-section B. Probationary Period . 
5. Elmore County's Personnel Policy can be changed only after notifying elected officials and 
at the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. 
6. Neither Mr. Vence Parsons or any other supervisor of Plaintiff notified in writing, any 
elected official of Elmore County of any Elmore County personnel of a policy change 
regarding Plaintiff, prior to her termination of employment. 
7. The Elmore County Personnel Policy places limitations on the reasons an employee may be 
discharged and terminated. 
8. The Elmore County Personnel Policy contains all of the causes related to performance of 
job duties or other violations of the policy as grounds for termination , adopted or ordered by 
the Elmore County Commissioners prior to the Plaintiff's termination. 
9. The Elmore County Personnel Policy does not state that it is not part of any type of 
employment contract. 







11. Plaintiff did not sign any agreement between her and the Elmore County Commissioners 
specifically stating that her employment could be tenninated without cause at any time. 
12. No supervisor of Plaintiff had vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from that of 
a full-time employee. 
13. The Elmore County Personnel Policy is the only policy document of Elmore County 
stating the reasons for which Plaintiff could be terminated and/or discharged. 
14. No employee of Elmore County has in the past twenty years 
been tenninated and/or discharged for any reason other than those stated in the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy . 
15. The Elmore County Personnel Policy does not state in any provision thereof, that 
employees may be tenninated without cause. 
16. The Elmore County Personnel Policy does not state that employees may be terminated at 
any time for reasons not stated in that document. 
17. Plaintiff had a property interest in her employment regardless of any contractual right 
created by the Elmore County Personnel Policy . 
18.It is the contention of Elmore County in this case that unless Plaintiff was hired pursuant to 
a contract, her employment was at-will. 
19. Prior to the month of June 2012, no elected official of Elmore County advised Plaintiff 
orally or in writing that she was an employee at-will. 
20. Plaintiff was a full time employee of Elmore County at the time of her termination. 
21. Plaintiff's probationary period ordered by her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 1, 
2012 was for a disciplinary reason. 
22. Plaintiff successfully completed her first hire probationary period one year after the 
calendar year 2007 in which she was hired. 
Cherri Nix Affidavit with Exhibits 
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23. Vence Parsons was without authority to change, modify or establish any employment 
policy of Elmore County . 
24. Only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to change the terms and 
conditions of the Elmore County Personnel Policy which must be by an express writing. 
2S. Only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to interpret the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy with respect to the reasons for employee termination. 
26. Vence Parsons had no vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from a full time 
employee as defined in the Elmore County Personnel Policy . 
27. Vence Parsons at no time between 2010 and this date, was an elected official of Elmore 
County. 
28._ Vence Parsons in 2012 was at all times relevant to this action, an employee of Elmore 
County and subject to the Elmore County Personnel Policy . 
29. The Elmore County Personnel Policy contains no statement other than in the paragraph 
discussing the introductory period of employment, that employees can be discharged for any 
reason or at any time, without cause. 
30. No employee of Elmore County including supervisors, have the authority to 
resolve for any employment issue, any express or implied ambiguity in 
The Elmore County Personnel Policy . 
31. Plaintiff was not advised of her at will status as an employee, other than by those 
notifications authored by Vence Parsons, her supervisor. 
32. Elmore County represented to the United States District Court for the District ofldaho in 
Sommer v. Elmore County, et al Case 1: 11-cv-00291-REB that: 
"The only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular and 
part-time regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before 
termination. This hearing is available to regular employees." 
33. After serving her initial first-hire probationary period, Plaintiff was a full-time employee in 
accordance with the employee classification system provided by the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy. 
34. The Elmore County Commissioners did not by an official act, change the employment 
status of Plaintiff from being a full-time employee, until date of her termination. 
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35. No act by an elected official of Elmore County changed the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy regarding the classification of employees as full-time or otherwise, between January 1, 
2013 and the date of plaintiff's tennination of employment. 
36. Employees placed on disciplinary probation as per the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
are not automatically re-classified as not being full-time employees. 
37. Full-time employees placed on disciplinary probationary status are not first-hire employees 
subject to the probationary period stated on Pages 14 and 15 of the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy. 
Dated this~ day of August, 2013. 
~-~-ffh. em 1x, amt1 erem 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Cherri Nix , being first duly sworn, deposes and states that she is the plaintiff 
named in the above-entitled action; that she has read the foregoing Affidavit and 
believes the facts therein stated to be true to the best of her knowledge. 
CERTIFICATE O SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the ~day of __ ~ 
tmdersigned attorney, sent/delivered a true and correct~ 
document, to wit: 
-
2013, the 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHERRI NIX OPPOSING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF DISCOVERY 





to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mail addressed to: 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Nix Affidavit v.,i.th Exhibits 
Elmore County 
yesJxl--. 
yes ___ .383-9516 
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E. LEE SCHLENDER 
Schlender law offices 
2700 Holly Lynn Drive 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Idaho Bar 11171 /Washington Barl33921 
208-587-1999 
leeschlender@gmail.com 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






Case No. _CV-2012-1213 
Plaintitr s First Interrogatories, 
Request for Production of Document and 
First Request for Admissions 
WILL YOU PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff herein requests Defendant above named to 
answer the following Interrogatories within thirty days from the date of service herein in 
conformance with all provisions of Rule 33 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In answering these Interrogatories, furnish all Information available to you including 
information In the possession of you and your attorneys, investigators, experts, etc., retained by 
you and your attorneys (not merely information known of 
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1\11 ~ Affidavit of August 6. 20 B 
Exhibit A, 
Plaintiffs First Interrogatories, 
Request for Production of Documents and Request for Admissions 
June 18, 2013. 
your own personal knowledge) accountants, advisors or other persons directly or indirectly 
employed by or connected with you or your attorneys and anyone else otherwise subject to your 
control. 
In answering these Interrogatories, you must make a diligent search of your records and 
of other papers and materials in your possession or available to you or your representatives. If 
an Interrogatory has subparts, answer each part separately and In full, and do not limit your 
answer to the Interrogatory as a whole. If these Interrogatories cannot be answered in full, 
answer to the extent possible, specify the reason for your lnablllty to answer the remainder, and 
state whatever information and knowledge you have regarding the unanswered portion. With 
respect to each Interrogatory, In addition to supplying the Information asked for and Identifying 
the specific documents referred to, identify and describe all documents to which you refer in 
preparing your answers. 
These Interrogatories are deemed continuing and your answers thereto must be 
supplemented, to the maximum extent authorized by law and the applicable rules, as additional 
information and knowledge becomes available or known to you. 
DEFINITIONS 
Unless otherwise Indicated, the following definitions will be applicable to these 
I nterrogatorles: 
A. "Person" means any natural person, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, 
association, governmental entity, agency, group, organization, or group of persons. 
B. The word "Document" means every writing or record of every type and 
description that is or has been in your possession, custody, or control or of which you have 
knowledge, including but not limited to emails, correspondence, memoranda, tapes, 
stenographic or handwritten notes, studies, publications, books, pamphlets, pictures, drawings 
and photographs, films, microfilms, voice recordings, maps, reports, surveys, minutes or 
statistical compilations, or any other reported or graphic material in whatever form, including 
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copies, drafts, and reproductions. "Document" also refers to any other data compilations from 
which information can be obtained, and translated, if necessary, by you through computers or 
detection devices into reasonably usable form. 
C. To "identify11 a "document" means to provide the following information irrespective 
of whether the document ls deemed privileged or subject to any claim of privilege: 
1. The title or other means of identification of each such document; 
2. The type of document (e.g., letter, memorandum, record); 
3. The date of each such document; 
4. The author of each such document; 
5. The recipient or recipients of each such document, including but not limited to, 
Defendants or anyone who purports to represent the Defendant; 
6. The present location of any and all copies of each such document in the care, 
custody, or control of Defendant; 
7. The names and current addresses of any and all persons who have custody or 
control of each such document or copies thereof; and 
8. If all copies of the document have been destroyed, the names and current addresses 
of the person or persons authorizing the destruction of the document and the date the document 
was destroyed. 
In lieu of "identifying" any document, it shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with 
these interrogatories to attach a copy of each such document to the answers hereto and 
reference said document to the particular interrogatory to which the document is responsive. 
D. To "identify" a natural person means to state that person's full name, title, or 
affiliation, and last-known address and telephone number. To "identify" a person that is a 
business, organization, or group of persons means to state the full name of such business, 
organization, or group of persons, the form of the business, organization, or group of persons 




(e.g., government agency, corporation, partnership, joint venture, etc.), and to "identify" the 
natural person who would have knowledge of the information sought by the interrogatory. 
E. "Defendant, 11 "you" or "your" refers to, without limitation Inc. Elmore County, its 
agents, employees and commissioners . 
F. Plaintiff refers to, without limitation, the named Plaintiff Cherri Nix. 
G. Complalnr refers to the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff in this action. 
H. The Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A may be referenced herein as the ECPP or other term, such 
as Employment Policy or Policy. 
ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff herein, pursuant to Rule 34 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, requests the production of documents as hereinafter described, 
at the office of the undersigned, E. Lee Schlender, counsel for Plaintiffs, within thirty days of 
service hereof. Compliance with this request may be made by mailing copies of the requested 
documents to the offices of E. Lee Schlender, 2700 Holly Lynn Drive, Mountain Home, Idaho 
83647, within the requisite time period above described. 
This request is intended to cover all documents in the possession of Defendant. or 
subject to Defendant's custody and control, whether located in Defendant's offices, or located in 
some other place. 
IN THE EVENT ANY DOCUMENT OR WRITING IS NOT PRODUCED BY REASON OF A CLAIM OF 
PRIVILEGE OR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, STATE THE EXACT BASIS OF THAT CLAIM. ALSO, 
NAMES AND ADDRESSES MAY BE REDACTED FOR PURPOSES OF CONFIDENTIALITY, AS LONG 
AS A DATE OR OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDES SUFFICIENT LANGUAGE TO DETERMINE THE 
NATURE OF THE DOCUMENT; FOR EXAMPLE, AS A TERMINATION, DISCHARGE, ETC. 
ALSO PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Requests Answers to the Request of 
Admissions contained herein, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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PLAINTIFFS FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTS 
INTERROGATORY NO. I. 
State the name of any employee of Elmore County who within ten years from date 
of this Interrogatory, was dismissed and/or terminated from employment for conduct or 
violation of any rule , other than those stated under Rules of Employee Conduct of the 
Elmore County Personnel Polley, pages 9 through 13 thereof which Policy Is attached to 
the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2. 
For each person named in Interrogatory No. 1 , state the conduct, which resulted in that 
employee being terminated and/or dismissed. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3. 
State which person or persons, if any as named In answer to Interrogatories 1 and 2 
a full-time employee of Elmore County at the time of the termination and/or dismissal. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO 1. 
Provide a copy of the final Order and/or Decision terminating and/or dismissing any person 
named in answer to Interrogatories 1 and 3. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 2. 
Provide a copy of the final Order and/or decision terminating any employee of Elmore County for 
any reason whatsoever, for the last ten years. For purposes of privacy, unless the name is one 
provided in answer to Interrogatories 1 and 3, the name of the 
terminated individual may be redacted from the document or documents of dismissal and/or 
termination. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 3. 
Provide a copy of every Rule of Conduct adopted and/or promulgated by Elmore County for its 
employees for the last ten years, other than those stated Rules of Employee Conduct of the 
Elmore County Personnel Policy, pages 9 through 13 thereof which Policy is attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
If none exists, please so state. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 
State what Rule or Rules of Conduct where relied upon by Elmore County for the termination 
and/or dismissal of any employee for the past ten years, other than those Rules of Employee 
Conduct of the Elmore County Personnel Policy, pages 9 through 13 thereof, which Policy is 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele, dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5. 
State the name of each full-time employee of Elmore County terminated and/or dismissed by the 
County in the past ten years who was not given an Appeal Hearing as provided by the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy, pages 9 through 13 thereof, which Policy is attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele, dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. pages 33 and 34 thereof. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 4. 
Provide a copy of each Order and/or Decision terminating any employee in the manner as 
described in Interrogatory No. 6 ; any full-time employee not given an Appeal 
Hearing. ? If none exists, please so state. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6. 
State the limitation on time or length of employment if any of any full-time Elmore County 
employee, as the same is stated in the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 5. 
Provide a copy of every document stating any Policy adopted by Elmore County in the past ten 
years which states a date and/or time limitation on the employment of full-time 
employees of the County, other than what may be stated expressly or implied, in 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A. If it does not exist, please so state. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7. 
State the title and office of each and every elected and/or non-elected person who for the past 
ten years has held the authority to terminate and/or dismiss any full-time employee of Elmore 
County. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8. 
State the title and office of each and every elected and/or non-elected person who for the past 
ten years has held the authority to terminate and/or dismiss any employee of Elmore County 
during the first year of their employment while they were on probationary status. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 9. 
State the names of those employees of Elmore County who while on first hire probationary 
status have been granted a pre-deprivation hearing prior to final dismissal as an employee, for 
the past ten years. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1 O. 
State if the term "employee at will" or any similar phrase is stated or used in any Personnel 
Polley of Elmore County, including the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. · 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO, 6. 
Provide a copy of each and every writing or document described or named in answer to 
Interrogatory No. 1 o. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11. 
Identify any writing of any kind, which constitutes a decision, or policy of the Elmore County 
Commissioners in the past ten years, which states a date and/or time limitation on the 
employment of full-time employees of the County. ? If It does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7. 
Provide a copy of any document or writing identified In answer to Interrogatory No. 11. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12. 
State what document considered as a policy or practice applicable to Elmore County employees 
adopted by the Elmore County Commissioners by vote and/or signature in the past ten years 
which states that any employee may be terminated and/or dismissed without cause. In 
answering this Interrogatory, if reference is made to a document believed to imply dismissal 
without cause, so identify the document and language therein. ? If it does not exist, please so 
state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8. 
Provide a copy of each document or writing identified or otherwise described in answer to 
Interrogatory No. 12. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13. 
State the name of any elected or non-elected person or political entity and/or body that Elmore 
County allows directly or indirectly, to change any term or condition of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14. 
State if any non-elected official of any department of the Elmore County government or staff, 
may terminate any employee in a specific department. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15. 
Does there exist any written policy, letter or document issued and/or adopted by the Elmore 
County Commissioners in the past ten years that states any employee of Elmore County can be 
terminated and/or dismissed for any reason other than those set forth in the Elmore County 
Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A ? 
If it does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO 9. 
Provide a copy of any document identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 15. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16. 
Does there exist any written policy, letter or document issued and/or adopted by the Elmore 
County Commissioners in the past ten years that states any employee of Elmore County can be 
terminated and/or dismissed without cause ? If it does not exist, please so state. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10. 
Provide a copy of each item identified in answer to Interrogatory No. 16. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17. 
Did the supervisor of the Plaintiff have the authority as per any law or policy of Elmore County to 
change her status from any type of employment other than full-time ? 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11. 
Provide a copy of any document stating the authority of Plaintiff's supervisor to change her 
status from that of a full-time employee, if any exists. If it does not, please so state. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 18. 
State the section and paragraph of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit 
of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A , by which the Plaintiff was placed on 
probationary status by her supervisor. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. 
State what document, writing or policy of Elmore County provided authority for the supervisor of 
Plaintiff to determine and/or establish, that her status after her initial first hire employment period 
expired, was that of an at-will employee. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12. 
Provide a copy of any item described or named in Interrogatory No. 19. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS NO. 13. 
Provide a copy of each and every document which sets forth the acts or actions of plaintiff other 
than as stated in the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, for which she could be dismissed and/or terminated. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19. 
State what section and/or provision of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, provides that probationary 
employees are "at-will employees." 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20. 
Was Plaintiff terminated and/or dismissed from employment by Elmore County without further 
pay? 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21. 
Name the page, section and paragraph of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, which was relied upon by her 
supervisor as authority to change her status from other than that of a full-time employee prior to 
her termination. 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1 
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Admit that Plaintiff did not sign any document approved and authorized by the Elmore County 
Commissioners, stating that she understood and/or agreed that the Elmore County Policy 
Manual was not a guarantee of any particular length or term of employment. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2. 
Admit that only an appointed , elected official of Elmore County or a politic body of such elected 
officials, has the authority to change or alter any provision of the Elmore County Personnel 
Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3. 
Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to provide an 
interpretation of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. in the event any provision thereof is deemed to be 
ambiguous. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4. 
Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners did not by any specific ruling , decision or order 
state prior to June 2012 that Plaintiff was at the time of her termination on probation in 
accordance with that section of the ECPP entitled "Employee Classification, compensation and 
Benefits", sub-section B. Probationary Period ; all as found on page 14 of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5. 
Admit that Elmore County's Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A , can be changed only after notifying elected officials and at the 
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6. 
Admit that no neither Mr. Vence Parsons or any other supervisor of Plaintiff notified in writing, 
any elected official of Elmore County of any Elmore County personnel policy change regarding 
Plaintiff, prior to her termination of employment. If you deny this request, provide a copy of any 
such notification. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A places limitations on the reasons an employee may be discharged 
and terminated. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains all of the causes related to performance of job duties or 
other violations of the policy as grounds for termination , adopted or ordered by the Elmore 
County Commissioners prior to the Plaintiff's termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 9. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that it is not part of any type of employment contract. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 10. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any provision thereof, that 
employees are at-will . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11. 
Admit that Plaintiff did not sign any agreement between her and the Elmore County 
Commissioners specifically stating that her employment could be terminated without cause at 
any time. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12. 
Admit that no supervisor of Plaintiff had vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from 
that of a full-time employee. If denied, provide a copy of the decision, policy or order of the 
Elmore County Commissioners granting that authority to any supervisor. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A is the only policy document of Elmore County 
stating the reasons for which Plaintiff could be terminated and/or discharged. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14. 
Admit that in no employee of Elmore County has in the past twenty years 
been terminated and/or discharged for any reason other than those stated in the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 15. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any provision thereof, that 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 16. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that employees may be terminated at any time for 
reasons not stated in that document. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 17. 
Admit that plaintiff had a property interest in her employment regardless of any contractual right 
created by the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 18. 
Admit that it is the contention of Elmore County in this case that unless Plaintiff was hired 
pursuant to a contract, her employment was at-will. 
REQUEST FOR ADMSSION NO. 19. 
Admit that prior to the month of June 2012, no elected official of Elmore County advised Plaintiff 
orally or In writing that she was an employee at-will. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20. 
Admit that plaintiff was a full time employee of Elmore County at the time of her termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21. 
Admit that plaintiff's probationary period ordered by her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 
1, 2012 was for a disciplinary reason. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22. 
Admit that plaintiff successfully completed her first hire probationary period one year after the 
calendar year 2007 in which she was hired. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23. 
Admit that Vence Parsons was without authority to change, modify or establish any employment 
policy of Elmore County . 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24. 
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Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to change the terms and 
conditions of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, which must be by an express writing. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25. 
Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to interpret the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as 
Exhibit A with respect to the reasons for employee termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26. 
Admit that Vence Parsons had no vested authority to change the status of Plaintiff from a full 
time employee as defined In the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27. 
Admit that Vence Parsons at no time between 201 o and this date, was an elected official of 
Elmore County. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28. 
Admit that Vence Parsons in 2012 was at all times relevant to this action, an employee of 
Elmore County and subject to the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 29. 
Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains no statement other than in the paragraph discussing the 
introductory period of employment, that employees can be discharged for any reason or at any 
time, without cause. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30 
Admit that no employee of Elmore County including supervisors, have the authority to 
resolve for any employment issue, any express or implied ambiguity in 
The Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 31. 
Admit that Plaintiff was not advised of her at will status as an employee, other than by those 
notifications authored by Vence Parsons, her supervisor. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 
Admit that Elmore County has represented to the United States District Court for the District of 
Idaho in Sommer v. Elmore County, et al Case 1 :11-cv-00291-REB that: 
" The only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular and part-time 
regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before termination. This 
hearing is available to regular employees." 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 33. 
Admit that after serving her initial first-hire probationary period, Plaintiff was a full-time employee 
in accordance with the employee classification system provided by the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 34. 
Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners did not by an official act, change the employment 
status of Plaintiff from being a full-time employee, until date of her termination. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 35 
Admit that no act by an elected official of Elmore County changed the Elmore County Personnel 
Polley attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. regarding 
the classification of employees as full-time or otherwise, between 
January 1, 2013 and the date of plaintiffs termination of employment. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 36 
Admit that employees place on disciplinary probation as per the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A are not 
automatically re-classified as not being full-time employees. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 37 
Admit that full-time employees placed on disciplinary probationary status are not first-hire 
employees subject to the probationary period stated on Pages 14 and 15 of the Elmore County 
Personnel Pc;,licy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A . 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the 18 day of June, 2013, the undersigned attorney, 
senUdelivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document, to wit: 
PLAINTIFFS FIRST INTERROGATORIES, REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
AND FIRST REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
to the Attorneys for Elmore County, by the following method: 
First Class Mall addressed to: 
yes. __ 
Kirtian G. Naylor 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste 61 0 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
yes __ xx_.383-9516 
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Klrtlan 0. Naylor [)SB No. 3569) 
Bruce 1. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Ff LE['. 
2013 AUG -8 PH 3: 24 
BARBARA~)' £LE 
CLERK OF TH URT 
DEPUT 
Email: kirt@navlorhales.com; bjc@naylorhales.com; jake@naylorhales.com 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLffiCAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
NOTICE OF SERVICE RE: 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant 
to Rule 36(c)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby gives notice to all parties and 
counsel of record that Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions were served 
upon Plaintitrs counsel. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 1. 
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8/8/ 3118 PM FJI.OH1 Fax TOI 5872134 PAGE: 003 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
,.-- ,,----,; 
~~ 
~~eton, Of the Firm 
--
Attom for Defendant 
CERTJFICAII OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tho 8th day of August, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 




_ Email: leeschlender@gmail.com 
JL~ ----· 
Bruce J. Castleton 
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Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR STAY: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT I.R.C.P. 
56(f) 
Currently pending before the Court is PlaintiWs Motion for Stay: Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment I.R.C.P. 56(t). Having carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully 
advised, the Court hereby denies the PlaintiW s motion, for the reasons stated in oral argument during 
the hearing of August 5, 2013. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR STAY: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT I.R.C.P. 56(f) - 1. 
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ORDER 
IT IS SO ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion for Stay: Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment I.R.C. P. 56(f) is DENIED. 
DATED this~ of ~ , 2013. 
L~ 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l!Jt day of A~ 1 d , 2013, I caused to 
be served, by United States Mail, a true and correct copy of foregoing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Bruce J. Castleton 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Defendant's Attorney 
BARBARA STEELE 
ELMORE COUNTY CLERK'·i 1 I ,'i,1 
") 
' 
By~ eputyClerk' ' 
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Kirt1an o. Naylor [ISB No. 3569) 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attomeys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
STIPULATION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Currently pending before the Court is the parties' Stipulation for Protective Order. Having 
carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court hereby adopts the parties• 
agreement. 
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties, by and through 
their respective undersigned counsel, that, subject to the approval of tqe Court, a Protective Order 
shall issue in this action regarding the production of certain documents and information. The 
aforementioned information and documents may contain information or documentation which is 
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subject to confidentiality agreements with third parties; or it may constitute confidential and/or 
sensitive financial or personal information, and other sensitive or proprietary information. The 
parties desire that the confidential nature of all such material be protected by virtue of designating 
such material as confidential and restricting its dissemination. This Stipulation is without prejudice 
to any party moving the Court for different or additional protection for specified documents or 
categories of documents. 
DEFINmONS 
1. As used in this Stipulation, 
a. "Designating Party" means any Person who designates Material as 
Confidential Material. 
b. "Discovering Counsel" means counsel of record for a Discovering Party. 
c. "Discovering Party" means the Party to whom Material is being Provided by 
a Producing Party. 
d. "Confidential Material" means any material designated as CONFIDENTIAL 
in accordance with the terms of this Stipulation. 
e. "Material" means any document, testimony or information in any form or 
medium whatsoever, including without limitation any written or printed matter and 
electronic records provided in this action by a Party before or after the date of this 
Stipulation. 
f. "Party" means the parties to this action, their attorneys of record and their 
agents, and subpoenaed, non-parties. 
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g. "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, unincorporated 
association, governmental agency, or other business or governmental entity, whether 
a Party or not 
h. "Producing Party'' means any Person who Provides Material during the course 
of this action. 
i. "Provide" means to produce any Material, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily, whether pursuant to request or process, and whether in accordance with 
the Idaho or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise. 
CONFIDENTIAL DESIGNATION 
2. A Producing Party may designate as "CONFIDENTIAL" any material provided to 
a Party which the Producing Party in good faith believes contains or discloses any of the following: 
a. Confidential and/or sensitive personal or personnel information, personnel 
files; and 
b. Information that the Parties to this action agree is Confidential. 
3. A Producing Party shall stamp as CONFIDENTIAL all Materials which the 
Producing Party in good faith believes is entitled to protection pursuant to the standards set forth 
herein. A Producing Party may designate Confidential Material for Protection under this Stipulation 
by any of the following methods: 
a. By identifying the Material with reasonable specificity before permitting the 
Discovering Counsel to inspect it or copy it; 
b. By physically marking each page of protected Materials "CONFIDENTIAL" 
prior to Providing it to a Party; or 
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c. By identifying with specificity in writing to the Discovering Party any 
previously Provided Material which was not designated as CONFIDENTIAL prior 
to it having been Provided. For purposes of this method of designation, it will be a 
sufficiently specific identification to refer to the Bates numbers or deposition page 
numbers of previously Provided Material. Where a Producing Party designates 
previously Provided Material as Confidential Material pursuant to this subparagraph, 
the Producing Party will follow the procedures set forth in the previous subparagraph 
for designating Confidential Material. For previously Provided Material which was 
not designated as Confidential Material at the time of its being provided, this 
Stipulation shall apply to such materials beginning on the date that the Producing 
Party makes such designation. 
RESTRICTION ON USE OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 
4. Confidential Material shall not be disclosed, nor shall its contents be disclosed, to any 
person other than those described in paragraph 7 of this Stipulation and other than in accordance 
with the terms, conditions and restrictions of this Stipulation. The Parties agree that they will not 
use any Material provided in this action for any purpose other than this action. 
5. Confidential Material Provided by a Producing Party to a Discovering Party shall not 
be used by the Discovering Party or anyone other than the Producing Party, specifically including 
the persons identified in paragraph 7, for any purpose, including without limitation any personal, 
business, governmental, commercial, or litigation ( administrative or judicial) purpose, other than the 
prosecution or defense of this action. 
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6. All Confidential Material shall be kept secure by Discovering Counsel and access to 
Confidential Material shall be limited to persons authorized pursuant to paragraph 7 of this 
Stipulation. 
7. For purposes of the preparation of this action, and subject to the terms, conditions, 
and restrictions of this Stipulation, Discovering Counsel may disclose Material designated as 
CONFIDENTIAL and the contents ofMaterial designated as CONFIDENTIAL only to the following 
persons: 
a. The parties and counsel of record working on this action on behalf of any 
party and counsel's employees who are directly participating in this action, including 
counsel's partners, associates, paralegals, assistants, secretaries, and clerical staff; 
b. Court reporters and their staff; 
c. The Court and any Person employed by the Court whose duties require access 
to Confidential Material; 
d. Witnesses at depositions, pre-trial and trial proceedings, in accordance with 
the procedures set forth in paragraphs 8-11 hereof; 
e. Expert witnesses upon the expert witnesses' execution of a written 
acknowledgment to be bound by this Stipulation as provided for in the form attached 
hereto as Exhibit A; 
f. Non-party experts, consultants and investigators assisting counsel with 
respect to this action, and their secretarial, technical and clerical employees, 
including copy services, who are actively assisting in the preparation of this action, 
in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraphs 9-11 hereof; 
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g. Officers, directors and employees of the Parties who have a need to review 
Confidential Material to assist in connection with this litigation, subject to the 
limitations set forth herein; 
h. Photocopy service personnel who photocopied or assisted in the photocopying 
or delivering of documents in this litigation; 
i. Any Person identified on the face of any such Confidential Material as an 
author or recipient thereof; and 
j. Any Person who is determined to have been an author and/or previous 
recipient of the Confidential Material, but is not identified on the face thereof, 
provided there is prior testimony of actual authorship or receipt of the Confidential 
Material by such Person. 
The Parties shall make a good faith effort to limit dissemination of Confidential Material 
within these categories to Persons who have a reasonable need for access thereto. The Parties do not 
intend for this Stipulation for Protective Order to govern the court procedures relating to the 
introduction of evidence proposed to be admitted at trial, or to govern the Court's determination as 
to the admissibility of evidence at trial. Rather, the Parties agree that such procedures and questions 
of admissibility at trial will be governed by normal court procedure and applicable rules of evidence, 
with the added agreement that either party may request the Court to take certain action with respect 
to any confidential substance of any piece of evidence proposed to be admitted at trial to preserve 
the confidential nature of that substance to the extent possible. The Parties agree that the ultimate 
decision as to any such request rests with the Court. 




8. Those portions of testimony where any Confidential Material is used or inquired into 
may not be conducted in the presence of any Person(s) other than (a) the deposition witness, (b) his 
or her counsel, and ( c) Persons authorized to view such Confidential Material under paragraph 7 of 
this Stipulation. 
9. Counsel for any deponent may designate testimony or exhibits as Confidential 
Material by indicating on the record at the deposition that the testimony of the deponent or any 
exhibits to his or her testimony are to be treated as Confidential Material. Confidential information 
within the deposition transcript may be designated by underlining the portions of the pages that are 
confidential and marking such pages with the following legend: "Confidential-Subject to Protection 
Pursuant to Court Order." Counsel for any Party may designate exhibits in which that Party has a 
cognizable interest as Confidential Material by indicating on the record that such exhibits are to be 
treated as Confidential Material. Failure of counsel to designate testimony or exhibits as 
confidential, however, shall not constitute a waiver of the protected status of the testimony or 
exhibits. For purposes of this paragraph 9, this Stipulation shall be deemed "effective" on the date 
on which it has been executed by all counsel for the Parties. 
10. When Material disclosed is designated Confidential Material at the time testimony 
is given, the reporter shall separately transcribe those portions of the testimony so designated, shall 
mark the face of the transcript in accordance with paragraph 9 above, and shall maintain that portion 
of the transcript or exhibits in separate files marked to designate the confidentiality of their contents. 
For convenience, if a deposition transcript or exhibit contains repeated references to Confidential 
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Material which cannot conveniently be segregated from non-confidential material, any Party may 
request that the entire transcript or exhibit be maintained by the reporter as Confidential Material. 
USE OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL 
IN PLEADINGS AND OTHER COURT PAPERS 
11. If any Party files with the Court any pleading, interrogatory, answer, affidavit, motion, 
brief, or other paper containing, appending, summarizing, excerpting or otherwise embodying 
Confidential Material, the pleading or other paper in which the Confidential Material is embodied 
shall be filed and maintained under seal and shall not be available for public inspection. The Party 
making the filing shall be responsible for filing the pleading or other paper in a sealed envelope, with 
a cover sheet stating: 
CONFIDENTIAL - this document is subject to a 
PROTECTIVE ORDER in Nix v. Elmore County 
(Idaho Fourth Judicial District Court, Elmore County 
Case No. CV-2012-1213) and may not be examined 
or copied except by the Parties, their respective 
counsel of record, or by Court Order. 
OBJECTIONS TO DESIGNATION 
12. Any Party may at any time notify the Designating Party in writing of its contention 
that specified Material designated as Confidential Material is not properly so designated because 
such Material does not meet the standards set forth in paragraph 2 of this Stipulation. The 
Designating Party shall, within five (5) court days, meet and confer in good faith with the Party 
challenging the designation in an attempt to resolve such dispute. The Challenging Party shall have 
twenty (20) calendar days from the conclusion of the meet and confer to file a motion challenging 
the designation of the Material in question. If no motion is filed within that 20-day period, or any 
mutually agreed to extension of time, all Parties shall treat the Material as designated. If a motion 
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challenging the designation is filed, the Designating Party must show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there is good cause for the designation as Confidential Material. Pending resolution 
of any motion filed pursuant to this paragraph, all Persons bound by this Stipulation shall continue 
to treat the Material that is the subject of the motion as Confidential Material. 
RETURN QF MATERIAL 
13. Within ninety (90) calendar days after the final settlement or termination of this 
action, Discovering Counsel, and counsel for all clients receiving service of Confidential Materials 
as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, shall return or destroy (at the option and expense 
of Producing Counsel) all Materials provided by a Producing Party and all copies thereof except to 
the extent that any of the foregoing includes or reflects Discovering Counsel's work product, and 
except to the extent that such Material has been filed with a court in which proceedings related to 
this action are being conducted. In addition, with respect to any such retained work product and 
unless otherwise agreed to, at the conclusion of this action, counsel for each Party shall store in a 
secure area all work product which embodies Confidential Material, and shall not make use of such 
Material except in connection with any action arising directly out of this action, or pursuant to a 
court order for good cause shown. The obligation of this Stipulation shall survive the termination 
of this action. To the extent that Confidential Materials are, or become, known to the public through 
no fault or action of the Discovering Party, or counsel for any party receiving service of Confidential 
Materials as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, such Confidential Materials shall no 
longer be subject to the terms of this Stipulation. Upon request, counsel for each Party shall verify 
in writing that they have complied with the provisions of this paragraph. 
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SCOPE OF THIS STIPULATION 
14. Counsel agree to meet and confer concerning the details of the use and treatment of 
Confidential Material at trial so as to agree upon the measures to be employed to carry out the intent 
of this agreement. 
15. Nothing in this Stipulation shall be deemed to limit, prejudice, or waive any right of 
any Party or Person (a) to resist or compel discovery with respect to, or to seek to obtain additional 
or different protection for, Material claimed to be protected work product or privileged under Idaho 
or federal law, Material as to which the Producing Party claims a legal obligation not to disclose, or 
Material not required to be provided pursuant to federal or Idaho law; (b) to seek to modify or obtain 
relief from any aspect of this Stipulation; (c) to object to the use, relevance, or admissibility at trial 
or otherwise of any Material, whether or not designated in whole or in part as Confidential Material 
governed by this Stipulation; or ( d) otherwise to require that discovery be conducted according to 
governing laws and rules. 
16. Designation on the face of Material as Confidential Material shall have no effect on 
the authenticity or admissibility of such Material at trial. 
17. This Stipulation shall not preclude any Person from waiving the applicability of this 
Stipulation with respect to any Confidential Material Provided by that Person or using any 
Confidential Material Provided by that Person or using any Confidential Material owned by that 
Person in any manner that Person deems appropriate. 
18. This Stipulation shall not affect any contractual, statutory or other legal obligation 
or the rights of any Party or Person with respect to Confidential Material designated by that Party. 
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19. If at any time any Confidential Material protected by dus Stipulation is subpoenaed 
from the Discoverin1 Party by any Court, administntive or legislative body, or is requested by any 
other Person or entity purportina to have authority to require the productioa of such material, the 
Party to whom the subpoena or other request is directedsbaP immectiately give written notice thereof 
to the Producina Party with respect to the Confidential Material sought, and shall afford the 
Producing Party at least five (S) business days to pursue formal objections to such disclosurel. 
SUBMISSION TO COURT 
20. 1be Parties agree to submit this Stipulation to the Court for adoption u an order of 
the Court. 
21. The Parties reserve the right to seek, upon good cause, modification of this 
Stipulation by the Court. 
Dated ~/'(-£blJ 
Exh. A-Expert Witness Acknowledgment 
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EXPERT WITNESS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER 
I, _____________ acknowledgethatlhaveread the Stipulated Protective 
Order entered in this action, Nix v. Elmore County, Elmore County Case No. CV-2012-1213. I 
understand the terms of the Stipulated Protective Order, and I agree to be bound by it. I further 
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Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
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Attorneys at Law 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
ORDER RE: STIPULATION FOR 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Currently pending before the Court is the parties' Stipulation for Protective Order. Having 
carefully reviewed the record and otherwise being fully advised, the Court hereby adopts the parties' 
agreement. 




IT IS SO ORDERED that the parties' Stipulation for Protective Order is ADOPTED in full 
and this Protective Order incorporates that Stipulation and the parties are hereby ordered to abide 
byil 
DATEDthisl~~of ~ ,2013. 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th~ day of Au.~ , 2013, I caused to 
be served, by United States Mail, a true and correct copy of th ~ing upon: 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
K.irtlan 0. Naylor 
Bruce J. Castleton 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Defendant's Attorney 
BARBARA STEELE' . I) I i I 11 • 
,•1· . ' 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLmCAL 
SUBDIVISION OF TIIB STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Elmore ) 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
AFFIDA V1T OF BRUCE J. 
CASTLETON IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AND AMEND 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
I, BRUCE J. CASTLETON, having been duly sworn do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am counsel for Elmore County in the current matter, and I have personal 
knowledge as to proceedings of this matter. 
AFFIDAVIT OFBRUCEJ. CASTLETON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW AND AMEND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION - 1. 
352 ORIGINAL 
2. Plaintiff served upon Defendant, on June 17, 2013, and via fax, her First 
Interrogatories, Request for Production of Document and First Request for Admissions. 
3. Upon receiving Plaintiff's discovery requests, I calendared a deadline to 
respond to these using the date July 17, 2013, plus an additional three (3) days because the requests 
were faxed to our law offices by Plaintiff's counsel. These additional three (3) days were based on 
Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for an additional three (3) days for 
facsimile service. Upon reviewing Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Opposing Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Admitted Requests for Admission, I reviewed Rule 36(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and saw that this rule does not include service by facsimile in allowing the additional three 
(3) days. The original thirty (30) day deadline would have been July 17, 2013, however I interpreted 
the thirty-three (33) day deadline calculation as being July 20, 2013, which falling on a Saturday, 
would extend the deadline to July 22, 2013, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(a). 
4. Based on my understanding of the deadline, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Protective Order on July 22, 2013, which I believed was timely with the discovery deadline, stating 
in part that Plaintiff's requested discovery would be of unnecessary cost and effort to Defendant with 
Defendant's pending motion for summary judgment 
5. To this end, and to avoid unnecessary cost and effort to Defendant in gathering 
the discovery requested by Plaintiff, Defendant waited until the determination ofits pending motion 
for protective order before performing any more discovery. 
6. At the oral argument of the hearing on August 6, 2013, both motions were 
argued. In his argument to stay Defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel did 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRUCEJ. CASTLETON IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WlTHDRA W AJ.~D AMEND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION - 2. 
353 
not mention any untimeliness of Defendant's responses to its previously filed discovery, nor that 
Plaintiff considered the filed requests for admissions to be, in fact, admitted at that time. 
7. This Court issued an oral ruling from the bench that denied both motions, and 
so at that point, Defendant considered that its deadline to respond to Plaintiff's discovery would be 
extended to some reasonable time after this Court issued its written order denying its motion for 
protective order. 
8. On August 7, 2013, plaintiff's counsel agreed to a ten (10) day deadline to 
respond to his previously filed discovery via email. 
9. Defense counsel received Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Opposing Motion for 
Summary Judgment; Admitted Requests for Admissions, via U.S. Mail on August 7, 2013. Upon 
realizing that Plaintiff had immediately deemed the prior requests for admissions actually admitted 
under I.R.C.P. 36(a), Defendant served its Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission to 
Plaintiff on August 8, 2013 via fax and U.S. Mail. A true and accurate copy of Defendant's 
Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
I 0. Defendant served its Responses to Plaintiff's First Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Document on Plaintiff on August 19, 2013, via U.S. Mail and fax. 
Ill 
Ill 
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DATED this 23rd day of August, 2013. 
No~ Public fo~~o fltt!_ 
Restdingat £tiJjJL~ 
Commission Expires: _tli_'ffi .......... _,__ __ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of August, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy copy: 
Honorable Lynn G. Norton 
lnorton@adaweb,net: 
hfurst@elmorecount,y.ora 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiffs Attorney 




-¥ Facsimile: 587-3535 
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K.!rtlan 0. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915) 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 1474) 
NA YI.OR & HA.LBS, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Email~ Jdrt@nuJorhales.com; bic@naylorhales.com; jake@nlylorhales,com 
Attorneys for Defendant. . 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OFTBE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
CHERRI NIX, 
vs. 
ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDMSION OP TI:IB STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendant, Elmore County, by and through its attorney of 
record, the law firm of Naylor & Hales, P.C., pursuant to Rules 33, 34 and 36(c)(2) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and responds to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions as follows: 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 




Defendant has not yet completed discovery in this matter and therefore does not 
possess complete information at the present time. Defendant reserves the right to 
supplement or amend any or all of the answers/responses contained herein once it has 
had an opportunity to complete discovery regarding the matters refened to in 
Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions. 
PLAINTlli'FS FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIQN NO, 1. Admit that Plaintiff' did not sign any 
document approved and authorized by the Elmore County Commissioners, stating that she 
understood and/or agreed that the Elmore County Policy Manual was not a guarantee of any 
particular length or term of employment. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 2. Admit that only an appointed, elected official of 
Elmore County or a politic body of such elected officials, has the authority to change or alter any 
provision of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REOUESTFQRADMISSIONNQ, 3, Admit that only the Elmore County Commissioners 
have the authority to provide an interpretation of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to 
the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, in the event any provision thereof 
is deemed to be ambiguous. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4. Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners did 
not by any specific ruling, decision or order state prior to lune 2012 that Plaintift'was at the time of 
her termination on probation In accordance with that section of the ECPP entitled "Employee 
Classification, compensation and Benefits", sub-sectionB. Probationary Period; all as found on page 
14 of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit ofBarbara Steele dated March 4, 
2013 as BxhibitA. 
RESPQNSg: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 5. Admit that Elmore County's Personnel Policy 
attached to the aftldavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A, can be changed only 
after notifying elected officials and at the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6. Admit that no (sic] neither Mr. Vence Parsons or 
any other supervisor of Plaintiff notified in writing, any elected official of Elmore County of any 
Elmore County personnel policy change regarding Plaintiff, prior to her termination of employment. 
If you deny this request, provide a copy of any such notification. 
RESPQNSI: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 7. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A places limitations on 
the reasons an employee may be discharged and terminated. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
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REOUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to tho affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains all of the 
causes related to performance of job duties or other violations of the policy as grounds for 
~ination, adopted or ordered by the Elmore County Commissioners prior to tho Plaintiff's 
termination. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 9. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state that it is 
not part of any type of employment contract. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 10. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any 
provision thereof, that employees are at-will. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 11. Admit that Plaintiff did not sign any agreement 
between her and the Elmore County Commissioners specifically stating that her employment could 
be tenninated without cause at any time. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REOUESTFOR ADMISSION NO, 12. Admit that no supervisor of Plaintiff had vested 
authority to change the status ofPlaintiff ftom that of a full-time employee. If denied, provide a copy 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 
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of the decision, policy or order of the Elmore County Commissioners granting that authority to any 
supervisor, 
RESPONSE: Deny. See Affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013, Ex. A, p. 33: 
"The following actions include some but not all tho disciplinary steps which may be taken bxJhA 
syperyisor in response to personnel policy violations • • • c. Suspension with or without pay. 
d. Demotion. e. Probation. f. Dismissal." (emphasis added) 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 13. Admit that tho Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A is tho only policy 
document of Elmore County stating tho reasons for which Plaintiff' could be terminated and/or 
discharged. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 14. Admit that in no employee of Elmore County has 
in the past twenty years been terminated and/or discharged for any reason other than those stated in 
the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 
as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 36(a), Defendant at this time has made reasonable inquiry 
into the admission requested and the information known and readily available is insufficient for 
Defendant to be able to admit or deny at this time. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 15. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A does not state in any 
provision thereof, that employees may be terminated without cause. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 




REQUIST FOR ADMISSION NO, H, Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 u Exhibit A does not state that 
employees may be terminated at any time for reasons not stated in that document. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NQ, 17. Admit that plaintiff had a property interest in her 
employment regardless of any contractual right created by the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 u Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, UJ. Admit that it is the contention of Elmore County 
in this case that unless Plaintiff wu hired pursuant to a contract, her employment wu at-will. 
BESPQNSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19. Admit that prior to the month of June 2012, no 
elected official of Elmore County advised Plaintiff orally or in writing that she wu an employee 
at-will. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION No, 20. Admit that plaintift'wu a full time employee of 
Elmore County at the time of her termination. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUESTPQRADMISSIQNNQ,21. Admitthatplalntiff'sprobationaryperiodordered 
by her supervisor Vence Parsons on February 1, 2012 was for a disciplinary reason. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 




REQUEST FOR ADMISSIQN NO. 23, Admit that plalntitf successfully completed her 
first hire probationary period one year after the calendar year 2007 in which she was hired. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 23. Admit that Vence Parsons was without authority 
to change, modify or establish any employment policy of Elmore County. 
RESPQNSE: Admit only that Mr. Parsons is without authority to change, modify, or 
establish any employment policy of the Elmore County Personnel Policy. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIQN NO, 24. Admit that only the Elmore County 
Commissioners have the authority to change the terms and conditions of the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exlu'bit A, which 
must be by an express writing. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25. Admit that only the Elmore County 
Commissioners have the authority to interpret the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the 
affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A with respect to the reasons for 
employee termination. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26. Admit that Vence Parsons had no vested authority 
to change the status of Plaintiff from a full time employee as defined in the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exlu'bit A. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 




REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27. Admit that Vence Parsons at no time between 
2010 and this date, was an elected official of Elmore County. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 28. Admit that Vence Parsons in2012 was at all times 
relevant to this action, an employee of Elmore County and subject to the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 29. Admit that the Elmore County Personnel Policy 
attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A contains no statement 
other than in the paragraph discussing the introductory period of employment, that employees can 
be discharged for any reason or at any time, without cause. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 30. Admit that no employee of Elmore County 
includingsupervisors,havethe authorityto resolve for any employment issue, any express or implied 
ambiguity in The Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
REQUEST FQRADMISSIONNQ. 31. Admit that Plaintiff was not advised of her at will 
status as an employee, other than by those notifications authored by Vence Parsons, her supervisor. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 32. Admit that Elmore County has represented to the 
United States District Court for the District of Idaho in Sommer v. Elmore County, et al Caso 
1: 1 l-cv-00291-RBB that: 
"The only limitation on the at-will employment relationship is that full-time regular 
and part-time regular employees may request a pre-deprivation appeal hearing before 
termination. This hearing is available to regular employees." 
RESPONSE: Admit that statement was made in that case, but deny Plaintiff's 
characterization of the statement and use without full context. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 33. Admit that after serving her initial first-hire 
probationary period, Plaintiff was a full-time employee in accordance with the employee 
classification system provided by the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of 
Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NQ, 34, Admit that the Elmore County Commissioners 
did not by an official act, change the employment status of Plaintiff from being a full-time employee, 
until date of her termination. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO, 3S. Admit that no act by an elected official of Elmore 
County changed the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. regarding the classification of employees as full-time or 
otherwise, between January 1, 2013 and the date of plaintiffs termination of employment. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S 
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REQUEST FQB ADMISSION NQ, 3§. Admit that employees placed on disciplinary 
probation as per the Elmore Cotmty Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit ofBarbara Steele dated 
March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A are not automatically re-classified as not being full-time employees. 
RESPONSE: Admit 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NQ, 37. Admit that full-time employees placed on 
disciplinary probationary status are not first-hire employees subject to the probationary period stated 
on Pages 14 and 15 of the Elmore County Personnel Policy attached to the affidavit of Barbara Steele 
dated March 4, 2013 as Exhibit A. 
RESPONSE: Deny. 
DATED this 8th day of August, 2013. 
B • Castleton. Of ili 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTmCATE or SERVICE 
I HBRBBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of August. 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
B. Leo Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 




_ Email: leeschlender@gmail.com 
J:5:.. Fax:587-353S 
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Kirtlan 0. Naylor [ISB No. 3S69] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
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BARBARA S fE~LE 
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DEPUTY-
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Attorneys for Defendant 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLmCAL 
SUBDIVISION OF TIIB STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
WITHDRAW AL AND 
AMENDMENT OF ADMISSIONS 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b ), hereby requests the Court order withdrawal of any 
deemed admissions as alleged in Plaintifr s Affidavit RE: Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Admitted Requests for Admissions, and to allow Defendant to amend its responses pursuant to 
Defendants' s Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission to Plaintiff, dated August 8, 2013 ( as 
attached to the Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton, filed concurrently). This motion is supported by the 
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pleadings and documents on file and Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions and the Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions, filed concurrently. 
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
B J. Castleton, 0 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of August, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. Lynn G. Norton 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
~ Email: lnorton@adaweb.net; 
hfurst@eimorecounty.org 
'/... U.S. Mail 
Federal Express 
Email: leeschlender@amail.com 
L Facsimile: 587-3535 
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Jacob H. Naylor [ISB No. 8474] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLmCAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
WITHDRAW AL AND 
AMENDMENT OF ADMISSIONS 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Withdrawal and Amendment of 
Admissions pursuant to I.RC.P. Rule 36(b). 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAW AL 





Currently pending before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on 
June 25th, 2013. In opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed 
"Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment; Admitted Requests for 
Admissions," on August 6th, 2013. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Admitted Requests for 
Admissions") In this affidavit, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to respond to her Request for 
Admission, served on June 17th, 2013, within the 30 day time period required in I.R.C.P. 36(a). 
(Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Admitted Requests for Admissions, p. 1) This deadline would have been 
July 17th, 2013. (Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton In Support ofDefendant' s Motion to Withdraw and 
Amend Requests for Admission, 1 3; hereinafter, "Castleton Aft") However, defense cotmSel 
included an additional three days to the deadline for responding to these requests for admission 
based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). (Castleton Aft, 13) The 33 day deadline calculation would have 
been July 20th, 2013, which falling on a Saturday, would extend the deadline to July 22nd, 2013 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 6(a). Accordingly, Defendant filed a Motion for Protective Order on July 22nd, 
2013, which it believed was timely with the discovery deadline, stating in part that Plaintiff's 
requested discovery would incur unnecessary cost and effort to Defendant with Defendant's pending 
motion for summary judgment. (Castleton Aff., 1 4) Plaintiff had also filed a motion to stay 
Defendant's summary judgment pending discovery. 
At the oral argument of the hearing on August 6th, 2013, both motions were argued. 
(Castleton Aff., ,i 6) In his argument to stay Defendant's motion for i;ummary judgment, plaintiff's 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR WITHDRAW AL 
AND AMENDMENT OF ADMISSIONS- 2. 
370 
J 
counsel did not mention any untimeliness of Defendant's responses to its previously filed discovery, 
nor that Plaintiff considered the filed requests for admissions to be, in fact, admitted at that time. 
(Id) This would have, assumably, been relevant infonnation with respect to Defendant's motion for 
a protective order prohibiting all discovery until after resolution of the motion for summary 
judgment Regardless, this Court issued an oral ruling from the bench that denied both motions, and 
so at that point, Defendant considered that its deadline to respond to Plaintiff's discovery would 
continue to some reasonable time after this Court issued its written order denying its motion for 
protective order. (Castleton Aff., 1 7) 
On the same day as the August 6th, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff filed her Affidavit RE: Admitted 
Requests for Admissions, and effected service upon Defendants by U.S. Mail. The next day, 
plaintiff's counsel agreed to a 10 day deadline to respond to his previous discovery. (Castleton Aff., 
18) However, upon later receiving Plaintiff's Affidavit RE: Admitted Requests for Admissions on 
August 7th, 2013, and realizing that Plaintiff had deemed the prior requests for admissions actually 
admitted, Defendant served its Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission to Plaintiff on 
August 8th, 2013 via fax and U.S. Mail. (Castleton Aff., ,r 9) It is worth noting that of the 37 
requests for admission originally propounded, Defendants admitted almost two-thirds of them. (See 
Castleton Aff., Ex. A) 
Defendant now comes before this Court requesting that either the Court determine the 
requests for admission not admitted pursuant to Defendant's then pending motion for protective 
order and any reasonable extension of the discovery deadline pursuant to that pending motion, or in 
the alternative, should the Court deem Plaintiff's requests for admissions actually admitted, that it 
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exercise its discretion in allowing Defendant to withdraw those admissions and amend them pursuant 
to I.R.C.P. 36(b) with those served upon Plaintiff on August 8~ 2013. 
IL 
ARGUMENT 
The issue as to whether allow withdrawal or amendment of an admission is a matter of 
discretion. I.R.C.P. 36(b ); Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 564 (1997). In addition. there are two 
requirements as set forth in I.R.C.P. 36(b) to allow withdrawal or amendment: 1) presentation of the 
merits must be promoted, and 2) the party who obtains the admission must not be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal. Id. In the promotion of hearing the case upon its merits, when "upholding the 
admissions would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case," the first 
requirement ofl.R. C.P. 36(b) is satisfied. Id, quoting Hadley v. United States, 45 F .3d 1345, 1348 
(1995). 
The party who obtains the omissions, the Plaintiff in this instance, then has the burden to 
demonstrate prejudice from the withdrawal and/or amendment. I.R.C.P. 36(b). However, Plaintiff 
must show more than that they will now have to affirmatively prove the elements previously 
admitted. I.R.C.P. 36(b) requires that she demonstrate that the prejudice arises in the difficulty of 
proving those elements, "because of the sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions 
previously deemed admitted." Quiring, 130 Idaho at 564; quoting Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348 (further 
citations omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that the unavailability of key witness could be 
such a showing of appropriate prejudice, and cited with approval Ninth Circuit case law stating the 
general rule that a "high level of reliance on the admissions" would be required to show appropriate 
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prejudice. Id It did note, that "where the motion for withdrawal is not made until the middle of the 
trial, prejudice has been found." Id 
In Quiring, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court failed to find requisite prejudice when the request 
to have the untimely answered admissions be admitted was made on the first day of trial. Quiring, 
130 Idaho at 565. There, the party obtaining the admissions represented to the trial court that he had 
prepared his trial strategy based on the untimely responses of the opposing party. Id In its holding, 
the Supreme Court stated that prejudice was not demonstrated "due to the unavailability of key 
witnesses or any other commensurate burden." Id Additionally, in Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 
the Idaho Supreme Court also upheld the granting of a motion to "discard" unanswered admissions 
right before trial because "statements in depositions and interrogatories set out plaintiffs' positions 
which adequately denied the substance of the requests for admissions submitted by the association." 
111 Idaho 536,545 (1985). 
In the current action before this Court, to prohibit the withdrawal and amendment of these 
admissions as found in Plaintiff's affidavit would eliminate the presentation of the merits of the case. 
For example, Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 7 as admitted states, "The Elmore County 
Personnel Policy places limitations on the reasons an employee may be discharged and terminated." 
To admit this statement would automatically place the Elmore County Personnel Policy in the 
position of a binding contractual employment agreement which would indicate that Plaintiff is no 
longer an at-will employee. Thus, Defendant would not have the legal ability to end the employment 
relationship at any time without incurring liability, and any further evidence produced by Defendant 
to the contrary would be effectively futile. 
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Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 9, if admitted, is actually in direct contravention to the 
factual record as already established in this case. It would read, "The Elmore County Personnel 
Policy does not state that it is not part of any type of employment contract." When in fact, as already 
recognized by this Court, the Policy reads: 
THIS PERSONNEL POLICY IS NOT A CONTRACT. NO 
CONTRACTOFEMPLOYMENTWITHELMORECOUNTY 
WILL BEV ALID UNLESS IT IS SIGNED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PROPER PROCEDURES BY A SPEcmCALLY 
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNING 
BOARD AND UNLESS IT IS SIGNED AND CONTAINS THE 
NAME OF THE EMPLOYEE WHO WOULD BE 
BENEFITIED BY THE CONTRACT. 
(Aft'. of Barbara Steele, Ex. A, p. 7) ( emphasis in original) To allow this admission would not only 
preclude Defendant's argument that the Personnel Policy is not a contract, but would be absurd in 
the face of the established factual record. 
Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 17, as admitted, would state, "Plaintiffhad a property 
interest in her employment regardless of any contractual right created by the Elmore County 
Personnel Policy." Again, to allow this admission would indicate that Plaintiff was not an at-will 
employee without allowing Defendant an opportunity to provide any evidence to the contrary, and 
that would preclude one of Defendant's main legal defenses, as already argued during Plaintiff's 
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. Especially seeing as this "property interest," is \llldefined 
or identified, Defendant would be left without any ability to know even what kind of evidence to 
present in order to rebut this admission. 
Plaintiff's Requests for Admission Nos. 12 and 26 effectively would establish that the actions 
taken by Plaintiff's supervisor, Vence Parsons, were \lllauthorized and by extension, that Plaintiff's 
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case in that if Plaintiff's termination itself was invalid, then there would be no evidence that 
Defendant would be able to produce in order to rebut this fact. This admission is also directly in 
contravention to the Elmore County Personnel Policy, which clearly gives a supervisor the authority 
to terminate employees. (See Affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013, Ex. A, p. 33) 
Based on the previously cited requests for admission, were they admitted, there would 
effectively be no hearing of this case on the merits. Allowing admiMion without withdrawal and 
amendment would contradict the factual record, contradict the prior argument of Defendants, and 
create confusion at trial as Defendant would have somehow admitted that Plaintiff'had a ''property 
interest" in her employment, without being able to articulate or defend against that undefined 
interest. 
It is also highly unlikely that Plaintiff will be able to establish sufficient prejudice to her case 
from Defendant's withdrawal and amendment of these admissions. Primarily, Plaintiff had 
Defendant's actual responses to her Requests for Admissions just two days after filing her Affidavit 
RE: Admitted Requests for Admissions. In addition, Defendant has admitted 24 of the 37 requests, 
so these admissions would obviously not prejudice Plaintiff, and would still be applicable in the 
pending motion for summary judgment Discovery in this case is still ongoing, and so Plaintiff can 
still obtain any necessary evidence required to meet her evidentiary burden. Defendant has already 
responded to Plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for production, which seem to be further 
attempts to factually support her requests for admission. (Castleton Aft., 1 10) In other words, 
continuing discovery will allow Plaintiff to obtain the appropriate evidence she seeks in order to 
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have a jury determine the merits ofher purported requests for admissions. There is no indication that 
based on Defendant's untimely responses, that Plaintiff will be able to demonstrate prejudice from 




Based on the above argwnent, Defendant requests that this Court allow withdrawal of any 
of Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions which are deemed admitted at this time, and allow the 
amendment ofDefendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Request For Admissions, as attached to the 
Affidavit of Bruce Castleton (filed concurrently) and previously served upon Plaintiff. 
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2013. 
ru J. Castleton, QfT,,_.__..."" 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of August, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. Lynn 0. Norton 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
im Email: lnorton@adaweb,net; 
hfurst@ehnorecountv,OfJ 
..::I::. u .s. Mail 
Federal Express 
Email: Ieeschlender@iUJlail.com 
y__ Facsimile: 587-3535 
~--;>---
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submits its Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. 
In response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed "Plaintiffs 
Affidavit RE: Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment; Admitted Requests for Admissions," 
(herein after, "Plaintiffs Opp. Aff.'') on August 6, 2013. In doing so, she alleges that pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 36(a), her previously served Requests for Admissions should be deemed admitted and that, 
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n .... ,tt,,,rl Requests for Admissions established law and facts sufficient to deny the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed herein and enter judgment for me on all issues of liability." (Plaintiff"ts 
Opp. Aff., ,r 6.) As discussed more fully in Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Amend 
Admissions, filed on August 23, 2013, Defendant seeks to amend these allegedly deemed admissions 
pursuant to Idaho case law allowing the same in order to determine this case by the merits and 
because there is no prejudice to Defendant in amending these admissions. Should this motion be 
granted, there would be no issue of material fact that would preclude granting summary judgment 
to Defendant as a matter of law. However, even should these admissions remain, the majority of 
them have no consequence on the legal basis behind Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and as such, summary judgment should be granted and this case dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant's summary judgment motion argues simply that this Court has previously ruled 
that Plaintiff failed to set forth any genuine issue of material fact as to any contractual nature of her 
employment, and denied her partial summary judgment motion regarding claims of wrongful 
termination and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a matter of law as Plaintiff 
was an at-will employee. (See Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, April 15, 2013, pp. 5, 8; hereinafter"April 15, 2013 Memorandum and 
Order.") Therefore, Plaintiff's at-will employment status is a legal determination previously made 
by this Court, and is controlling in the current Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Primarily, and as argued in Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, it is important to 
note that following this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order the Plaintiff filed two motions-a 
Motion for 1.A.R. Rule 12(b) Permissive Appeal and a Motion for I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) 
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written Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, counsel stated: 
PLAINTIFF CERTIFIES THAT THERE ARE NO ISSUES OF 
FACT TO BE RAISED OR BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT 
WITH RESPECT TO THESE ISSUE [sic] AND FINDINGS UPON 
FURTHER HEARING OR TRIAL. 
(Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification, p. 2) (emphasis in original). Additionally, at oral argument on 
these motions, counsel for the Plaintiff stated multiple times that the facts upon which this Court 
relied in its Memorandum Decision are the facts of this case, and that there are no more facts for this 
Court to consider in addressing the issues of this case. Thus, Plaintiff is bound by the statements of 
counsel regarding the state of the facts of this case. See Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B. V., 148 
Idaho 89, l 09 (2009) (holding "it is generally accepted that the relationship between an attorney and 
client is one of agency in which the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent" and the client 
"is bound by counsel's actions"); Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 736-73 7 (2010) (holding "[g]enerally, 
parties are bound by the actions (and failures to act) of their attorneys"). Plaintiff should not now, 
when facing summary judgment, be able to assert further factual discovery as Defendant has relied 
on the prior statements of her counsel that the facts were established. 
Should the Court grant Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Amend Admissions, the 
remaining admissions that Defendant did admit are insufficient to withstand summary judgment. 
These admissions generally address the following: 
1. There was no written contract or document between Plaintiff and Defendant, 
or statement in the ECPP, stating that she was an at-will employee. (Request 
for Admission Nos. 1, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, and 29.) 
2. Only the Elmore County Commissioners have the authority to change the 
ECPP and that it was not changed with respect to Plaintiffs employment. 
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(Request for Admission Nos. 2, S, 6, 24, 35.) 
3. Clarification as to the statements of the Elmore County Commissioners 
regarding Plaintiff's employment status. (Request for Admission No. 4.) 
4. Clarification as to the existence of any other policy documents from 
Defendant. (Request for Admission No. 13.) 
5. Clarification as to Plaintiff's full-time probationary employment status. 
(Request for Admission Nos. 20-22, 33, 34, and 36.) 
6. Clarification as to supervisor duties. (Request for Admission Nos. 23, 27, and 
28.) 
(See Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Amend 
Requests for Admission, Ex. A.) These admissions are insufficient for Plaintiff to overcome the 
presumption that she ~as an at-will employee and, therefore, could be terminated at any time by 
Defendant. It is clear, though, that Plaintiff is attempting to manufacture an implied employment 
contract to manipulate Plaintiff's presumed at-will status to make her a for-cause employee. Plaintiff 
seems to oppose Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment through an implied argument that she 
was not an at-will employee based solely on the history and previous practices of Defendant, which 
Idaho precedent has established as legally impermissible. She also seems to argue that the ECPP was 
somehow improperly modified or interpreted, which is immaterial to her termination as an at-will 
employee as this Court has established that the ECPP is not a contractual basis for her employment. 
1. Plaintiff has Failed To Contest Defendant's Summary Jud&Dlent Re1ardin1 Her 
Claims of Violation orthe Idaho Protection of Employees Act and Public Policy 
Claims. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment argues that Plaintiff's allegations regarding a 
violation of the Idaho Protection of Employees Act was untimely pursuant to the statute of 
limitations, and that Plaintiff had failed to specify any public policy violation from her termination. 
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Plaintiff has failed to factually or legally contest these arguments. Thus, summary judgment is 
appropriate for Defendant in these uncontested allegations. 
2. Any Prior Facts Sugportin1 Historical Precedent Sugportinz Alle1ed For Cause 
Terminations are Immaterial to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judzment. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that, '·An emgloyer's custom of only 
terminatin1 emgloyees r or 100d cause is likewise not sufficient to support a claim or an implied 
contract term eliminatin1 the emgloyer's ri&ht to terminate at will," Jenkins v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 242 (2005) (emphasis added). Thus, although the allegedly deemed 
admissions would establish that "[n]o employee of Elmore County has in the past twenty years been 
terminated and/or discharged for any reason other than those stated in the Elmore County Personnel 
Policy," (Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., 1 14), this assertion does nothing to rebut the presumption that 
Plaintiff was an at-will employee of Defendant. This fact is insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment as a matter of law pursuant to firmly established Idaho law. 
In Jenkins, supra, the plaintiff in that action attempted to argue exactly what Plaintiff is 
apparently attempting to argue here: that "salaried personnel in positions similar to [the plaintiff] 
were not normally discharged without cause," and thus he was a "for cause" employee. Jenkins, 141 
Idaho at 241. The court there held that simply having a policy or procedure for terminating 
employees without cause "did not represent the idea that an employee could only be terminated for 
cause." Id at 242. In fact, the court cited to a specific policy basis for why such an interpretation 
of the Idaho at-will presumption of employment was essential: to find to the contrary would imply 
that an employer would be in a position where it would be in its self-interest to abandon its pro-
employee policies, such as indiscriminately firing employees for no cause in order to maintain its 
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employees' at-will status. Id This is why the Jenkins court made clear that "an employer may 
provide guidelines, which are necessary conditions for continued employment, and avoid havina 
them read as a guarantee for a specified term of employment or placinii limits on the reasons for 
dischame." Id (emphasis added.) As discussed previously before this Court, the ECPP is simply 
a general policy statement favoring employees. 
As this Court has previously held, Plaintiff was an at-will employee of Defendant because 
she had not presented any admissible evidence to show "~ had a contract to be employed for a 
specified time or which limits the reason( s) she may be terminated." (April 15, 2013 Memorandum 
and Order, p. 4) (emphasis added). None of Plaintiff's alleged admissions, even if considered as 
admitted, satisfy that prior deficiency. In Idaho, the presumption is that employment is at-will unless 
an employee is hired pursuant to a contract that specifies the duration of employment or limits the 
reasons for which an employee may be terminated. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 
380, 387 (Idaho 2005). Plaintiff, however, seeks to establish "for cause" status not from the 
existence of a contract to rebut the at-will presumption, but rather from the lack of a statement or rule 
from Defendant explicitly stating that she was "at-will." (See Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., 11 1, 7, 8, I 0, 11, 
13-15, 18, 19, and 31.) Her intent is to apparently show that she was an implied "for cause" 
employee simply by virtue of an alleged historical precedent for only terminating employees "for 
cause," which argument has been directly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Defendant's Personnel Policy sets forth pro-employee conditions of employment that 
generally encourage positive employee relations. The disclaimers and statements in the ECPP 
indicate that it is intended to be a general statement of policy, not a contract. Idaho precedent, along 
with this Court's own prior holding, is clear: a policy must indicate an intent that it become part of 
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employment agreement to have contractual force and to overcome the presumption of at-will 
employment. Where, as here, there is contract disclaimer language specifically negating such intent, 
the at-will presumption stands. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate for Defendant. 
3. Any Alle1ed Chance or Interpretation of the ECPP Manual is Immaterial to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judament. 
This Court has previously held as a matter oflaw that Defendant's Personnel Policy was not 
"intended to create enforceable contract rights," and that there was no material issue of fact the 
ECPP did not constitute an employment contract for Plaintiff. (April 15, 2013 Memorandum and 
Order, p. 5.) Again, Plaintiff has provided no evidence to the contrary, even with her allegedly 
deemed admissions, that would correct that prior deficiency. Based on Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., Plaintiff 
assumably will argue that her supervisor's actions in terminating her were some sort of alleged 
unauthorized change, modification, or interpretation of the ECPP. This is a moot point, however, 
because there is no preliminary contractual basis for the ECPP to have such authority. The final 
analysis, which remains unrebutted by Plaintiff's evidence in the record, is that she was an at-will 
employee without any other employment contract, and'Defendant could terminate the employment 
relationship at any time. 
Even though the ECPP is clearly without contractual authority, this Court did note in its prior 
decision that the provisions of the ECPP needed to be followed in good faith to satisfy the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (April 15, 2013 Memorandum and Order, p. 6-8.) There 
is no new evidence to rebut this Court's prior holding that Plaintiff has failed to show an issue of 
material fact exists that the Defendant breached this covenant. Regardless of Plaintiff's currently 
alleged admissions, Plaintiff has already admitted by affidavit in her prior partial Motion for 
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Summary Judgment that the Elmore County of County Commissioners ratified her placement 
on probationary status and maintaining her at-will employment status in February 2012 and 
subsequent termination through a written decision issued June 18, 2012. (Nix Affidavit Supporting 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 1 11.) In the course of that confirmation, the County 
Commissioners specifically noted that Plaintiff had probationary employee status at the time of her 
termination. (See Id, Ex. I.) They also specifically note, without qualification, that Mr. Parsons 
placed Plaintiff on probation in February 2012. (Id) As Plaintiff's own evidence already indicates 
that the Board of County Commissioners reviewed and confirmed all actions leading up to Plaintiff's 
termination, including actions of her supervisor, Mr. Parsons, it is unclear how evidence that the 
ECPP prohibits a supervisor from placing an employee on probationary status and maintaining her 
at-will status would even exist, seeing as the Board of County Commissioners themselves confirmed 
the very act of placing Plaintiff on probationary status prior to her termination, and the termination 
itself. 
Further, this Court has already held that Plaintiff's supervisor "followed the policy requiring 
notice prior to discipline which could, and did, include placing her on probationary status as set out 
on page 33 of Exhibit A to the Steele Affidavit." (April 15, 2013 Memorandum and Order, p. 8.) 
A plain reading of the ECPP, which has been previously established by this Court, states clearly that 
a supervisor has specific authority to impose discipline upon employees, including both placing 
employees on probationary status or even terminating their employment. (Affidavit of Barbara 
Steele, Ex. A, pp. 32-33.) Thus, Mr. Parsons followed the policy as written which allowed both 
placing Plaintiff on probationary status and ultimately terminating her employment. These actions 
were subsequently confirmed by the Board of County Commissioners. Thus, summary judgment 
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is appropriate Defendant because there is no evidence that Defendant deviated from the 
employment policies found in the ECPP in bad faith. 
4. Even if This Court Deems Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions to Be Admitted, 
Summary Judment is Still Appropriate for Defendant. 
Even assuming that this Court deems the requests for admissions admitted, the Plaintiff has 
still not met her burden to establish either an issue of material fact or a legal basis by which summary 
judgment is improper for Defendant. In Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., she attempts to create a new factual 
basis upon which to avoid summary judgment through her requests for admissions. However, the 
allegedly deemed admissions do not address the lack of an employment contract between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. In fact, they only further confirm that no evidence of any written contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant exists. (See Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., ,r,r 1, 11, and 18.) There is no further 
evidence presented by Plaintiff that would indicate that there is any written or implied contract 
between Plaintiff and Defendant, and so without a contract, Plaintiff remained an at-will employee 
of Defendant. 
These admissions also attempt to indicate that Mr. Parsons, as Plaintiff's supervisor, acted 
outside the authority established by the ECPP. (See Plaintiff's Opp. Aff., ,r,r 12, 23, 25-28, 30, 31.) 
However, as argued above, the plain language of the ECPP gives an employee's supervisor express 
authority to place an employee on probation or to terminate them. 
Finally, the admissions attempt to make broad and undefined legal conclusions in a desperate 
attempt to avoid summary judgment. For example, Plaintiff attempts to simply state that she "had 
a property interest in her employment regardless of any contractual right created by the Elmore 
County Personnel Policy," presumably to make Plaintiff a "for cause" employee. (Plaintiff's Opp. 
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1 17.) This conclusory statement, as an undefined, general assertion of a vague property 
interest, is an inappropriate attempt to create an issue of material fact and is insufficient to withstand 
summary judgment. See Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556 (2009). As an employee 
must have more than a "mere hope of continued employment" in order to have a property interest 
in employment in Idaho, it would follow that Plaintiff must have more than a mere conclusory 
statement as basis for some property right's existence. See Harkness v. City of Burley, 110 Idaho 
353, 356 (1986). Even more paradoxical is that Plaintiff alleges that this property interest is 
"regardless of any contractual right created by the Elmore County Personnel Policy." (Plaintiff's 
Opp.Aff.,117.) However, the only basis for any and all Plaintiff's alleged due process claims stems 
directly from the ECPP, and specifically, its mention of an appeal hearing to full-time regular 
employees. If this property interest does not come from the ECPP, it must come from "ordinance, 
or by implied contract." See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,344 (1976). There is no evidence of 
either in this case, and there is no factual basis in the record for Plaintiff's property interest, and as 
such, she cannot avoid summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Defendant Owyhee County respectfully requests this Court 
GRANT Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISS Plaintiffs Complaint in full. 
DATED this 28th day of August, 2013. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
ruce . Castleton, Of the Firm 
Attom ys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 28th day of August, 2013, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy copy: 
Honorable.Lynn G. Norton 
lnorton@adaweb.net; 
hfurst@elmorecounty.ora 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintifls Attorney 
181 Via email 
.1L U.S. Mail 
Federal Express 
Email: leeschlender@amail.com 
-1L Facsimile: 587-3535 
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ELMORE COUNTY A POLITICAL 
SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-2012-1213 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL 
AND AMENDMENT OF 
ADMISSIONS 
Defendant Elmore County, by and through its attorneys of record, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby submits its Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Withdrawal and Amendment of 
Admissions pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 36(b). 
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A. Defendant's Motion to Withdraw and Amend Admissions is TimeJI. 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b )(3), Defendant filed and served its Motion to Withdraw and Amend 
Admissions on August 23, 2013, which was 14 days before the hearing date for this motion on 
September 6, 2013. Plaintiffhas argued that this motion and its accompanying affidavit are untimely 
because it was not filed pursuant to the summary judgment deadlines found in I.R.C.P. 56. 
Plaintiff's argument is without merit. There is no Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which applies the 
deadlines found in I.R.C.P. 56 to any other motions brought before the Court. In fact, that would be 
in direct contradiction to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3), which provides deadlines for all other motions, affidavits, 
and briefing. Defendant has argued its Motion for Summary Judgment considering that this separate 
Motion to Withdraw and Amend may or may not be granted in the Court's discretion, but the Motion 
to Withdraw and Amend is not a motion for summary judgment and, therefore, the deadlines of 
I.R.C.P. 56(c) are inapplicable. 
It is also unclear from Plaintiff's argument how exactly she is applying I.R.C.P. 56 to the 
current motion. Based on the continued hearing date for the Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 6, 2013, the 28 day deadline for Defendant to submit the motion, affidavit, and supporting 
brief for its Motion for Summary Judgment was August 9, 2013. Defendant filed and served its 
initial motion and supporting brief on June 25, 2013, which was timely. Plaintiff now argues that at 
the hearing on August 6, 2013, this Court "advised that as per Rule 56(c) the responses to Request 
for Admissions and other discovery had expired with the passed deadline of28 days as per Rule 56." 
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This argument is inconsistent even with I.R.C.P. 56(c) as the deadline to be applied to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was actually August 9, 2013. 
B. u,rendant has Satisfted the Two-Pron1 Int of I,R.c.r, J6£bl to Allow 
this Court to Consider Withdrawal and Amendment of Admissions. 
Defendant has always recognized that the issue as to whether to allow withdrawal or 
amendment of an admission is a matter of discretion for this Court. I.R.C.P. 36(b); Quiring v. 
Quiring, 130 Idaho 560,564 (1997). However, when the Idaho Supreme Court has addressed this 
issue, it has stated that it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion ifit makes a decision on a motion 
to withdraw and amend admissions without analysis of the two-prong requirements in I.R. C.P. 3 6(b ). 
First Federal Savings Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Engineering, Inc., 154 Idaho 626, 636(2012). 
This rule allows withdrawal and amendment to preserve the presentation of the merits of the case 
and where there is a lack of substantial prejudice against the party who obtained the admissions Id, 
quoting Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (1995). 
While Plaintiff argues that "a deciding factor regarding withdrawal of admissions is whether 
the party simply made a mistake of time computation or a clerical error," this statement is not 
founded on any Idaho case law. In fact, while the Idaho Supreme Court has noted the reasoning or 
timing behind a failure to respond in its holdings, these have been secondary factors and the court 
has still allowed withdrawal and admissions when there has been no specific finding noted regarding 
the reasons behind the original failure to respond to the opposing party's request for admissions. 
Neither has the Idaho Supreme Court ever discussed or analyzed a "pattern of neglect and knowing 
not being diligent" as a singular, determinative factor in its holdings regarding withdrawal of 
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admissions. Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically adhered to the two-prong analysis in 
I.R.C.P. 36(b) in its analysis regarding similar motions. 
In fact, Plaintiff has cited to First Federal Savings Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel 
Engineering, Inc., supra, where the Idaho Supreme Court held it was an abuse of discretion to dem: 
a withdrawal of admission when the trial court failed to recognize and address the two-pron& factor 
test ofl.R.C.P. 36<b).1 In that case, the admission was made by plaintiff's counsel on January 22, 
2010, and the motion for withdrawal was not made until May 3, 2010, after the plaintiff had already 
been denied summary judgment twice. First Federal Savings, 154 Idaho at 635. Notwithstanding 
these facts, the Supreme Court held that not allowing the withdrawal of the admission was an abuse 
of the trial court's discretion. Id. at 63 7. It is noted that withdrawing the admission would "promote 
'the overriding policy to have issues between litigants decided on the merits."' Id at 636, quoting 
Bauscher Grain v. Nat'/ Sur. Corp., 92 Idaho 229,231 (1968). It is also noted that there was no 
claim that withdrawal of the admission would cause undue delay or additional discovery in violation 
ofa discover order. Id Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's current argwnent, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
taken a highly pennissive view on allowing the withdrawal and amendment of admissions. 
In considering the two-prong I.R.C.P. 36(b) factors, Plaintiff has not shown how the 
admission of her unanswered requests for admissions would not be detenninative of this case. In 
her memorandum, she has addressed two admissions cited by Defendant as being controlling to the 
1In this case, the admission at issue was an oral representation of counsel in open court, but 
the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the analysis was "conceptually no different from a motion 
to withdraw an admission made under Rule 36 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure," and analyzed 
the issue pursuant to I.R.C.P. 36 case law. First Federal Savings, 154 Idaho at 637. 
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merits of this case, and ignores the remainder. Via their amended responses to Plaintiff's Requests 
for Admission (Castleton Aff., Ex. A), there are 14 arne11ded responses. 
Primarily, Plaintiff argues that it would not be a controlling legal issue were Defendant to 
admit Request for Admission No. 7, which would admit that the "Elmore County Personnel Policy 
places limitations on the reasons an employee may be discharged or terminated." She appears to 
ignore long standing Idaho employment law stating that if there are contractual limitations on the 
reasons an employee may be terminated, then they are no longer a presumed at-will employee, but 
are instead a for-cause employee. See Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 108 P.3d 380,387 (Idaho 
2005). In similar manner, Request for Admission No. 8, which states . h 1t the ECPP "contains all 
causes related to performance of job duties or other violations of policy as grounds for 
termination," and Request for Admission No. 14, which states that no employ, ~ has been terminated 
for reasons other than in the ECPP, would also implicate the ECPP as an ir'lplied contractual 
limitation on an employee• s status. Therefore, if Defendant were to admit, via these ,dmissions, that 
the ECPP places limitations on the reasons an employee may be discharged or termi . ated, and that 
it contains all the causes for grounds for termination, it would be effectively allowing Plaintiff to 
avoid the presumption of at-will employment status and, as such, Plaintiff could .vgue her 
termination was facially invalid, thus negating any determination on the merits as to waet!:er her 
termination was in fact, valid. 
Likewise, were Defendant to admit Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 17, it would be 
admitting that Plaintiff had a property right in her employment. Based on long standing employment 
law, when an employee has a property right in their employment, that employee is no longer 
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presumed to be an at-will employee and is instead is for cause. See Lawson v. Umatilla County, 139 
F.3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998) (citingPortmanv. County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898,904 (9th 
Cir.1993)). Similar to the analysis above, were this admitted by Defendant, Plaintiff could then 
argue that her at-will termination was facially invalid due to her for-cause employment status and 
seek damages accordingly. 
Plaintiff's Request for Admission No. 9, would admit that the ECPP does not contain a 
disclaimer of contractual intent. Therefore, pursuant to Idaho case law, Plaintiff would be allowed 
to argue that without the disclaimer of contractual intent, the ECPP is actually an implied contractual 
provision of her employment, and that she had a contractual expectation in the policies of that 
agreement. See Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 712-13 (1994). Not only would this be 
determinative as to the status of the ECPP as an implied contractual term, but it would be in direct 
contradiction to the established factual record, as already argued. 
Plaintiff's Requests for Admission Nos. 3, 12, 25, 26, and 30 effectively would establish that 
the actions taken by Plaintiff's supervisor, Vence Parsons, were unauthorized by the ECPP, and 
would allow Plaintiff to argue her entire termination as an invalid act. To allow such an admission 
would effectively end Defendant's case in that if it were admitted that Plaintiff's termination itself 
was invalid, then there would be no evidence that Defendant would be able to produce in order to 
rebut this fact. This admission is also directly in contravention to the ECPP, which clearly gives a 
supervisor the authority to terminate employees, and does not have any provision regarding the 
interpretation of the ECPP by a supervisor. (See Affidavit of Barbara Steele dated March 4, 2013, 
Ex. A, p. 33.) 
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Again, were these requests for admission deemed admitted, the ultimate effect would be that 
Plaintiff would be considered a for-cause employee based on both the ECPP and some undefined yet 
admitted property interest, with the ECPP providing implied contractual terms to her employment 
agreement, and that her supervisor violated the ECPP in effecting her termination. Thus, there 
would be no hearing of the case on the merits of her at-will employment status, the non-contractual 
nature of the ECPP, or the validity of her termination. As argued above, this would also be in 
contradiction to the factual record already established in this case, and would lead to an inconsistent 
result for other cases regarding similar circumstances actually determined on the merits. 
In addition, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the prejudice required by I.R.C.P. 36(b) in 
order to preclude this Court from exercising its discretion in granting withdrawal and amendment 
of the admissions. Plaintiff has argued that she will be prejudiced in "the need to present evidence 
to establish all of the facts," in those admitted admissions. (Plaintiff's Memorandum: Request for 
Admissions, p. 6) The Idaho Supreme Court has already clearly established that this alone is 
insufficient to demonstrate prejudice, but that there must be some difficulty in proving these facts 
based on the high reliance on the admissions and "due to the unavailability of key witnesses or any 
other commensurate burden." Quiring, 130 Idaho at 564-65. 
Plaintiffhas also argued that "there is insufficient time to complete discovery regarding these 
issues with the trial date fast approaching and Defendant not remotely responding to outstanding 
discovery in a meaningful manner." (Plaintiff's Memorandum: Request for Admissions, p. 6.) 
Defendant does not understand how the trial date currently set in this case for December 3-6, 2013, 
is insufficient time to complete any discovery. From the date of the hearing on the Motion to 
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Withdraw and Amend Admissions, three months still remain. Initially, on August 19, 2013, 
Defendant provided its discovery responses before this Court filed the stipulated protective order on 
August 20, 2013. Therefore, its objection stating that it would supplement its response when there 
was a protective order in place was valid. Further, Defendant has already provided Plaintiff with 
most all the discovery documents requested in her First Requests for Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production. Plaintiff still has more than sufficient time to file any discovery motion she feels 
appropriate. Plaintiff has not demonstrated the prejudice required in I.R.C.P. 36(b) to preclude this 
Court from exercising its discretion in allowing withdrawal and amendment of Defendant's 
admissions. 
Plaintiff also makes the argument that to withdraw the admissions that Defendant concedes 
would waste the Court's and Plaintiff's time, therefore causing prejudice. As Defendant has also 
moved to~ the admissions, which would include the admission of those conceded, Defendant 
does not understand how allowing withdrawal and amendment of the admissions would waste any 
time or resources. Plaintiff would not be required to prove these amended admissions again because 
they are, already, admitted. 
c. Plaintiffs Cited Cases are Distineuisbable to the Current Motion. 
The majority of the cases that are cited in Plaintiff's briefing are inapplicable to Defendant's 
motion to withdraw and amend its admissions. The case that Plaintiff cites to in her support for her 
proposition that the reasoning behind a failure to respond to request for admissions is a "deciding 
factor," Deloge v. Cortez, 131 Idaho 201 (1998), is inapplicable to the current case because there the 
party seeking withdrawal had never even attempted to file a motion to withdraw and amend 
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admissions, and gave no explanation for the failure to respond and after being granted two 
extensions to file discovery responses. In other words, the trial court never had an opportunity to 
exercise its discretion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 36(b) because counsel never requested it. The Supreme 
Court noted this, in stating that the admissions were deemed admitted as a matter of law, and without 
any I.R.C.P. 36(b) motion to withdraw before them, there was no error by the district court in 
allowing them to be admitted. Id In the present case, Defendant has filed a timely motion to 
withdraw and amend its response to Plaintiff's request for admissions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 36(b). 
Contrary to Plaintiffs argument, Defendant has never alleged to this Court that its responses 
to Plaintiff's requests for admission were timely. (See Plaintiff Memorandum: Withdrawal of 
Admissions, p. 2.) Instead, Defendant stated that it believed the original motion for protective order 
was timely pursuant to its application of the three-day I.R.C.P. 6(d) extension. (Castleton Aff., 14.) 
Upon the denial of the protective order, and upon the basis that Defendant sought the protective 
order to avoid a waste of resources in having to gather and provide 10 years' worth of discovery 
evidence, it thought to have a reasonable time to respond to Plaintiff's discovery requests, which 
would have been presumably negotiated with Plaintiff's counsel after the denial of the protective 
order. However, as Plaintiffhad filed her opposition affidavit deeming those requests for admissions 
admitted on the same day as the hearing and denial of the protective order, this did not occur. 
Plaintiff's counsel did, however, allow ten days for Defendant to produce responses to other 
discovery after the denial of the protective order. In doing so, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledges that 
she provided these ten days on August 7, 2013. (Plaintiff's Memorandum: Request for Admissions, 
p. 2-3.) This would have led to a deadline of August 17, 2013, which was a Saturday. Pursuant to 
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I.R.C.P. 6(a), the discovery responses for interrogatories and requests for production provided to 
Plaintiff on August 19, 2013, the first Monday following August 17, 2013, were timely. 
Plaintiff's other cited cases are similarly distinguishable from the current action in that their 
contexts (or jurisdictions) are inapplicable to the current action, when there is substantial and direct 
controlling Idaho case law: 
• JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Eldon, 144 Conn. App. 260 (2013): The 
Connecticut Appellate Court found no error in denying plaintiff's motion for 
withdrawal and amendment of admissions when plaintiff did not move for 
withdrawal and amendment of admissions until one year after summary judgment 
was granted and thus, the merits of the case were already decided at the time of 
the motion. Also, plaintiff failed to request any sort of extension or amendment 
prior to the hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Here, 
Defendant has moved for withdrawal and amendment, and has made its motion 
prior to any determination of the merits of the case. 
• Young v. Smith, 67 So.3d 732, 740 (Miss. 2011): The Mississippi Supreme 
Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny withdrawal and 
amendment based on multiple factors, including the failure to respond to the 
original requests for admission until after summary judgment was filed and that 
the motion for withdrawal and amendment was filed seven-and-one-half years 
after the original requests were submitted. Here, Defendant has already 
submitted responses to Plaintiff and has moved to withdraw and amend the 
responses to the requests for admission, and has done so prior to a summary 
judgment determination. 
• Precision Franchising, LLC v. Gate}, 2012 WL 6161223 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 
2012): The Eastern District of Virginia District Court, through interpretation of 
F.R.C.P. 36, found that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny withdrawal and 
amendment where defendant had not only failed to file a motion to withdraw and 
amend admissions, but also found prejudice where an untimely response to the 
request for admissions allowed plaintiff to rely upon those admissions for over 
two months past an already extended deadline to respond. Additionally, the 
defendant in that case had ignored orders to compel discovery issued by the court, 
and even after being admonished by the trial court judge, filed a unsatisfactory 
response. Here, Plaintiff was served with Defendant's responses to requests for 
admission and Defendant has already moved for withdrawal and amendment of 
admissions. 
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As these cases are either factually or legally distinguishable from Defendant's current motion, 
Plaintiff's reliance on them does not sufficiently support her opposition to Defendant's motion to 
withdraw and amend. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on Defendant's argument and affidavit, Defendant renews its request that this Court 
allow withdrawal of any of Plaintiff's Requests for Admissions which are deemed admitted at this 
time, and alJow the amendment of Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's First Request For 
Admissions, as attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Castleton (filed previously) and previously served 
upon Plaintiff. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2013. 
< 
ru e J. Castleton, Of the 1 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of September, 2013, I caused to be served, by 
the method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Courtesy Copy: 
Hon. Lynn 0. Norton 
District Court Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
E. Lee Schlender 
2700 Holly Lynn Dr. 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Plaintiff's Attorney 
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